Castellón de la Plana meeting on NATO and European Security

On 2-4 July, 1999, Pugwash Meeting No. 247 was held in Castellón de la Plana, Spain.

NATO and European Security

Report by Jeffrey Boutwell

THE 78 days of bombing by the NATO alliance against the Yugoslav regime of Slobodan Milosevic, having as its goal the cessation of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians and the repatriation of more than 800,000 refugees, represents a watershed in post-Cold War international politics. NATO conducted its first ever major combat operation, outside the boundaries of the alliance, not for the rationales of collective defense and security on which NATO was founded 50 years ago, but for the purposes of humanitarian intervention. Having only recently increased from 16 to 19 members in a controversial decision that damaged relations with Russia, NATO took the unprecedented step of waging war against a sovereign state – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – with whom it technically was at peace.

Long before the 11-week bombing campaign came to an end, the Kosovo conflict was the subject of intense analysis and lofty rhetoric about what it signified for the conduct of global politics in the 21st century. “A struggle for civilization” and “a just war” were the respective pronouncements of the French and British Prime Ministers. From an angry Moscow came reports about the re-targeting of Russian missiles, Kremlin decisions to accelerate the development of new tactical nuclear weapons, and the possible emergence of a new strategic triangle involving Russia, China, and India. In Beijing, anti-western riots broke out following the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the Chinese government and many others protested what they saw as a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law.

In the short-term, there are unanswered questions about the ramifications of NATO’s decision that the principles of protecting individual life and liberty should, in the particular case of the Kosovar Albanians, take precedence over the principles of the inviolability of borders and non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Will the Kosovar Albanians be successfully repatriated in conditions of peace and security? What of the rights and safety of the Kosovo Serbs who fear retaliation on the part of the returning Kosovars? Will Slobodan Milosevic remain in power and, like Saddam Hussein, be able to resist the will of the international community and continue to threaten both the rights of his own people and the security of his neighbors?

Over the longer term, is NATO prepared to intervene again, whether close to home or far away, when the rights and safety of minority populations are threatened? Does the alliance risk over-stretching its capabilities, and does it have the appropriate forces, for long-range crisis intervention? As an alliance of 19 members (and possibly more in the future), will it be able to reach consensus again when intervention is called for?

Over and above these questions, what exactly is the new evolving dynamic between international intervention on behalf of threatened minorities on the one hand, and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference on the other? Is there now an even more pronounced division between first and second tier states, between those major alliances and powers who have the capability to intervene, and those states who will be intervened against? Is the western alliance as represented by NATO setting the agenda for organizing the conduct of international relations, with unintended consequences for both European security and possible interventions on the part of other global powers?

It was with these questions in mind that Pugwash convened a workshop on “NATO and the Future of European Security” in Castellón de la Plana, Spain from July 2-4, 1999. Attended by 25 participants from 12 countries, the workshop took as its departure both the recent enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and the Kosovo military campaign, in order to illuminate the dynamics of evolving European security structures and their implications for the wider international arena. As noted above, however, the discussion also wrestled with the overarching themes of sovereignty and legitimacy, international law and the protection of fundamental human rights, and the tailoring of military means with political ends.

The following report is thus both a summary of the NATO-specific discussions held in Castelló n and a preliminary outlining of some main organizing principles that will shape international security in the years ahead. It is organized into five sections, proceeding from the specifics of European security to general trends affecting the conduct of international affairs:

  1. What is European Security?
  2. NATO: Enlargement and Beyond?
  3. Russia and the Post-Soviet Space
  4. Kosovo and the NATO Intervention
  5. Intervention and the International Community

Unlike traditional reports of Pugwash workshops, this summary is not intended to cover all the agenda items that were discussed during the meeting, nor is it meant to convey all the disparate views expressed by participants. Rather, its purpose is to synthesize many of the points of convergence that were apparent during the discussions while noting the plainly evident unanswered questions about how both Europe as a region and the international community as a whole can reconcile the often conflicting claims for peace and security between individuals, ethnic groupings, and nation states. As with all reports of Pugwash workshops, this summary is not intended to reflect a consensus view of the participants, or of Pugwash, but is the sole responsibility of the rapporteur.
What is European Security?

