Pugwash webinar: The Nordic, Baltic and Arctic Regions as a Connected Security Domain

Pugwash held the first webinar of its Nordic series online on 21 October 2026, as part of the project “Rethinking European Security”. Experts from Russia, the Nordic countries, other European states and the United States took part in a personal capacity. Around 32 participants were present. The discussion followed the Chatham House Rule, so this report attributes no views to individuals. It sets out the main analysis and where views met or diverged. It then lists the proposals that participants put forward.

Main findings

• Participants disagreed on whether the region constitutes a single security domain. They broadly agreed that military activity in the region is rising while the channels for managing incidents have fallen away.
• Several participants saw a shared interest on both sides in preventing incidents in the Arctic from escalating. Military-to-military channels drew the widest support. Political channels are lacking.
• Nuclear and energy safety emerged as a possible low-politics entry point for cooperation between experts, even while political contacts remain frozen.

One security domain or several?

Western planning increasingly treats the region as a single space. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO extended the land border between NATO and Russia by about 1,272 km. Russia has re-established the Leningrad Military District, which links the Arctic and Baltic seas.

Some participants challenged the idea of one domain. In their view, the Arctic holds at least three theatres. The first is strategic: it covers US and Russian nuclear forces, with the Kola Peninsula at its centre. The second covers the Norwegian and Barents Seas, which form part of the wider North Atlantic theatre. The third, the eastern Arctic, sees little military activity because it lacks infrastructure. Different command structures also run the Baltic and the High North on both sides. NATO directs the North Atlantic from Norfolk and the Baltic from Brunssum. Russia separates its Northern Fleet from the Leningrad Military District.

Other participants replied that doctrine in Northern Europe and the United States already treats the Baltic and the European Arctic as one theatre. For risk reduction, the debate matters in practice: each measure needs to match the command structure of the sub-region it targets.

Drivers of militarisation

Participants described a fast change in the military geography of the North. New defence cooperation agreements give the United States access to dozens of facilities in Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, many of them further north than before. Debate on Greenland centres on missile defence, possibly including elements of Golden Dome at Pituffik. Nordic states are buying F-35 aircraft, air defence systems and long-range artillery with a limited range of about 500 km. Russia operates more than 30 new military bases in the Arctic in addition to older Soviet sites.

Several participants warned of a second missile crisis in Europe due to the vacuum left by the abandoned INF Treaty. The volatile situation sees the build-up of long-range precision missile capabilities. Some pointed to European deep-strike projects, including cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,000 km. They also cited US plans to deploy intermediate-range hypersonic missiles. One participant compared the current course to the unstable early 1980s. In the Baltic Sea, damaged undersea cables and attacks on shipping and port infrastructure add to the risk of escalation at sea.

Nordic states are also moving closer to allied nuclear planning. Norwegian F-35s have taken part in the Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise. Norway has also, in principle, joined the French forward deterrence initiative. Peacetime bans on nuclear weapons on national soil remain in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Some participants argued that these bans no longer build confidence as they did during the Cold War, because plans foresee temporary deployments in a crisis. Participants from the Nordic side described national strategies of hedging against uncertainty about the long-term US commitment to Europe. One participant argued that restraint serves both sides in the High North, because higher levels of activity draw more forces into the region.

Proposals raised

1. Military communication channels. Participants proposed a direct channel between NATO Joint Force Command Norfolk and the Russian Northern Fleet. A working line already links Norway and the Northern Fleet. Others noted that Moscow would likely prioritise channels with the United States, which carry more weight for Russian strategic forces.
2. Arctic defence formats. Several participants supported reviving the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable or a meeting of Arctic chiefs of defence, possibly with the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. One view held that a full return of the Arctic Council would need to come first.
3. Risk reduction by the Nordic states. One participant proposed that the Nordic countries apply risk reduction logic to their own regional policies. The 22 measures of the 2019 Stockholm Initiative offer a starting list, from transparency to lower alert levels.
4. Protection of nuclear installations. A participant proposed expert principles for protecting nuclear power plants, icebreaker bases, spent fuel stores and the cables that supply them, based on the IAEA’s seven pillars and five principles. The annual exchange of lists of nuclear installations between India and Pakistan since 1992 offers a precedent.
5. Nuclear legacy and monitoring. Participants suggested resuming the exchange of radiation monitoring data between Norway and Russia, halted in 2022, with independent international observers for the planned raising of sunken submarines.
6. Energy safety in Arctic communities. Floating nuclear plants, small modular reactors and microreactors raise the same safety questions across the region. Participants saw this as a natural topic for scientists while political contacts remain frozen.
7. An Arctic regime built on the Law of the Sea. Participants proposed that Pugwash examine a more comprehensive regime for the Arctic before further militarisation sets the terms. Others advised first mapping what already exists, including the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the Polar Code and the fisheries agreement for the Central Arctic Ocean.
8. A new common security commission. One participant proposed a successor to the Palme Commission of the early 1980s, made up of people who hold or have held high office. It could start as an off-the-record consultative process. Unlike during the Cold War, no group of non-aligned states now exists to act as a go-between.