Geneva meeting of the CBW Study Group on the BWC 5th Review Conference

Pugwash Meeting No. 258

14th Workshop on the Implementation of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions

Key Issues for the Fifth Review Conference 2001
18-19 November 2000, Geneva, Switzerland

by Pamela Mills and Daniel Feakes

This was the fourteenth of the current Pugwash workshop series on chemical and biological weapons (CBW), held in collaboration with the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation (HSP). Like the six preceding workshops of the series held in Geneva, it was hosted by the Swiss Pugwash Group. Financial assistance for the meeting was provided by the Swiss federal government and by the Canton of Geneva through the Swiss Pugwash Group. The meetings were held on the premises of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva. Participating by invitation were 60 people from 18 countries (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA), all of them doing so in their private capacities. The present report is the sole responsibility of its authors, who were asked by the meeting to prepare a report in consultation with the Steering Committee. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the workshop as a whole, or of the Study Group.

The workshop focused on the upcoming Fifth Review Conference of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the key issues that will be addressed at that meeting, as well as on the continuing progress of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) toward the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to strengthen and verify compliance with the BWC. There is guarded optimism that this Protocol will be completed before the Fifth Review Conference, scheduled for November-December 2001, despite the contentious issues yet to be resolved. The workshop took place immediately before the twenty-first session of the AHG, the last of the year, which met in Geneva from 20 November to 8 December.

After reports on the general status of the CBW treaties, and activities, initiatives, and new developments in the field, workshop participants devoted their discussion to the technological and political issues that deserve to be addressed by the Fifth Review Conference. These topics included scientific advances, the question of pests and vectors, the definition of hostile purposes, the status of production facilities, national implementation measures, development of consultation procedures, the continuation of confidence-building measures (CBMs), international cooperation, the ongoing work of the AHG, and other issues such as regional security considerations. Much time was spent examining scientific and technological advances and the question of overlap between the BWC and the Protocol, in regard both to membership and to substance.

Reports on International CBW Activities and Initiatives

Following the custom of previous meetings of the Study Group, the workshop opened with updates on international activities relevant to the implementation of the CBW conventions?the BWC and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

CWC: Progress in Implementation

The first report noted the progress in implementation and toward universality of the CWC and the activities of its implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

As regards universality of the CWC, the year 2000 saw nearly twice the number of new states join the Convention than in 1999. Since January, eleven states have ratified or acceded to the CWC, the treaty has entered into force for five states within the last three months?Mozambique (14 September), Kiribati (7 October), Gabon (8 October), Jamaica (8 October), and Yemen (1 November).*

Certain regions in which there are states that have not signed or have signed but not ratified were highlighted, namely, the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and Africa. Israel has signed but not ratified while Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Libya all continue to adhere to the policy of linkage between their membership in the CWC and Israel?s ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Communication between the OPCW Secretariat and North Korea continues to be difficult but with recent moves toward reconciliation on the Korean peninsula it is hoped that this situation will improve. In Africa, although a large majority of states have either ratified or signed, regional instability, differing priorities, and a lack of procedural mechanisms have been obstacles to achieving 100 per cent CWC universality on the continent.

As concerns implementation, it was reported that all states parties, excluding the five most recent members, have submitted their initial declarations. The submission by the United States of its industry declarations in April and May was also noted. However, it was also mentioned that not all states parties have complied with the obligations to submit annual reports and declarations to the OPCW.

Destruction of chemical weapons by the states parties is proceeding: destruction programs had begun in all four declared possessor states (the United States, Russia, India, and one other state party). Destruction of the US stockpile is running ahead of schedule, while in India and the other state party (which possess smaller stockpiles), destruction activities have kept in line with timelines set out in the CWC. To date, over 5,000 metric tons of agent and 1.3 million munitions have been destroyed and their destruction verified.

The problems with destruction so far have largely been encountered in Russia where a lack of financial resources and infrastructure has slowed down activities considerably. The Conference of the States Parties, meeting in its fifth session in May, extended the first of the intermediate deadlines by which Russia must destroy specified percentages of its stockpile of chemical weapons under the terms of the CWC. However, without a significant increase in effort, Russia is in danger of not meeting even those extended timelines.