GEOGRAPHICALLY and institutionally, there are several different ways of conceiving of Europe and defining European security. Is Europe circumscribed by the 15 members of the European Union, the 19 states in NATO, or by the 56 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)? Other configurations would expand the notion of European security to include the newly independent states in the European portion of the post-Soviet space and the post-Ottoman and post-Hapsburg territories in the Balkans and southeastern Europe. As a bridge between the west and Islam, Turkey presents its own unique problems for conceptualizing about European security.

Secondly, what are the prerequisites for European security in a world that is now a decade removed from the ideological and military confrontation of the Cold War? One participant argued for the need to conceptualize security more in terms of prosperity than of survival, for giving emphasis to political, economic and social factors rather than to military. While applicable to the Europe of NATO and the EU, such conceptualizations seem less relevant to the realities of the post-Soviet space and the Balkans, and are even less congruent with the realities of a developing world characterized by failed states and sectarian conflict. In short, is security in the international arena becoming a dichotomous commodity, consisting of prosperity for the privileged members of NATO and the EU and ethnic instability and economic deprivation for those outside ‘Europe’ who live in precisely those countries and regions where military intervention will most often occur? And what are the implications of such a dichotomy?

In terms of threat perceptions, what are the challenges to European security? Four scenarios were noted: classical threats of war between strategic rivals; conflict between lesser powers that could escalate; civil and intrastate wars that could escalate to inter-state war; and the instabilities inherent in failed states (especially relevant in the post-Soviet space). There is a fifth concern as well, the “lethal leakage” through sale or theft of nuclear weapons and fissile material, chemical and biological weapons, and small arms and light weapons, in addition to accident-prone nuclear power plants.

Gauging the probability of these security threats depends, of course, on one’s conception of Europe. Is the arena that of the ‘Atlantic to the Urals’ or merely the 19 states of NATO, with the post-Soviet space considered a hinterland? The concerns and priorities of various security challenges would seem to be framed differently according to one’s geographic construct of Europe. It was noted by one participant, however, that, in each of the five threat scenarios listed above, the main security challenges to ‘Europe’ will emanate mainly from the post-Soviet space. The issue then is not one of mere security architectures or institutions, but of policy – in recognizing where the threats are coming from and framing options to meet those threats.

Policy options, on the other hand, emanate from capabilities, such as institutional arrangements, military planning and deployment of forces. There was general agreement that any unified European defense force is a long way off. There are some examples of European-wide defense cooperation on the operational level, such as the NATO AWACs force, which is a supranational force that could be a model for other capabilities. Other potential multinational missions include strategic airlift (e.g., through leasing Ukrainian Antonovs), a multinational Eurofighter force with integrated units based at five to seven central air bases throughout Europe, and a multinational naval mine countermeasure capability. At the bilateral level, the formation of a joint Belgian-Dutch naval headquarters offers useful lessons as well.

Other participants urged the creation of a European Union defense capability if Europe is to have a strong political voice. Unfortunately, no state is taking a strong lead on European integration at the moment. Nonetheless, there exist several means for helping to propel defense integration. These would include greater consultative mechanisms within the EU, transferring Western European assets to the EU, reconfiguring the Eurocorps heavy armor unit to a more rapidly deployable force, and acquiring an independent GPS (global positioning system) capability.

In the end, however, what will be needed is a unified European defense budget, with contributions from member states being made either in capabilities or money. Those countries like the UK and France with independent defense needs can meet those with additional capabilities. Moreover, a joint defense capability only makes sense with a unified and coherent European foreign policy, and the EU is a long way from speaking with one voice on foreign policy and security issues.

NATO: Enlargement and Beyond?

WORKSHOP participants analyzed the rationales for, and ramifications of, the NATO enlargement process. Looking back, some participants were surprised by the scarcity of domestic debate in the original 16 over the implications of adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and extending NATO’s collective defense boundary well to the east towards Russia. Looking ahead, sentiments were expressed that NATO enlargement will have positive benefits in terms of inducing new members to improve their record on human rights, treatment of ethnic minorities, and in relations with their neighbors.

The main issue for the near term is how to manage the process while reassuring Moscow that enlargement, both now and in the future, does not pose a security threat to Russia nor erode the security of other European states left outside. Ultimately, NATO’s aim should be that of including Russia in a comprehensive European security system that enhances mutual security for all, not some number less. In the meantime, difficulties will arise as other countries in eastern Europe and in the post-Soviet space ask to be considered for membership.

