Yerevan workshop on the future of European security

Thinking beyond the Ukraine war

The discussion focused on how Europe’s security order might evolve after the war in Ukraine, with repeated emphasis on the need to think beyond the immediate conflict and toward the post-war situation. Such a ‘day after tomorrow’ approach does not ignore the profound disagreements over borders, sovereignty, alliances, territory, and political legitimacy that recurred during the two days’ discussions. Rather, it seeks to frame a more productive and thoughtful set of ambitions for the project.

While this approach was widely accepted, given the very limited impact any non-governmental group could have on resolving the war, participants were regularly reminded that, under current conditions, most European states were politically unable to contemplate new arms control, confidence-building under the current situation, or even target a dialogue with Russia. Indeed, there was a strong impression that much of NATO and EU policy is being driven by more rearmament-only oriented governments, particularly in Eastern Europe, who retain a deep-seated fear of potential future Russian military escalation. The current US uncertainties also add to this instable environment. Some participants emphasised the enormous political costs of dialogue after the invasion of Ukraine and the deterioration of trust since 2014. A change of borders with violence is the biggest barrier in many European capitals and societies. Others argued that refusing dialogue would leave the most dangerous assumptions untested and would remove opportunities to manage future military risks under a changed environment.

The language of “strategic defeat” has acquired an expansive, even civilisational, meaning in Russian public discourse, framed as a threat to the State’s status and identity. In parts of Europe, avoiding Ukraine’s strategic defeat and thereby preventing Russian strategic success is treated as an essential political objective. This fundamental disconnect inevitably makes compromise more difficult. At this time, it seemed that two of three stated strategic goals for the invasion had not just failed but had been drawn to the other end of the spectrum: there has been no regime change and indeed the Zelensky government is now viewed as ‘indispensable’ to Europe; rather than disarming the Ukrainian army, it now stands as the most numerous, battle-hardened and well-resourced army in Europe. Consequently, the third strategic goal of seizing the Donbas assumes central importance for Moscow, although there is debate over the extent to which the Kremlin feels compelled to sell or defend its positions to its public. Participants did suggest that greater clarity about Moscow’s political objectives and possible acceptable end-states would be valuable, particularly because uncertainty encourages worst-case assumptions and makes de-escalation appear politically dangerous.

The debate was not necessarily between engagement and concession. Rather, it concerned whether the very limited current communication on nuclear issues, arms control, military incidents management, and crisis prevention could coexist with political disagreement and sanctions. Such perspectives focused the discussion of which risk-reduction measures to explore in future projects work, with a focus on both nuclear and conventional arms dynamics. A critical task in this vein will be to identify possible arrangements in both the nuclear and conventional realms that promote greater long-term predictability and stability for war and arms race prevention.

Helsinki: back to the future?

A rich seam of discussion focused on revisiting the Helsinki principles (1975), which had undergirded the transition out of the Cold War. Several participants stressed that such principles should not be casually discarded esp. refraining from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlements of disputes or the sovereign equality of states; at the same time, they argued that they must be accompanied by effective mechanisms to ensure their credibility. Territorial integrity, for example, cannot function as a stabilising principle if states lack confidence that borders will be respected or that violations will carry meaningful consequences. Similarly, the freedom to join alliances becomes destabilising when one side views the enlargement of alliances as a direct military threat.

The Helsinki process was therefore discussed not simply as a historical reference, but as a possible source of institutional and political lessons. One participant proposed that a high-level Helsinki Act Review Conference at a ministerial level, potentially supported by expert-level work, would be one way to reaffirm principles while allowing space to address contemporary security concerns. However, several participants expressed concern that holding on to and yearning for a past security system may not be reconcilable with a present in which the principles have been fundamentally transgressed and undermined.

The discussions exposed a deep tension between competing interpretations of the European security order. For many European and Western actors, any acceptance of forcibly revised borders in the Ukraine conflict would represent a major rupture to the established order. For Russia, however, the post-Cold War expansion of Western institutions – especially NATO and the possible integration of Ukraine – has been presented as evidence that its security interests were disregarded.