A total of 61 chemical weapons production facilities in 11 states parties have been declared to the OPCW. Twenty-five of these facilities have been destroyed, while one-third of them are planned for conversion; four have already been converted and seven are currently undergoing conversion. The workshop heard that the Secretariat has carried out 850 inspections at 140 sites in 40 states parties since entry into force. The majority of this on-site activity has occurred at destruction sites; but a large number of industry inspections have also been undertaken. Besides scheduled-chemical sites, 35 missions to plant sites using unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (DOC) have been undertaken.

Problems still faced in the implementation of the CWC, in addition to the delay in Russian destruction activities, have been categorized as either unresolved issues (stemming from the Prepcom days) or pending issues (that have arisen since entry into force). Included in this group are efforts by some states parties to restrict or limit the CWC?s verification regime, particularly as it applies to industrial sites.

Discussion focused on the issue of managed access, which states parties have used more often than was envisaged when the CWC was drafted to control the level of access granted to OPCW inspectors at military and/or industrial sites. Managed access was originally conceived in order to limit the intrusion on national security posed by investigations of alleged use and challenge inspections. The workshop heard that some states parties are attempting to narrow the definition of a facility so that the OPCW inspectors can only inspect the core parts of a facility. Participants also discussed the restrictions on out-of-country sampling and analysis imposed by the United States. Some participants were worried by the precedent that this sets for other states parties and viewed such action as a de facto reservation to the Convention. The recent passage of legislation in India, on 10 May, was cited as an example of a state party placing similar limitations on the activities of the OPCW on its territory. However, others pointed out that the US restrictions still allowed samples to be taken off-site to independent laboratories within the United States where they could be analyzed either by or under the surveillance of OPCW staff.

It was also stressed to the workshop that the programs to provide international assistance and cooperation were both being implemented and under further development. Pledges of assistance from states parties, which are transparent, detailed, and compatible with the resources of other states and the Secretariat, are very much in demand. The provision of assistance, along with the passage of effective implementing legislation will be the next major challenges for the Secretariat. These two issues will be main topics on the agenda for the First CWC Review Conference, to be held in the Spring of 2003. It was also proposed that the Review Conference could assess the OPCW?s role in the prevention of chemical terrorism. Activities could include the encouragement of legal cooperation and the international coordination of domestic anti-terrorist agencies.

BWC: Work of the Ad Hoc Group

A Special Conference of the States Parties to the BWC established the AHG in 1994. The Conference mandated that the AHG finish its work at the earliest possible date and report to a further Special Conference. The presentation to the workshop expressed guarded optimism that the AHG negotiations would be completed in 2001, claiming that the Protocol was in a state of semi-set concrete. Trade-offs are expected in the coming months, but the scope for introducing completely new ideas into the text was seen as very limited. The last round of negotiations in July and August saw the removal of brackets from a large amount of Protocol text. The negotiations recently entered a new phase of work, involving numerous bilateral discussions and a division of unresolved issues into three categories: category 3 issues are those on which strong conceptual differences exist, while category 1 and 2 issues are less divisive.

Eight of the category 3 issues were listed: whether investigations will be launched using a red light or green light procedure; the necessity for randomly selected visits to all declared facilities; the setting of thresholds; modifications to Article I; control over the transfer of toxins and biological agents; establishment of a cooperation committee; the declaration of bio-defence capabilities; and clarification of the procedures to be taken with respect to undeclared facilities.

Subsequent discussion emphasized the importance of concise definitions and clear language in the text of the Protocol. However, some workshop participants were skeptical about the possibility of negotiations on the Protocol being completed in 2001.


The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), established in 1991 by Security Council Resolution 687 in order to verify Iraq?s compliance with cease-fire obligations to dismantle and destroy its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, evacuated its staff from Baghdad on 15 December 1998. A series of panel discussions, in early 1999, led to the passage of Resolution 1284 in December 1999. This resolution?from which China, France, and Russia abstained?established the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC, under the leadership of Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix, was charged with continuing the work of UNSCOM. To date, the main work of UNMOVIC has been training, since they have yet to be allowed to enter Iraq. Two training courses have been undertaken with a third planned for the Spring of 2001. These courses have addressed the historical, cultural, legal, administrative, and political issues related to WMD. One of the numerous criticisms leveled against UNSCOM was its lack of understanding of Iraqi history and the country?s societal and political structures, in addition to allegations of a lack of impartiality among the inspectors.