Among the three new members of NATO, the Kosovo crisis has already changed some of the terms of reference regarding their membership. In Poland, the Kosovo conflict was an unpleasant surprise, yet public support for NATO membership did not drop significantly. Unlike Hungary, Poland had no direct stakes in the conflict, and Russia’s support for Milosevic helped shape an automatic pro-NATO response among the Polish public. While Poland supports a next round of NATO enlargement, this is now seen as being compromised by the Kosovo action.

For Hungary, joining NATO was seen as the sine qua non of rejoining the Western community. Yet Hungary did balk at NATO using its territory for a possible ground campaign against Yugoslavia, and Budapest rejected the prospect of deploying Hungarian troops who might find themselves facing, in Vojvodina, Hungarian troops of the Yugoslav army.

Among future candidates for NATO membership, Romania’s interest in membership has increased because of Kovoso, while its chances of joining have probably diminished. With 14 minority ethnic populations, Romania has reason to fear the kind of domestic instability leading to intervention that happened in Kosovo, thus it seeks the security protection of joining NATO. In addition, NATO membership is seen as a means of greatly reducing the country’s onerous defense burden. On the other hand, it is felt that the strong Russian reaction to Kosovo will mean an even stronger stand by Moscow against Romanian membership in NATO. In addition, historical ties with Yugoslavia and perceptions of the importance of international law for smaller states have weakened public support for joining NATO.

Likewise, Bulgaria has been in favor of joining NATO and now finds itself concerned over Russian nationalist statements regarding the need for closer Russian-Bulgarian-Serbian cooperation. Moreover, with its Turkish minority, Bulgaria also has concerns about possible pretexts for intervening in its domestic affairs.

In the Ukraine, the Kosovo crisis has made NATO membership a more controversial issue. Ukrainian officials have done much to promote the public’s image of NATO regarding collective security and democratization, and have even talked of Ukraine joining NATO before 2010. With 1999 an election year, the Kosovo crisis came at a bad time, giving ammunition to leftist opposition forces that seek to reverse Ukraine’s progress towards democracy and free-market policies. Ukraine felt isolated during the Kosovo crisis (it was not consulted at the beginning of operation, and its offer of trying to facilitate an agreement with Belgrade was largely ignored). Many in Ukraine feel its independence and sovereignty are predicated on closer ties to Europe, yet Ukraine and Moldova are the only two states in the entire region not formally involved in any kind of negotiation vis-a-vis ultimate NATO membership. Moreover, some in Ukraine feel that the principle of unilateral action implicit in the NATO action could be used by others, including Russia, to justify unilateral actions on its part, or through agencies that it controls. On the other hand, there are strong sentiments for re-integrating Ukraine more tightly with Russia and Belarus. Despite these tensions, one view held that Ukraine’s future is neither dissolution nor falling back into the Russian orbit, but of whether the country becomes economically and politically stable and a contributing factor to European security. If a secessionist movement is at all possible, it won’t be in the Crimea or eastern Ukraine, but in that part of western Ukraine wanting to integrate with Europe.

In terms of possible future enlargement, a number of concerns were expressed regarding new members. The candidacy of the Baltic states is especially sensitive, in part because of the presence Russian military forces (and possibly nuclear weapons) in the isolated Kaliningrad enclave.

Regarding the deployment of NATO forces into combat, one participant asked if, in an alliance of 19 members, there is necessarily a lowest common denominator element to NATO military operations. Using the Persian Gulf war as an example, and putting aside political issues such as when to terminate a conflict, it was noted that Desert Storm was a NATO operation, in terms of command, training, operations, etc., and was a success precisely because it was the result of 40 years of NATO experience. In that respect, one participant was convinced that the loss of NATO’s military cohesion would mean the dissolution of the alliance (and that is something to be aware of in terms of future enlargement).

When it comes to the effectiveness of military intervention, defense capabilities are relatively easy; having the field intelligence on which to base military actions is much more difficult. On the issue of training, is NATO still the optimum organization, or should we be looking more broadly, to the Partnership for Peace countries or even more broadly to countries with effective military capabilities, such as China and Japan? Finally, it will be important to strengthen civilian police capabilities in order to re-establish social order and protect individual rights and security following the termination of conflict.

