Venice meeting of Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security

Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security
10-11 December 1999, Venice, Italy

Report by Jeffrey Boutwell

IN the space of just a few months, from March to September 1999, the global community witnessed major interventions in defense of human rights and self-determination in Kosovo and East Timor. Although carried out by different coalitions of forces and acting under quite different mandates, these two interventions signaled what could well be an increased emphasis on humanitarian intervention by the international community at the seeming expense of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in a country’s domestic affairs.

In December 1999 in Venice, Italy, the Pugwash Conferences held the first in what will be a series of meetings of the Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty, and International Security. This new Pugwash endeavor stems in part from the lively discussions generated during a Pugwash workshop in Spain in July 1999 on the inter-related issues of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the West’s relations with Russia, and the prospect of future military interventions by the international community. Given the complexity of the issues discussed in Spain, George Rathjens (Secretary General of Pugwash) was convinced of the need for more in-depth analysis by Pugwash of the important and continuing tensions on issues relating to intervention and sovereignty. In particular, it was thought that Pugwash could draw upon its international network of policy specialists and scientists to convene a series of meetings with the aim of bridging, where possible, the very real differences that exist among nations and regions r egarding international intervention to deal with cases of widespread humanitarian abuse and failed states.

To help plan the work of the study group, Rathjens and the US Pugwash Committee convened a meeting at the House of the Academy in October 1999. Participants at this meeting included Carl Kaysen, chair of the Academy’s Committee on International Security Studies (CISS), Robert McNamara, Peter Galbraith (former US ambassador to Croatia), Gen. William Nash (former commander of US forces in Bosnia), Owen Harries (National Interest), Paul Doty, and Steven Miller, co-chair of US Pugwash. The group discussed the pros and cons of seeing the Kosovo intervention as a precedent for future military interventions by the international community, and the need especially for a group like Pugwash to seek common ground among sharply divergent international attitudes on the legitimacy and feasibility of humanitarian interventions.

Pugwash then convened the first meeting of the international Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security. A total of 23 participants from eleven countries took part in the 2 ½ day workshop, which was held at the Instituto Ciliota in Venice. At this initial meeting, the Study Group focused specifically on what could be called ‘first-order issues’ regarding intervention (e.g., concepts of international law, the UN Charter, the international politics of intervention, and various types of intervention). Subsequent workshops will focus more on the operational issues of intervention and the need for more effective post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction strategies.

It was also decided that a number of the essays prepared for the workshop would be published as Pugwash Occasional Papers. The first issue, to be published in February 2000, will include essays by Gwyn Prins, Alain Pellet, and Hugh Beach, while the second issue scheduled for April 2000 will contain essays by Claude Bruderlein, Timothy Garden and Taylor Seyboldt. In launching this new publication series (the essays will also be available on the Pugwash website), Pugwash aims to circulate innovative analysis and policy prescriptions on sensitive and controversial issues facing the global community to as wide an audience as possible of policymakers, the media, NGOs, and the research community.
Concepts of Intervention and International Law

WORKSHOP participants began by posing general questions regarding the very concept of intervention. What are the criteria that should stimulate intervention by the international community, i.e., what are the moral, legal, security, and humanitarian bases of intervention? Who in the international community decides when these criteria have been met, when a certain threshold of behavior has been passed that justifies intervention in the sovereign affairs of a nation state? Is it also necessary to define, in advance, the criteria for a ‘successful’ intervention? Should the international community intervene only when the prospects for success are great? The point was also made that interventions should be seen as setting a precedent on what is acceptable behavior, they should send a message to regimes and political leaders on what will be tolerated by the international community.

International law rests on two legs. Codified law as represented by the UN Charter enshrines the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state, while customary law increasingly emphasizes the protection of human rights and the safety and well-being of the individual. In the discussion of Kosovo, there was spirited debate regarding the legality of the NATO action. One view held that, as there was no Security Council approval for NATO’s use of force, the intervention was illegal according to black letter law. A contrary view pointed out that Yugoslav violation of previous Security Council resolutions and a clear pattern of widespread human rights violations did, in the end, provide sufficient justification for the NATO action. In looking to the future, one participant stressed the evolutionary nature of international law, of working to shape international law to help build a more peaceful global society.

To what extent are new norms of international humanitarian intervention evolving? One participant noted that norms in a sociological sense are constraints inculcated by behavior and tradition as well as law. Looking back in history, one can trace changing norms regarding the institution of slavery, where the anti-slavery tenets of a religious movement in England (the Quakers) ultimately evolved into a British national policy that was applied globally (e.g., the Royal Navy intercepting slave trade ships in Buenos Aires harbor). The end of colonialism provides another example.