In its organizational structure, UNMOVIC has learnt from UNSCOM and the Security Council panels established in early 1999. Operations and planning have been separated out from analysis and assessment, and there is a separate unit dealing with information processing. In contrast to UNSCOM, the inspectors who have joined UNMOVIC are wholly employed by the UN and not contributed by individual states. It was estimated that if UNMOVIC received permission to enter Iraq, it could take action within six weeks, with minimal additional training.

Workshop participants speculated on whether Iraq is or is not in legal violation of the BWC, which it did not ratify voluntarily but was forced to do so as part of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement. Some participants also felt that the OPCW should not become involved in Iraq at present as the CWC is a voluntary agreement based on an assumption of compliance. It was also pointed out that, in theory, Resolution 1284 provides for inspections in states that are thought to be aiding Iraq in the continued development of its WMD programs.

At the workshop, it was stressed that far from the impotence ascribed to UNMOVIC by the international media, it has been assiduously preparing to carry out its mandate, and those involved believe that if Iraq allows the UNMOVIC inspectors into the country, much progress could be made in terms of monitoring to prevent reconstitution of Iraq?s WMD programs and drawing the country back into the international community.

International CBW Criminalization: HSP Initiative

The workshop was provided with an update on the HSP initiative for the international criminalization of CBW. The HSP draft convention on this matter was published in the December 1998 issue of The CBW Conventions Bulletin. The draft text of the convention would make it a crime under international law for any individual, regardless of citizenship or official position, to order, direct, or knowingly to render substantial assistance in the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of biological or chemical weapons, to threaten the use of such weapons, or to create or retain facilities intended for the production of such weapons. Any person who knowingly commits any of the prohibited acts anywhere, worldwide, would face the risk of apprehension, prosecution, and punishment if found in a state party to the proposed convention.

The HSP draft convention is modeled on recent international conventions now in force that seek to establish universal jurisdiction for such crimes as aircraft hijacking, torture, hostage taking, theft of nuclear materials, and harming internationally protected persons. These conventions, like the HSP draft convention, do not establish international tribunals but instead provide for the specified offenses to be adjudicated in national courts on the territory where the alleged offender is found or to which such person may be extradited. In contrast, the International Criminal Court, expected to be established in The Hague, can accept a case only if the state which has jurisdiction over that case is unable or fails to carry out the investigation or prosecution. As regards chemical weapons, the ICC Statute prohibits, under the category of war crimes, the employment of poison or poisoned weapons and of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices.

So far, the drafters of the HSP convention have encountered no serious objection to it from the various government officials with which whom they have held discussions. However, no government has yet taken the lead in seeking to refer the draft convention to the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN General Assembly for negotiation, to be followed by signature and ratification by states.

Education, especially of future biologists and chemists, as to the potentially deleterious uses of biology and chemistry was deemed essential. Workshop participants emphasized the need to establish a norm in the profession against offensive CBW work. The suggestion was made that perhaps professionals should be required to take a pledge similar to the Hippocratic oath for medical doctors that prohibits engaging in the development or production of CBW.

The Fifth BWC Review Conference 2001

As its main agenda item, the workshop looked at the important issues for the upcoming Fifth Review Conference of the BWC. It first examined the opportunities and challenges to be faced in the coming year. This was followed by an analysis of recent advances in science and technology and discussion on the individual articles of the BWC. The workshop concluded with a look at the work of the AHG.

The Fifth Review Conference will be an opportunity for states parties to extend their understandings of the BWC, to review any relevant new scientific and technological developments, and to address issues arising out of the Protocol negotiations in the AHG.

It was suggested that the Fifth Review Conference could address the perceived institutional deficit of the BWC. The creation of interim institutions, such as a Committee of Oversight, assisted by a Scientific Advisory Panel and a Legal Advisory Panel as well as a small secretariat, would greatly enhance the implementation of the BWC and would facilitate the resolution of bilateral and multilateral disputes while providing representation for the BWC within the UN framework. They would also ensure that the BWC received continuous care rather than the ad hoc attention paid to it every five years through the review conferences. Eventually, such institutions could be merged with the OPBW, which is to be created by the Protocol.