Most agreed that it’s not the military issues that confront NATO, but the political. In this vein, there is the US tendency for opting out of complicated multilateral decision-making (especially in the UN, but at times also in NATO). Could this lead to more cases of unilateral US action? While such multilateral decision-making can often be a frustrating experience, it was noted that decisions to use major military force should never be easy.

In terms of NATO decision-making, is there a tension between Article 5 (collective defense) and Article 4 (out of area operations)? Some advocate redesigning NATO and reconfiguring its military forces primarily for Article 4 operations. Others countered that, while Article 5 threats are of low probability, they are not zero. If the major threat of great power war re-emerges, how would NATO reconstitute its Article 5 capabilities, especially in relatively short order? As General Joulwan has noted, having Article 5 capabilities allows NATO to cover out-of-area operations as well, but the converse is not true.

This sentiment was re-enforced with the thought that, even in the absence of any major conflict in the future, Europe would still need NATO for common training, command, and operations experience. NATO’s capability is the only effective means for conducting international multinational military operations, such as those that would be carried out under the auspices of the UN. In short, whatever the institutional arrangements, Europe needs to do far better in the military capabilities it deploys, whether for national interests, NATO objectives, or international peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Russia and the Post-Soviet Space

WHILE is true that Moscow reacted sharply to the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (going on increased military alert, breaking off participation in the Partnership for Peace and conducting an active diplomatic campaign against NATO), other, more severe measures were not implemented (selling arms to Serbia, deploying theater nuclear weapons in Belarus, sending volunteers to Serbia). Nonetheless, Russian policymakers are citing a number of ‘lessons’ from the Kosovo intervention that they say will guide Russian policy in the post-Soviet space in the future. These include:

  • an increased reliance on future Russian/CIS peacekeeping interventions in the post-Soviet space (such as that in Tadjikistan);
  • a preference for regional peacekeeping operations as compared to those conducted by the UN (e.g., Russian officials have pointed to the parallels between the Kosovo operation and that of Russian, Georgian and Abkhazian troops in South Ossetia);
  • a feeling that Kosovo shows that legitimacy and effectiveness in carrying out interventions are more important than acquiring a formal legal mandate from the UN (put more crudely, don’t waste time getting a mandate… solve the problem and then worry about legitimacy).

Whether or not CIS interventions are truly multilateral or symbolic covers for unilateral Russian action, these are realities that shape Moscow’s reactions to future instabilities in the post-Soviet space.

More broadly, the wider goal of European security from the Atlantic to the Urals is not doing well. This applies not only to Russia, but to the newly independent states (NIS) of the post-Soviet space as well, as regional instability in the post-Soviet space is not seen as a European security issue. In this view, the concept of mutual security is not being considered adequately (i.e., would Ukraine’s security really be enhanced through membership in NATO, or would it be counter-productive?). Among the CIS states, Russia is a problem for some (Ukraine, the Baltic states, Azerbaijan); it is the solution for others (Belarus, Armenia), and a mixed-bag for a third group (Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova). Moreover, western interactions in the post-Soviet space tend to be viewed by Russia as strategic interventions by US and others (e.g., a common Russian perception is that Caspian oil is not primarily an economic issue, but a US attempt to strengthen Turkish interactions with the central Asian states, at Moscow’s expense).

Accordingly, the unintended consequences of an expanded NATO are more dramatic than most realize, especially given the current polarization of security occurring in the post-Soviet space (e.g., the splintering of the CIS collective security arrangement, with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan having pulled out of the Tashkent Treaty arrangement, leaving six remaining states). In this situation, there are three particularly worrisome developments:

  • Russia is seriously taking NATO as posing a military threat, and giving new emphasis on tactical (i.e., low-yield) nuclear weapons;
  • some of the internal splits within the CIS (Armenia-Azerbaijan) threaten to involve NATO unwillingly, (e.g., Azerbaijan has offered to give basing rights to NATO aircraft);
  • a growing Russian fear of an increasingly intense strategic rivalry with the US and NATO (with some in Moscow seeing Kosovo as a dry run for future NATO actions in the post-Soviet space, such as Transdniestr).

