Pugwash held the second webinar of the project “Rethinking European Security” online on 11 November 2026. It covered the project’s third cluster. Experts from Russia, the Nordic countries and other European states took part in a personal capacity. The discussion followed the Chatham House Rule, so this report attributes no views to individuals. Joel Naoki Christoph (Pugwash-Carnegie Fellow for European Security) and Poul Erik Christiansen (Programme Director of Pugwash) prepared this report. Read the first webinar report.
Main findings
- Most participants argued that risk reduction should come first without waiting for the end of the war in Ukraine. Some added that it could improve the climate for ending the war. One participant doubted that much could happen before the war ends.
- Reopening military-to-military communication, both at the highest level and between regional and local commanders, drew the widest support. Several participants saw it as a modest step that both sides could take now.
- Participants saw value in revisiting lessons from the 1980s, including common security and past Pugwash work on non-offensive defence (lower concentrations of forces along the NATO-Russia border), to ease the security dilemma.
The state of arms control
Of about 70 arms control and confidence-building agreements concluded, about 30 no longer apply: parties have terminated, left or violated them. About three dozen remain legally in force but with uneven implementation. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty are defunct. The Open Skies Treaty lost most of its value when the two largest military powers withdrew. States still have the Vienna Document but make little use of it.
Participants dated the erosion to two decades ago. They drew two lessons. Arms control fails when states use it as a tool of geopolitical rivalry. It also fails when states stop adapting it to new conditions, as the failed 1999 Adaptation Agreement to the CFE Treaty showed. Participants recalled several linked sets of confidence- and security-building measures, including those in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Stockholm Document of 1986 and the successive editions of the Vienna Document (1990–2011). No agreement in force today limits conventional forces or temporary deployments near borders.
Drivers of risk
Both sides have stepped up their conventional forces along the Russia-NATO line of contact since Finland and Sweden joined NATO. The border between Russian and NATO military infrastructure now runs for 2,600 km, of which 1,272 km are new. In response to the latest NATO enlargement, Russia has re-established the Leningrad Military District. Some participants pointed to French plans to extend nuclear protection to European partners. In their view, any future talks should count French and British nuclear arsenals.
About half of Russia’s strategic submarines have their base in the Arctic. Nordic-US defence cooperation agreements, precision-strike missiles and anti-submarine capabilities are meant to strengthen regional defence. Yet they may also appear to add to US capabilities to destroy Russian nuclear forces, which would undermine crisis stability. Ukrainian strikes on Russian bomber bases and early-warning radars have weakened the taboo on attacking nuclear assets. US B-52 bombers have conducted exercises over Finnish Lapland, close to the Russian border. Norway has largely lifted its self-imposed limits on allied exercises and overflights in Finnmark. The reference line now runs at 28 degrees east instead of 24 degrees east, with further exceptions. For the first time in modern history, Norway aims to defend the whole territory of Finnmark.
In the Baltic Sea, participants saw a higher risk of incidents than in the Arctic. They cited close encounters between NATO and Russian forces, tanker incidents linked to the “shadow fleet” and drones straying into NATO territory. One participant stressed that the Baltic region includes international airspace and that media reports often exaggerate the number of intercepts there. Air defence identification zones exist to identify aircraft, so these intercepts amount to escorting.
Participants broadly agreed that Russian nuclear signalling has lowered the nuclear threshold. The latest edition of the Russian Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, approved on 19 November 2024, widened the conditions for nuclear use. Participants discussed the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus and the use of the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile with a conventional warhead against Ukraine. Because intermediate-range ballistic missiles have short flight times, leaders have little time to assess warning information. Under a launch-on-warning posture, they could order a nuclear launch by miscalculation or mistake.
Proposals raised
- Military communication. Participants proposed local hotlines between regional commands along the NATO-Russia border, including naval commands in the Baltic. Existing lines between Norway and the Russian Northern Fleet offer a basis. A new line could link Russian and Finnish officers. Others proposed resuming regular meetings between the Russian Chief of the General Staff and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The commanders of the Leningrad Military District and the relevant NATO regional command should also meet.
- A deconfliction mechanism. The 2015 US-Russian arrangement in Syria could serve as a model, with on-duty officers from both sides at contact points along the border.
- Incident prevention. Participants proposed extending the agreements on incidents at sea to states not yet party and adapting them to drones. A NATO-Russia agreement could follow the model of the 1989 Soviet-US agreement on preventing dangerous military activities. Russia and the United States could reactivate the joint centre for exchanging early-warning data and notifying of missile launches, agreed in June 2000.
- The Vienna Document. States could notify exercises near common borders and invite observers. In the longer term, they could widen the definition of forces that count towards thresholds, consider limits on exercise size and extend the document to sea areas.
- Intermediate-range missiles. One proposal called for a moratorium on all ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. Another called for a political moratorium on stationing ground-launched hypersonic systems in Europe. European states could pledge not to target Russian strategic assets with long-range strike weapons. That step could lead to reciprocal regional freezes and, later, to a new INF-type treaty that covers more than land-based systems.
- Russia could offer clearer assurances that it has no designs on Baltic territory. NATO members could do the same for Kaliningrad.
- Principles for nuclear arms control. One participant proposed trading whole systems for whole systems instead of seeking numerical parity. Wider overall ceilings could cover strategic and intermediate-range weapons, with the freedom to mix. Talks would also need to address hypersonic weapons, drones and missile defence. Limits on the number of weapons that states store and could return to service would also help.
- Conventional arms control. Participants considered a new CFE Treaty unrealistic for now. They saw more promise in new data exchange and transparency. After a lasting peace, a non-offensive defence posture could follow, with low force concentrations near the borders and greater depth inland, possibly starting between Finland and Russia. Participants recalled Pugwash’s work on non-offensive defence in the 1980s and suggested that Pugwash should revive it.
- Arctic formats. Participants proposed bringing Russia back into the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the forum of Arctic chiefs of defence. Russia has not taken part since 2014.
- Participants called for a dialogue on threat perceptions as the first step towards confidence-building. The structured dialogue of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), launched in 2016 and dormant since 2021, the Annual Security Review Conference and the military doctrine seminars offer existing formats. Longer-term ideas included a post-war peace conference in the spirit of the Helsinki process. Some also suggested a Russian proposal for a meeting in a neutral country to discuss the grievances of both sides. The Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits emerged as a possible model for the Baltic Sea, for maritime experts to examine.
Open questions for the series
- Participants disagreed on what the unilateral Russian moratorium on intermediate-range missiles covered. Some read it as a ban on all ground-launched missiles in the former INF range. Others described it as covering nuclear-armed missiles deployed in numbers and targeted at NATO states. On that view, the use of Oreshnik against Ukraine did not breach it. One participant warned that the narrower reading would change the Western debate on European long-range strike projects. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced on 4 August 2025 that Russia no longer considers itself bound by the moratorium.
- Much depends on how the war ends. A ceasefire might allow only small steps. A lasting peace agreement could open the way to bigger change in the European security order. European governments will also want the Helsinki principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention on the table.
- Participants discussed whether Washington now acts as a mediator between Europe and Russia. Russian participants described fading hopes in Moscow of restarting arms control with the current US administration.
Participants also noted that proposals such as a new Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or a new INF Treaty face resistance even among experts, so Pugwash will need to frame its ideas carefully.