In terms of the current situation and evolving norms on intervention, there seem to be two separate but related norms: a narrowly focused norm on the fundamental unacceptability of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (e.g., the creation of the International Criminal Court) and a broader norm stressing the importance of the non-use of force to settle disputes internally.

Historical examples also exist, however, in support of realist perspectives on intervention: that might makes right. One case cited was that of Athens and Melos, the realist flavor of which also informed the December 1999 joint communiqué of Russia and China upholding principles of sovereignty. Russia feels the West, currently dominant, is using the concept of intervention to give a veneer of legality in order to do what it wants to do anyway.

How does one counter that argument? By giving legitimacy to emerging norms on human rights, conduct in war, and rules of civilized behavior. And how does one derive authority for these norms? There was much discussion of using ‘just war’ criteria as derived from Augustine and Aquinas. Discussion also focused on Kant’s third categorical imperative (individuals should be seen as ends, not means). Unfortunately, Kant’s imperative was gradually bastardized, first by the French and then especially by the Russian and Chinese revolutions, which imbued the state with a higher authority that was then used as justification for any behavior whatsoever vis-a-vis its citizens.

Kant’s categorical imperative aside, it must be admitted that political and ideological motivations come into play as often as legal and moral justifications. One participant thought there was no such thing as an ‘apolitical’ humanitarian intervention. Moreover, the original aims of an intervention can change or be modified after the intervention has begun, often having significant unintended consequences.

More thought needs to be given to the why’s of intervention, the criteria that should be met to justify intervention in order to help pinpoint where international law and custom should be evolving. Delineating such criteria could also help establish common ground between quite divergent international perspectives on the relative weight to be given to sovereignty v. intervention, thus ensuring that when intervention occurs, it has the widest international support. Four possible categories of criteria justifying intervention, from the easiest to the most difficult, could be:

• Gross and systematic human rights abuses, including genocide, such as occurred in Cambodia and Rwanda;
• The suppression of the clearly demonstrated will of the majority, such as the overthrow of the democratically-elected government in Haiti or the suppression of an internationally-mandated expression of self-determination, as in East Timor;
• Clear cases of failed states, where central authority is non-functioning and the civilian population is at the mercy of militias, warlords, criminal gangs, etc. (Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone);
• The illegal and inhumane use of power by one side or the other during a civil war encompassing an attempt at secession and/or ethnic/religious self-determination.

The difficulty with such categories is that evidence of the criteria in question is not always clear-cut (especially #4), that gray areas can exist within a category (when does widespread civil strife become a failed state?), and that some cases fall into more than one category (was Kosovo an example more of #4 or of #1?).

There is also the need to ask, when should the international community not intervene, and why? One example cited was the UN mission that provided a corridor in Rwanda that only froze the political situation. If the victims within a country can help themselves, then don’t intervene directly (but do provide needed aid). Only rely on military intervention when victims are powerless to help themselves (recalling Edward Luttwak that the only good purpose of war is to provide peace)

How do we measure gross human rights violations, genocide, and crimes against humanity? Estimates of such wrong-doing are often inaccurate or politically manipulated (by either internal or external actors committed to an intervention taking place). In the most extreme case, internal forces hoping for intervention could provoke the very repression that is then cited as justifying intervention by outside forces.
International Perspectives on Intervention

GIVEN the difficulty of establishing criteria, and the divergent political, cultural, and ideological views on intervention vs. sovereignty, there is a real need for airing the fundamental disagreements between countries on what is legitimate intervention.

One participant said that too strict a western standard is being applied to other states regarding governance and human rights. Many non-western states essentially see interventionism as neo-colonialist. In the end, are new concepts of intervention just a guise for the application of foreign policy pressure from the western states?

Another noted that the concept of intervention can viewed as positive (giving a helping hand) or negative (interference). Likewise, the concept of human rights is viewed differently around the world, encompassing both the individual and the collective society. Regarding human rights, these include not only individual freedoms but social goods such as equitable living conditions and access to health care. In recent times, interventions have caused widespread and lasting damage to society (e.g., Iraq). Human rights abuses are not unknown in western countries, are these grounds for intervention? Finally, intervention is a tool of the powerful. Weak states can’t intervene, thus they must rely on sovereignty.

Cultural perspectives can and do color attitudes on intervention. What kind of peace is intervention intended to create, the mere absence of conflict or the strengthening of common values? In Arabic, the term Jihad means not just a holy war, but the spread of Islamic values, while Salaam connotes a state of non-hostility. Intervention will be viewed differently depending on which type of ‘peace’ is perceived as intended by the intervenors. Hence the apprehension in some parts of the world that the “new interventionism” is based mainly on western values of human rights.