There is little doubt that the coherence of the post-Soviet space is increasingly fracturing, due to diverging security as well as economic interests within the CIS (e.g., Georgia and Azerbaijan trade more with Turkey than with Russia; strengthening ties between the central Asian states and Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). It was noted that a natural reshuffling of relations within the CIS was to be expected, and that integration in the post-Soviet space still exists with the Tashkent security alliance of six members, the economic alliance of five central Asian states, and the Russia-Belarus bilateral relationship. Yet, while such diversity is to be expected, increased polarization within the CIS is making it more difficult for Europe to engage successfully with the CIS on security issues.

Summing up, one participant compared the Russia-NATO relationship as existing along a continuum from strategic partnership to low intensity cooperation to low intensity competition to major military confrontation, with the current reality lying closest to low intensity competition.
Kosovo and the NATO Intervention

THE Kosovo episode provided the jumping off point for a spirited discussion of emerging norms of intervention by the international community in defense of individual and human rights.

One point of view stressed the illegality of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, citing no Security Council approval or UN authorization, violation of the Nuremberg Statute on waging aggressive war, violation of its own North Atlantic Treaty about acting in conformity with the UN Charter, the bombing of civilian targets and other violations of Geneva Conventions, and episodes of ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo. In the aftermath of the war, national questions remain for Serbia, Albania, and Macedonia. While NATO was successful in establishing an international presence in Kosovo and isolating the Milosevic regime, the conflict had negative effects on democratic and free-market forces in Serbia and on the principles of international law which are especially important for small countries.

A contrary view held that it was sufficient for NATO to act in conformity with the UN Charter rather than obtain formal approval by the Security Council (and risk certain vetoes from Russia and China). NATO’s Washington Charter talks of NATO actions being in “conformity with the purposes of the UN.” Accordingly, the Kosovo operation could be said to adhere to UN Security Council resolutions from 1992 and 1998 that called on Milosevic to adhere to international norms in the treatment of minorities within Yugoslavia. Based on these resolutions, it is argued that NATO could proceed with its military action with reference to both UN principles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Some of those opposed to the NATO operation believe that NATO had very different goals than mere humanitarian intervention. For example, if the goal was to protect human rights and improve ethnic relations within a sovereign state, then the means used were disproportionate and misdirected (destroying economic infrastructure of Serbia and the killing of several thousand Yugoslav citizens). Moreover, where does “humanitarian intervention” stop? Does NATO have the right to determine the post-Milosevic order in Yugoslavia? Does the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia set a precedent for Russia asserting its right to protect minority Russians in Estonia and Lithuania?

Regarding Moscow, what Russia rejects is NATO deciding for itself that it is the guarantor of European security. This brings up the issue of selective application of norms of intervention. How does one protect the rights of 350,000 Serb refugees from Bosnia? As for the indictment of Milosevic, one participant asked, is the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal truly an independent body or is it an extension of NATO and western policy? The point was also made that the prospect of intervention runs the risk of stimulating illegal/terrorist activity by those desiring intervention, i.e., groups that will seek to provoke repression and then appeal for international help. Of course, the flip side of the coin is that the option of intervention is meant to deter those in power from engaging in repressive policies in the first place.

There was agreement that the modalities of military intervention should adhere to fairly strict criteria, which was not totally the case in Kosovo. Above all, military objectives in an operation like Kosovo should be those that facilitate successful political outcomes. This proved difficult to do in Kosovo in an alliance of 19 nations. There was also a failure to recognize that Milosevic would not be cowed by a couple of days of bombing, especially when the use of ground troops was explicitly ruled out.

Another participant found it difficult to excuse the unintentional killing of civilians by NATO, especially as this was the consequence of a systematic bombing campaign. In response, it was stressed that Yugoslav civilians were killed by accident, Kosovar Albanians were murdered and raped deliberately. Still others stressed that NATO had no hidden agenda beyond humanitarian intervention, while acknowledging that the actual conduct of military operation left much to be desired. It was emphasized again that a crucial factor will be the need for resources to rebuild civil society in order to achieve ultimate success.