Past review conferences have failed to establish such institutions and preoccupation with negotiation of the Protocol may prevent the Fifth Review Conference from remedying this shortcoming. However, it would be imprudent to attach the Protocol to a weak BWC regime. One of the largest concerns raised was the overlap between the BWC?s CBMs and the declarations which will be required of states parties to the Protocol. An interim administrative body might help to facilitate measures to bring the two regimes into concert.

Advances in Science and Technology (Article I)

The workshop discussed advances in science and technology, particularly genetics, that may impact the BWC and necessitate a strengthening of its mandate. It was largely agreed that the final declaration of the Review Conference should extend the understandings of the Convention in order to facilitate current implementation and determine non-compliance as well as make future adaptation to new technologies possible.

The Fifth Review Conference is expected to reaffirm that the prohibitions contained in Article I of the BWC apply to all relevant scientific and technological developments. If necessary, the final declaration of the Conference should affirm that Article I also covers new terms such as genomics and applies to attacks on plants and animals as well as directly on human populations. It should also be affirmed that Article I applies to all vectors and means of delivery of biological agents, including insect pests.

One scientific development that is integral to the future implementation of the BWC is the increasing knowledge of bio-regulators?substances produced in the body naturally that when introduced unnaturally can cause illness and/or death and their receptor systems. One such bio-regulator, endothelin, is able powerfully to affect blood pressure. Much research has been done on endothelin since its discovery in the late 1980s. It was noted that there is a danger of such research being misused. Like all other new technologies, it is entirely possible that the current biotechnology revolution will also be exploited for hostile purposes.

Genetic manipulations, as recently exemplified by experiments with RNAi and other advances, increasingly have the ability to alter the very nature of living species. It should be recognized that all such bio-active substances and agents are covered by the general purpose criteria of the BWC, the CWC, or both. Even as they advance scientific knowledge and its beneficial applications, scientists must be aware of the deleterious potential of biotechnology

The reasons for and likely groups behind an attack on a state?s agricultural or livestock resources were outlined. National or sub-national groups may adopt such an approach as such agents may not be hazardous to the perpetrators, a lower moral barrier is crossed, there may be few technical obstacles to weaponization, and there is the possibility of mimicking naturally occurring events. Modern, industrialized agriculture is especially vulnerable to specific plant pathogens. It was argued that effective national legislation criminalizing attacks on plants and animals and affirmation by the Review Conference that such attacks are covered by the BWC are important to deterring them in the future.

It was pointed out by several workshop participants that such developments are covered by the general purpose criteria of the BWC and the CWC taken together. However, the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC should take special care to ensure that this is clearly reaffirmed.

“Hostile Purposes”

There was a discussion of what is meant by the term hostile purposes, as it appears in Article I of the BWC. It was affirmed that the term applies not only to such purposes directed by a state against another state but also to hostile purposes as may be directed by a state to populations or groups on its own territory or under its control. As an example, the production of a biological weapon by a state for use in the attack of a village within the territory or under the control of that state would be a breach of the BWC. It was also noted that, the bracketed language in the Protocol rolling text that sought to interpret the prohibitions of the BWC as being limited to hostile purposes directed by a state against another state had been removed at a previous session of the AHG.

Deriving naturally from the discussion of science and technology and of Article I, was a discussion of the status of the use of bio-control agents by one country against crops in another. The currently planned use of a biological agent (a fungus) by the United States under the United Nations International Drug Control Programme to destroy coca in Colombia , if requested by the Colombian government, could be viewed as a legitimate effort to destroy illegal crops. Yet, depending on the circumstances, the biological agent may in addition become an anti-insurgency weapon. Preparations intended for such use within a state would then be in violation of Article IV of the BWC which obligates states parties to prevent and prohibit those activities detailed in Article I.