In the case of China, Beijing has supported interventions in East Timor and Cambodia and has contributed to peacekeeping missions in Mozambique, the western Sahara, and Iraq/Kuwait. China is in favor of impartial interventions that promote international peace and cooperation, but has problems with interventions that serve the national interests of the intervenors or rely on selective interpretation and implementation of international laws. For example, there is a big difference between responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as compared to responding to the alleged Iraqi threat against George Bush, as a rationale justifying intervention.

Yet, it was noted that many international interventions have not been aimed at either the territorial integrity or the political independence of the state in question (e.g., the no-fly zone in Iraq, the Kosovars in Yugoslavia), at what might be called the fundamental elements of sovereignty. Rather, such interventions have sought to compel a change in behavior regarding widespread abuses of human rights (Kurds and Kosovars).

In the longer term, the ultimate aim of abolishing war will mean the final elimination of sovereignty, the creation of global governance, and the means to enforce the will of the international community.
Who Intervenes, and Why?

WHILE the United Nations is best positioned to give legitimacy to interventions (indeed, Russia and China say the UN Security Council is the only legitimate authority for intervention), too often UNSC action is blocked by a great power veto. One solution to this could be the concept of a negative veto, where action will be taken unless a veto is cast, making it more difficult for countries to block action. In the absence of such reforms, what other sources of authority can we look to provide legitimacy for intervention?

Certainly regional organizations can, and have, taken the lead. Regarding the Organization of American States (OAS), there is the triggering mechanism provided by the Santiago Declaration of 1991 regarding military overthrows of a democratically-elected government. Yet regional politics can mitigate against regional solutions; in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, countries in Latin America expressed a preference for having the international community, not regional organizations, intervene. In the future, the different types of problems facing Colombia, Mexico and Cuba could each in their way evolve into major crises, entailing different types of international intervention.

Regarding Africa, even though non-interference is enshrined in the OAU charter, there have been cases of the OAU being willing to give primacy to intervention over sovereignty (especially in the case of South African apartheid). Had there been a militarily-strong coalition of African states at the time, there might have been OAU intervention in South Africa or the Portuguese territory of Guinea-Bissau. Africa is looking for regional centers of power (Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa) that could provide intervention capabilities. It is possible that credible regional mechanisms could have solved many of the internal conflicts now plaguing Africa (Angola, Somalia, Congo). Yet, international help will be needed for Africa to implement chapter 6 operations. Thus the principle of intervention is not so much disputed as the modalities of intervention; who intervenes, and how?

Mention was also made of the increasing role and influence of NGOs in prompting intervention. The award of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize to Medecins sans Frontiers (which was created precisely to take a more activist role in alerting the international community to conflict-prone areas compared to the traditionally neutral International Red Cross) is yet one more indication of the ‘interventionist’ nature of the NGO community.

Regarding domestic politics and the national interest, discussion focused on domestic considerations that can both propel and constrain intervention. Indeed, some semblance of a “national interest’ must be present for a country to commit troops and resources to an intervention. In the case of the US and Haiti, for example, it was argued that several important national issues helped justify US intervention: Haitian refugees, the Congressional black caucus, and the affront to US power when the USS Harlan was turned away from Haiti’s shores. As in the case of Somalia, of course, events can also conspire to constrain and ultimately terminate an intervention.

One participant noted how the discussion thus far is symptomatic of the consensus-building problems faced by the international community. While there does seem to be convergence within the international community on criteria for intervening in the case of gross human rights abuses, the problem is one of agencies and modalities. There is thus a need to come back to issues of world governance and new concepts of security. While recognizing the need to avoid invidious double standards, a distinction (in terms of global security) can be made between instability in Bosnia and Kosovo and those in a country like Rwanda. Such threats to global security are also present from current and potential conflict in and around the former Soviet Union, China, and India (the three countries most opposed to intervention). To that end, unilateralist sentiments such as are being seen in the US will create difficulties for consensus building, especially with Russia, China and India.

The discussion ended with an interesting parallel being drawn between gaining international consensus on intervention and the introduction of the Metropolitan Police by Sir Robert Peel in the 1800s. At first, citizens were fearful of the police committing arbitrary acts, yet domestic order has been the better for it.
What is Successful Intervention?

THERE was a good deal of discussion about the effectiveness of military intervention being an important criterion for deciding to intervene in the first place. A strictly utilitarian approach to judging a ‘successful’ intervention could be based on the prospects of: 1) the number of lives saved; and 2) whether the intervention helps create post-conflict political stability. Not surprisingly, the question was raised, how will you know how many lives you’ve saved? Kosovo could be an example of more lives being lost because of the NATO operation.