Given the level of damage inflicted on Yugoslav civilians, it is important to ask: were all diplomatic options exhausted prior to the start of the military campaign? Were other military strategies seriously considered? Indeed, were there alternatives to the bombing campaign as carried out by NATO? How does the international community carry out a military campaign that is effective but also distinguishes between those bear responsibility (Milosevic, Yugoslav military, Serb paramilitaries) and those who don’t (Serb civilians)? How do policymakers deal with the constraints imposed by public opinion, which can limit military options (e.g., use of ground forces) and in turn complicate achieving political objectives? In the particular case of Kosovo, what are the risks inherent in NATO’s relationship to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with its own blemished history regarding human rights abuses?
Intervention and the International Community

PARTICIPANTS discussed the ambiguities inherent in considering both codified law (beginning with Congress of Vienna and running through the UN Charter) and customary law. International law stems not only from the sovereign rights of states, but from the rights of individuals to life and liberty (as enshrined in the principles of the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence). In addition, codified international law (including the provisions of the UN Charter) is subject to re-interpretation, whether by national by national authorities (the Pinochet case) or by international bodies (creation of the International Criminal Court).

As represented by codified and customary law, then, two strands of international law are in conflict: the rights of states (sovereignty, non-interference) versus the rights of individuals (the right to life and other essential human rights). While most participants thought that customary law is increasingly giving primacy to human rights over sovereignty, the tension between them is anything but clear cut.

Taking the long view, governance in the international system has been evolving from that based on city-states to the nation-state of the 19th century to the supranational system of the late 20th century. A distinction was drawn between anthropological bases of organizing society (on commerce and transactions – the Europe of merchants) or states and groupings based on race and ethnicity (the Europe of warm-blooded patriots). Given the tensions and conflicts that ethnically-based groupings have caused, it is important when looking at a case like Kosovo that post-conflict reconstruction not perpetuate the types of conflicts that Kosovo represented by falling into the trap of reconstituting an ethnically-based Kosovar nationalism that will only necessitate international intervention in the future. As characterized by eight Balkan wars this century, there has been a history in southeastern Europe of the intellectual elite manufacturing images of nationalism that have been grounded in territorial aggrandizement (calls for a greater Serbia being only one example). What will happen if the success of securing the rights of the Kosovar Albanians leads to the collapse of political legitimacy in Serbia, which would then leave a vacuum that could be even more troubling for the international community?

It was recognized that there is a split in the international community, with many western states helping to evolve new norms of intervention, while others (Russia and China especially) profess commitment to the principles of non-intervention (albeit sometimes selectively). In the bipolar era of the Cold War, the superpowers emphasized the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Now, in a world that is far more fragmented, with the US as the sole major military power, the West stresses principles of intervention that run counter to the protection sought by smaller states in the principles of sovereignty. During the Cold War, moreover, the primary aim of military force was to deter a state from committing aggression beyond its own national borders. Now, the use of force has a primary aim of compelling acceptable behavior by a nation state within its borders. In a similar vein, what is really at issue is the general question of public responsibility in a global civil society. Yet at present, there are no widely agreed upon measures for collective security that satisfy the often conflicting priorities of different members of the international community.

Thus, as the meeting came to an end, many participants felt there was less division on the question of the legitimacy of intervention than there was on how the decision gets made and who implements it. A crucial consideration for the future should be analysis of the structure that could be called upon in the future to carry out interventions on behalf of the international community. As one example, how could one imbed a NATO action in a larger international context that gives it legitimacy (if one assumes that only NATO will be able to carry out interventions, but that these will need legitimacy conferred by the wider international community).

Certainly, there will continue to be debate on the appropriate criteria for intervention (as occurs in the US between strict vs. loose constructionists). And those states with ethnic problems who could be subject to intervention will naturally be wary of a western-oriented debate on intervention. Both of these considerations demand that, despite how well a particular intervention might be grounded in international law, the legitimacy conferred by public opinion is still important. Legal briefs are fine, but the support of the international community is vital if intervention against a sovereign state is to be legitimate.


International Pugwash would like to express its sincere thanks to Prof. Federico García-Moliner and the Spanish Pugwash group, and to the Fundació Caixa Castelló Bancaixa and its President, Sr. Antonio Tirado-Jimenez, for their hospitality and support in hosting the workshop.