Concern was expressed that the CWC exemption of chemical agents for law enforcement purposes could undermine the prohibitions of the BWC in relation to novel biological agents, particularly as the CWC contains no definition of the meaning of law enforcement or of what chemicals may be used for it. This stands in contrast to riot control agents, as may be used for domestic riot control and which are defined in the CWC. The view as expressed that the exemption for law enforcement can only apply when there is applicable law and only when there is appropriate jurisdiction to enforce it. This condition is met for the use of chemicals in legally administered capital punishment, as was envisaged by the negotiators of the CWC. Beyond that, however, the situation is unclear. For example, what law and what jurisdiction would apply, and what circumstances must be met, to allow national forces engaging in a United Nations peacekeeping mission to use riot control agent munitions?

Production Facilities (Article II)

A brief discussion was held on the provisions of the BWC regarding biological weapons production facilities. Article II of the BWC requires the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of … all … equipment and means of delivery… that was designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Article IV requires states parties to take measures to prohibit and prevent the development and production of such agents. But the BWC says nothing about biological weapons production facilities and, until now, the status of production facilities under the BWC has not been addressed directly. This was highlighted as a discrepancy between the BWC and CWC. The latter contains much detail on the declaration, verification, destruction, and conversion of chemical weapons production facilities. There seemed to be a broad understanding that when considering the two articles noted above and the purposes and objectives of the BWC, a way should be found for the Fifth Review Conference to affirm that former BW production facilities are to be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

National Implementation Measures (Article IV)

The key to effective implementation of the BWC is national legislation, however, unlike the CWC which requires enactment of penal legislation, the BWC simply requires state parties to take any necessary measures. There is language in the BWC Protocol to require penal legislation. The OPCW has been experimenting with innovative ways to facilitate this process, including integrating implementation of the CWC with the implementation of other regional and global treaties that regulate trade and economic growth. This approach makes it easier for smaller and less developed states to ratify global treaties such as the BWC. Penal legislation making the development or use of biological weapons a criminal act would also aid in the implementation of the BWC and would reinforce the preventive side of Article IV. The Fifth Review Conference should underscore the importance of such legislative initiatives.

Also essential for implementation are educational programs designed to increase awareness of the BWC?its prohibitions and guidelines?among citizens, governments, scientists, and non-scientists. Previous Review Conferences have emphasised this. It was noted that a Federation of American Scientists working group has suggested that wording be inserted under Article VIII Confidence-Building Measures of the Protocol that would require states parties to the Protocol to educate their citizens in areas related to the prohibition of biological weapons. This provision would help keep the public aware of the activities of their governments and would force scientists to consider the ethical consequences of their work. It was noted that beyond international treaties it is societal pressure that will prevent the future development of biological weapons.

Consultation Procedures (Article V)

The issue of consultative procedures under Article V of the BWC was taken up briefly by the workshop. It was pointed out that at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 it had been stated that twice as many states had or were seeking biological weapons than when the BWC entered into force in 1975.Workshop participants noted how such allegations, when not followed up through the procedures provided for in the BWC, can undermine the Convention. Failure to use the consultative mechanism will lead to its corrosion, which would be unacceptable since consultations contribute much to legitimacy and provide a forum for the airing of disputes. Some workshop participants supported the idea that the Fifth Review Conference should explore the overlap between Article V and the Protocol, asserting that consultations promote transparency. It was also proposed that the Conference should review the use of the consultation procedure in the case of the 1997 Thrips Palmi infestation in Cuba as this was the first occasion on which the mechanism was used.

Confidence-Building Measures

The provision requiring states parties to the BWC to submit CBMs?”measures to decrease secrecy regarding relevant biological facilities and activities in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions“?was adopted by the Second Review Conference in 1986. Since then, only 82 states parties have submitted such information, with participation peaking in 1996, and decreasing steadily in the four (nearly five) years since. The issue has remained largely untouched since 1991, apart from a call for states parties to participate in the CBM regime, made at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996.Within the AHG, CBMs have not been addressed by the last 15 sessions, although language for nearly all the CBMs in force under the BWC have been included in an Annex to the Protocol. This situation begs the question of what the future status of CBMs will be once the Protocol enters into force, and whether those states which are parties to both regimes would be required to submit both CBMs and declarations.

Some parties argue that the CBMs are superseded by the legal obligations of the Protocol, yet this view assumes a 100 per cent correlation between the states parties to the BWC and to the Protocol. If CBMs are to be waived in favor of Protocol declarations, then those states that are not party to the Protocol would be deprived of the information contained in the CBMs. And, the CBMs may be critical to the future Preparatory Commission and OPBW in their planning for the implementation and verification of the Protocol. However, forcing some states to make duplicate declarations is also undesirable.