It was argued that, ultimately, the success of an intervention will depend on the goals and strategy of the intervenor(s) themselves, and these in turn will be shaped by six factors: operational strategy, motives, capabilities, coordination, timing, and objectives. This led to the issue of ‘mission creep,’ and the perceived need to ensure that the original rationale for intervention doesn’t change during the intervention itself. It was pointed out, however, that sometimes avoiding mission creep means the job doesn’t get done. In the case of Iraq, not finishing the job has meant continued oppression of Kurds and Shi’a and continued international intervention in Iraq. There is also the difficulty of the military preparing in advance for contingencies that spring up without advance notice.

When it comes to creating political stability, how long is the time line by which an intervention is judged? The Bosnia intervention could be called successful, but is it irreversible? Issues such as the return of refugees are very complex and not always handled well by international community. A similar view held that the right of return is essential to the long-term success of an intervention (e.g., Dayton will fail otherwise). Yet, the right of return has two inherent problems: establishing the status-quo-ante may not be the preferable solution, and taking away someone’s refugee status by telling him/her that they can now go home (especially if there is no effective policing and no individual security to return to) could expose such returnees to danger. Post-conflict cooperation with local authorities is also a delicate issue.
Sanctions and Intervention

DISCUSSION next turned to the use of sanctions as a tool short of military intervention. The fact that 250,000 children have died in Iraq, partly as a result of international sanctions, demonstrates the need for ways of making sanctions more ‘humanitarian.’ In the case of the Sudan, the UNSC delayed sanctions (following the assassination attempt on Pres. Mubarak) in order to assess their humanitarian impact. One NGO, Medicins de Monde, has recommended that an advisory humanitarian body be created that could provide early warning of humanitarian crises and disasters to the UNSC.

Yet targeted sanctions, aimed at political leaders, elites, and governments (freezing assets of Iraq, EC diplomatic ban on Burma) have been difficult to make effective. Authoritarian regimes have too much leeway in determining the internal allocation of resources, and thus can largely avoid the impact of sanctions.

What about sanctions aimed at controlling or blocking the flow of information, of seizing the various communications channels (radio, television) of oppressive regimes? Some thought concepts of cyber-warfare represented grasping for straws; open access to information is more widespread than ever, plus the intervening nations have more of a vulnerability in this regard that they should perhaps be wary of.

How great, in any event, is the distinction between chapters 6 and 7 (i.e. between sanctions and the use of force)? Military capability is employed against a wide range of objectives (including communications), and at times sanctions can entail more suffering than military force, so a continuum from one to another is not always obvious.

What is clear is that sanctions work best against those who are most vulnerable (rebel movements such as UNITA in Angola that are dependent on one or two sources of income). In this particular case, the UN has been working on sanctions that could reduce UNITA’s oil and diamond revenues. The goal is to make targeted sanctions, especially against exports that are important to the political elite, more effective.
Summary

THE final session focused on future Pugwash agenda items. An organization like Pugwash could help narrow differences on the criteria and utility of intervention, making sure that people are working from common bases of information. Suggestions were made for a workshop to more fully explore the full range of sanctions available to the international community. Finding common ground for intervention is also made difficult by the lack of accessible “on the ground” information, of working from the same assumptions; is it possible to create common information base? Regarding capacity building in a region like Africa, what institutions are best equipped to intervene, and how to build the military capacity to do so? There are also the issues of creating a permanent civilian police capacity for post-conflict reconstruction and of reviewing chapter 12 (trusteeships) of the UN Charter as one means of restoring political stability.

Regarding the future, it is likely that the international community will continue to face two alternatives: those cases where it can intervene (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor) and those cases where it can’t (Chechnya, Tibet, Siankang). Pugwash should not downplay the hard task of consensus building and of intervention achieving widespread political legitimacy, which is juxtaposed with the larger problem of losing the post-Cold War peace, deteriorating relations between the West and Russia and China, and the possibility of state failure on a much larger level.

Over time, one of strongest virtues of Pugwash has been identifying important issue agendas and bringing these to the attention of governments. In the area of intervention, future work could integrate the components of intervention (criteria, institutions, modalities) that are largely dealt with piecemeal elsewhere, but that together represent many of the essential elements of global governance, which is the longer-term goal.