One participant further noted that future scenarios must take into account three separate but interrelated conflicts: between Ukraine and Russia, between Russia and Europe, and between Russia and the USA (which also entails accounting for China’s role in nuclear arms control and its economic interests in Europe). This discussion highlighted the role of institutions such as the OSCE, NATO, the EU, as well as the wavering transatlantic commitment of the USA to both NATO and Europe.  The OSCE was repeatedly discussed as an institution that, despite its weaknesses, should not be discarded. Its inclusive membership and historical connection to European security principles and documents make it one of the few platforms capable of incorporating Russia, Ukraine, European states, Central Asian countries, and the wider Eurasian dimension. Participants differed over whether the OSCE had failed to act effectively in previous crises, but several argued that it remains necessary as a forum for dialogue and confidence-building.

Concerns were raised that, on the current trajectory of European thinking, rearmament is an urgent priority, without due consideration of how such actions will inevitably provoke Russian counterreactions, exacerbating a spiral of fear and escalating risks. This was viewed by all participants as an undesirable and costly path, but one increasingly likely without greater policy and public attention. Several participants argued that both the policy community in Moscow and the Kremlin underestimate such a future path. The implicit signal to EU/NATO states is that they ought, at a minimum, to include Russia as a point of reference, or in the best-case scenario, as a co-equal actor, in designing a new security architecture.

The spectre of US disengagement

The future role of the United States emerged as one of the most uncertain variables. Participants noted that Washington’s involvement is heavily dependent on presidential politics, domestic priorities, and the longer-term strategic shift toward Asia. A complete USA withdrawal from European security was considered unlikely by some, but the possibility of reduced engagement or a more conditional commitment was viewed as increasingly important to analyse.

The changing internal balance of NATO was also highlighted. Eastern and Northern European states are increasingly influential in alliance discussions because their threat perceptions are immediate and politically powerful. This may produce a more capable and confident Europe, but it may also increase the number of actors able to shape escalation dynamics. A NATO in which decision-making and deterrence signals are more dispersed could be less predictable from Moscow’s perspective. Participants warned that ambiguity may strengthen deterrence in some circumstances while creating dangerous opportunities for miscalculation in others.

On this theme, participants noted that political coherence in the emerging European scene is increasingly fragmented. The logic presented was that this has already complicated – and will deepen in the future – Moscow’s understanding of the shifting balance of power and its identification of interlocutors for security dialogue. Rather than having ‘only’ Washington and Brussels, Moscow is likely to need to invest in partnerships with multiple European capitals simultaneously. Moreover, if the USA strongly disengages from Europe, there is a greater likelihood of misperceptions and escalation dynamics without prioritising strategic dialogue with European nations.

The nuclear dimension was one of the most consequential areas of debate. Participants examined the credibility of extended deterrence, the changing nuclear postures of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the implications of greater European responsibility for deterrence. Questions were raised about what would constitute a credible European nuclear signal, how allies would interpret nuclear guarantees, and whether a more autonomous European posture would reassure allies or complicate relations with Washington.

Risk factors on the horizon

The group was particularly concerned about the interaction between nuclear and conventional capabilities where the latter is much affected by the ongoing war. The acquisition of long-range conventional missiles and deep-strike systems by several European countries will pose particular challenges for Russia. A conventional attack may be interpreted as part of a broader attempt to disable strategic forces or command systems, thereby accelerating the escalation risk.

Several participants argued that current conditions require a broader definition of arms control under the changing political environment. A traditional, comprehensive agreement based on numerical parity only is unrealistic. More feasible alternatives could include asymmetrical reductions, system-by-system trade-offs, modular agreements, unilateral restraint, declaratory-policy changes, and negotiations among different combinations of states. Existing agreements and principles could be revisited and adapted rather than abandoned entirely.

There was also interest in understanding why some arms-control agreements survived periods of political tension while others collapsed. This historical analysis could help identify the political conditions necessary for future arrangements. One proposed priority was to develop a paper or research programme on what elements of previous agreements could be revived, repurposed, or incorporated into new instruments. Participants suggested that earlier Pugwash proposals on non-offensive defence might be reconsidered.