One proposal to resolve this paradox suggests that states parties to both the BWC and the Protocol submit both CBMs and declarations, and those states that are only party to the BWC would only have access to the information contained in the CBMs. The argument for this system is that the burden of sharing information in a dual system is not all that arduous and such activities promote transparency. It was also stated that the interim institutions?discussed earlier as important to the integration of the BWC and Protocol regimes?could also help process and organize the submission of both CBMs and declarations. It was stated that the CBMs represent an important forum for the exchange of information, transparency, and trust-building between states and should not yet be permitted to lapse. The view that seemed to emerge within the workshop was that CBMs should continue to function at least until 2011, when it is thought that the BWC and the Protocol will be functioning as one integrated regime, hopefully with the same states parties.

International Cooperation (Article X)

Under this agenda item, attention focused on the measures to implement Article X of the BWC in Article VII of the draft Protocol. The workshop heard that many of the principles and statements contained in previous Review Conference final declarations concerning Article X and relating to the promotional aspects of cooperation have been elaborated in the Article VI or VII obligations of the Protocol. Therefore, it is assumed that the language to implement Article X in the Protocol will be a main focus of the Fifth Review Conference. The final declaration of the Fifth Review Conference should acknowledge the value of Article VII of the Protocol in carrying out the international cooperation mandate of the BWC. It was also mentioned that the promotional aspects of Article X have to be balanced with its regulatory aspects. Many developing countries need both to justify their decision to join the BWC.

It was pointed out that the promotional aspects of Article X provide significant motivation for governments and industry to initially support and join the BWC, and that fulfillment of this obligation must be carried out in order for such support to continue. Furthermore, as not all countries are expected to immediately become states parties to both the BWC and the Protocol, reserving some benefits of international cooperation solely for states parties to the Protocol (under Article VII) may act as an incentive for states to ratify the Protocol thus speeding its entry into force and eventual universality. It was pointed out that the Fifth Review Conference could be an opportunity for those states actively involved in the AHG to demonstrate the benefits of the Protocol to states not participating in the AHG.

Consideration of the Work of the Ad Hoc Group

The workshop next addressed the ongoing negotiations in the AHG and considered some issues that may facilitate the completion of the Protocol. One suggestion was that the Protocol should include language permitting the use of aerial imagery and open source information. While the information provided by these sources may be of little use in uncovering illicit development and production activities, it could prove valuable in the conduct of field investigations and to investigations of alleged use and could also help states parties demonstrate their compliance. Aerial imagery proved useful in UNSCOM?s work in Iraq as an adjunct to other sources of information.

The workshop next heard that the Protocol could serve as a model for future international treaties involving private industry. Within the next 25 years, a number of treaties, for example those that deal with environmental pollution, workers? safety, and workers? rights, are likely to mandate the significant involvement of industry and industrial facilities. Such treaties could even encompass verification mechanisms similar to the regime of declarations and random visits now being discussed in the AHG. It was suggested that the concerns of industry regarding the loss of confidential business information could be allayed by managed access concepts similar to those employed in respect to the CWC, national implementing legislation, and a slow phasing-in of the OPBW?s activities.

Future Work

The Study Group hopes to hold its fifteenth workshop in the Netherlands during the first half of 2001, possibly close to the start of the next session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC. One proposal was that the next workshop should focus on the progress in implementing the CWC to date and contribute to the review process, which culminates in 2003 with the First CWC Review Conference. The second workshop in 2001 will be held in the Fall in Geneva and will focus on the then imminent Fifth BWC Review Conference. Workshop participants also recommended that the Study Group should address the moral dimension of the work both of Pugwash and of the CBW disarmament regimes, and that it should examine the proper role of the academic and non-governmental organization (NGO) communities in these regimes.


* Since the workshop in mid-November, the United Arab Emirates deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary General in New York. The ratification took place on 28 November, and the Convention will enter into force for the United Arab Emirates on 28 December. With the inclusion of the UAE, all states of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council will have become States Parties of the CWC.