  • Prof. Ulrich Albrecht, Acting Director, Department of Political Science, Free University, Berlin, Germany; Member, Pugwash Council
  • Mr. Rafael L. Bardaji, Senior Adviser for Political Affairs to the Defense Minister, Ministry of Defense, Madrid, Spain; Member, Board of Directors, Strategic Studies Group (GEES) [formerly: Director, GEES; Professor of International Politics, ICADE University, Madrid]
  • Prof. Nansen Behar, Member of Parliament, Republic of Bulgaria; Director, Institute for Social and Political Studies (ISPS), Sofia [formerly: Director, Centre for National Security Studies, Ministry of Defence, Sofia]
  • Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Associate Executive Officer, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA [formerly: Staff Aide, National Security Council, Washington, DC]
  • Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, Pugwash Council [formerly: Secretary-General (1989-97), Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Member (1982-92), Governing Board, SIPRI]
  • Prof. Manuel Coma, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (U.N.E.D.), Edificio de Humanidades, Madrid, Spain
  • Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Associate Professor of Mathematical Physics, University of Milan, Italy; Secretary General, Union of Italian Scientists for Disarmament (USPID); Director, Program on Disarmament and International Security, Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Italy
  • Dr. Ingemar Dorfer, Director of Research, National Defense Research Establishment, Stockholm, Sweden; Guest Scholar, CSIS, Washington, D.C. [formerly: Special Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affaisr (1992-94); Associate Professor of Government, Uppsala University]
  • Prof. Federico García-Moliner, Professor of Contemporary Science, University “Jaume I”, Castellón de la Plana, Spain; Member, Academic Board, European Peace University, Castellón Branch; Vice-President, IUPAP [formerly: Associate Professor, University of Illinois; Professor, Autonomous University of Madrid; Research Professor, Spanish Research Council]
  • Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden, Writer and broadcaster on foreign policy and security issues, London, UK; Trustee of World Humanity Action Trust; Board Member of NATO Defense College; Member of Defence Evaluation and Research Agency Analysis Board; Committee member of the Council for Arms Control; Member of a number of other academic advisory boards [formerly: Director of Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) (1997-98); Commandant, Royal College of Defence Studies (1995-96); Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (1992-95); Assistant Chief of Air Staff (1991-1992); various Royal Air Force posts (1965-1991)]
  • Dr. Leonard V. Johnson, Member, Pugwash Council [Retired Major General; formerly: Commandant, National Defence College of Canada (1980-1984); flying and senior command and staff positions in the Royal Canadian Air Force and Canadian Forces (1950-80)]
  • Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka. Professor, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany [formerly: Secretary of State for National Defence, Poland]
  • Prof. Robert Legvold, Professor of Political Science, The Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
  • Maj.-Gen. (US Army retired) William (Bill) Nash, Director, Civil-Military Programs, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington, DC, USA [formerly: Commanding General, Task Force Eagle (Multinational Division, North), Bosnia (1995-1996); Fellow and Visiting Lecturer, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1998)]
  • Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center for Political and International Studies (CPIS), Moscow, Russia; Deputy Chair, Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists for Disarmament and International Security; Vice-President of the Russian Political Science Association; Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Member, Pugwash Council
  • Prof. Dr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, Member of Parliament, and Chairman of the Defense Committee, Parliament of Romania, Chamber of Deputies, Bucharest, Romania; Professor, National School for Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest [formerly: Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor; State Secretary, Defense Ministry]
  • Dr. Oleksandr Pavliuk, Director, East West Institute, Kyiv Centre, Kyiv, Ukraine; Associate Professor, University of Kyiv-Mokyla Academy [formerly: Assistant to the State Advisor on Public Policy (1992)]
  • Prof. Ranko Petkovic, President, Yugoslav Association For International Law, Belgrade [formerly: Editor-in-chief, Review of International Affairs]
  • Dr. Alexander A. Pikayev, Program Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia; Director, Section on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences; Advisor, Office of Vice Chairman, The Duma Defense Committee [formerly: Chief Counsellor, Defense Committee of the State Duma]
  • Dr. Gwyn Prins, Senior Research Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, UK; Visiting Senior Fellow, Defence Evaluation & Research Agency (MoD),; Senior Fellow, Office of the Special Adviser on Central & Eastern European Affairs, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO [formerly: Lecturer in History and Politics, University of Cambridge; Fellow of Emmanuel College]
  • Prof. J. Martin Ramirez, Professor of Psychobiology and Head of the Aggression Research Unit, School of Education, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, Spain
  • Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
  • Dr. Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Budapest, Hungary
  • Pugwash Staff: Rome Office: Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash Conferences