Final suggestions included the larger framework issues (working to narrow major differences on issues of authority and legitimacy); mechanisms (positive pre-emption options and sanctions, both pro-active and reactive); the need for full cycle planning; and post-conflict governance. Pugwash can help with these framing functions, of engaging different perspectives to frame feasible options for legitimate intervention. The ‘just war’ criteria is one place to begin, and if these criteria aren’t sufficient, then alternatives need to be found to help forge an international consensus on intervention.
Participant List

• Ambassador (ret.) Ochieng Adala, Africa Peace Forum (APFO), Nairobi, Kenya [formerly: Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, NY (1992-93); Deputy Secretary/Director for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (1988-92); Ambassador of Kenya to the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (1984-88)]
• Sir Hugh Beach, Vice Chairman, Council for Arms Control, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London, UK [formerly : Master General of Ordnance British Armed Forces)]
• Dr. Raul Benitez-Manaut, Researcher and Professor of International Relations and Conflict Resolution, Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencia y Humanidades, National University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City [formerly: Visiting Fellow, Woodrow Center for International Scholars, Smithsonian Institute, Washington DC; Professor of International Relations, Technological Autonomous Institute of Mexico; Professor of International Relations, National Defense College, Mexico]
• Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Associate Executive Officer, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA [formerly: Staff Aide, National Security Council, Washington, DC]
• Mr. Claude Bruderlein (Switzerland), Consultant, Executive Office of the UN Secretary General, Strategic Planning Unit, New York, NY; Special Advisor, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, New York; Research Fellow, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, Cambridge, MA [formerly: Head of Mission, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Gaza (1994-95); ICRC Protection Officer in Iran, West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Kuwait (1990-94)]
• Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, Pugwash Council [formerly: Secretary-General (1989-97), Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Member (1982-92), Governing Board, SIPRI]
• Dr. Marco De Andreis, former Member of the Cabinet of Commissioner Bonino, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium (1995-99); former Senior Researcher, and Director of International Security Studies, Center for International Political Studies (CeSPI), Rome, Italy; former Research Director, Research Institute for Disarmament, Development and Peace (IRDISP), Rome]
• Amb. Peter Galbraith, Professor, National War College, Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, DC, USA [formerly: US Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia (1993-98); Senior Advisor, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate (1979-93); Member, US delegation to United Nations General Assembly (1980 and 1983); Senior Legal Advisor, United Nations Environment Program (1988); Assistant Professor, Windham College, Putney Vermont (1975-78)]
• Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden, Writer and broadcaster on foreign policy and security issues, London, UK; Trustee of World Humanity Action Trust; Board Member of NATO Defense College; Member of Defence Evaluation and Research Agency Analysis Board; Committee member of the Council for Arms Control; Member of a number of other academic advisory boards [formerly: Director of Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) (1997-98); Commandant, Royal College of Defence Studies (1995-96); Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (1992-95); Assistant Chief of Air Staff (1991-1992); various Royal Air Force posts (1965-1991)]
• Col. Hua Liuhu, Research Fellow and Associate Professor, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Beijing, China
• Air Commodore Shri Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India; Convener, Indian Pugwash Society; Member, Pugwash Council [formerly: Director Operations, Air Headquarters, New Delhi]
• Prof. Alain Joxe, Directeur d’Etudes, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France; President, CIRPES
• Prof. Carl Kaysen, D.W. Skinner Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA [formerly: Special Assistant to the President of the US for National Security Affairs (1961-63); Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ (1966-76)]
• Prof. Robert Legvold, Professor of Political Science, The Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
• Dr. Andrei Malov, Counsellor, Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, Russia
• Prof. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre; Member and former Chairman, International Law Commission of the United Nations;
• Prof. John Polanyi, Department of Chemistry, University of Toronto; Member, Canadian Pugwash (since 1959); Co-Editor, The Dangers of Nuclear War, 1979; President, Canadian Committee of Scientists and Scholars (presently); Co-Chair, Department of Foreign Affairs International Consultative Committee on a Rapid Response Capability for the United Nations, 1995; Nobel Prize, Chemistry, 1986
• Dr. Gwyn Prins, Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK; Visiting Senior Fellow, Defence Evaluation & Research Agency (MoD); Senior Fellow, Office of the Special Adviser on Central & Eastern European Affairs, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO [formerly: Lecturer in History and Politics, University of Cambridge; Fellow of Emmanuel College]
• Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA, USA
• Sir Joseph Rotblat (UK), Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of London, London, UK; 1995 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; Member, Pugwash Executive Committee [former President (1988-1997), Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs]
• Prof. Carlo Schaerf, Professor of Physics, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy; Director, International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), Rome
• Dr. Iain Scobbie, Reader in International Law, School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK [formerly: Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Dundee; Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Glasgow]
• Dr. Taylor Seybolt, Project Leader, Conflict & Peace Enforcement Project, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Solna, Sweden [formerly: Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA]