On 27 August 2025 Pugwash organized a webinar with the Åland Islands Peace Institute on Outer Space Governance: WMD and Arms Control in an Era of Fragmenting Multilateralism. The purpose of the discussion was to build situational awareness of some of the most pressing technological, political and legal challenges to governance of outer space with respect to WMD, with the view of identifying concrete suggestions for arms control and confidence building.
The first theme focused on the governance of satellite systems in outer space, starting with the historical use of satellite remote sensing in nuclear arms monitoring (US CORONA program in the 1960s). Thereafter, the advancements in technology, particularly in machine learning and artificial intelligence, and their implications for arms control and verification processes were discussed. A framework for analysing trust in arms control was introduced, through a concept of a “trust budget”, distinguishing between confidence-based and trust-based relationships in arms control. Advancements in satellite remote sensing and machine learning could either enhance or detract from trust, depending on their impact on verification and cooperation. The potential for cyber threats to strain such trust budgets was also noted. On a last note, the difference between trust and confidence was brought up in the discussion, and it was said that confidence-building measures can aid in fostering trust but do not guarantee it. It was also noted how historical arms control efforts have focused more on managing nuclear deterrence rather than advancing disarmament, suggesting that this focus could lead to verification gap concerns that tend to be instrumentalized domestically to stall arms control progress.
The second webinar theme touched upon the increasing influence of private sector actors in the space industry and its implications for nuclear policy. An increasing interest in proliferated constellations could be noted as well as the role of private investment in shaping policy. While private companies drive technological progress, they also create risks related to misinformation and the commodification of critical infrastructure. A balanced regulatory approach and international cooperation were mentioned to tackle these challenges; the need for more public participation in regulatory discussions and the establishment of international rules for space traffic management were noted in this context.
The third theme was concerned with vulnerabilities in space-based systems, with the emphasis on the importance of satellite communications for various networks. Satellite communications are essential for positioning, navigation, and synchronizing critical networks. The risks to such communications arise from jamming and the potential for anti-satellite threats. The need for resilience in these systems was stressed. The convergence of technologies, such as AI and quantum entanglement, could enhance resilience and mitigate jamming threats. Proposed solutions for mitigating risks included maneuvering near-Earth orbit satellites and the development of a multi-faceted approach to communication technologies.
The fourth seminar theme presented the historical challenges of space arms control, with the focus on the legal frameworks established in the 1960s and 70s aimed at preventing war in outer space. Then the aim was to deconflict space, to disincentivize the various parties from having a conflict in space which can be clearly seen in the Outer Space Treaty. The current debate on space security actually started in the early 1980s. The shift in the United States´ stance on arms control resolutions at the UN was noted as well as the ongoing deadlock in disarmament discussions, particularly between major powers like the US, Russia, and China. The major players want the debate to stay static. There is an obvious necessity for a cohesive strategy (and not mismatched strategies) among major powers to advance arms control discussions in space. Work in the UN Working Groups was considered helpful in building common understanding, while technical governance issues were seen as possible first steps forward.
The last presentation highlighted the prevailing focus on space sustainability and space threat in current arms control discussions, while underscoring the critical yet often neglected concepts of space stability and space deterrence. A balanced understanding of these four interrelated concepts was deemed essential to developing effective, equitable and balanced space security governance. While sustainability is widely endorsed as a goal for space governance, stability—defined as a state free from space armed conflict where no actor is motivated to disrupt the existing equilibrium—remains under discussed. Stability should be regarded as the ultimate objective of space security, as it underpins all other goals, including sustainability. Overemphasizing sustainability while ignoring stability risks misdirecting international efforts, exacerbating tensions between negotiating camps, and overlooking the fundamental precondition for all space activities: a stable and conflict-free space environment. It also led to misunderstandings of the function of determining space threat which is often regarded as a prerequisite for the formulation of space arms control rules; the focus should be on specific space behaviours. Also, the one-sided framing of counter-space capabilities solely as threats was criticized, considering that such capabilities also serve as deterrents. Space deterrence—often combined with nuclear, conventional, or informational deterrence—plays a vital role in maintaining strategic stability and should not be taboo in negotiations. As a conclusion, a shift from a sustainability/threat-focused framework to one that integrates stability and deterrence was deemed necessary. It means a fundamental re-balancing of security interests. Future negotiations should be guided by the principles of comprehensiveness, interests-equilibrium, and self-restraint, requiring greater political courage and sincerity to achieve truly effective and balanced space arms control agreements.
Webinar Contributors
Dr Sara Al-Sayed, Union of Concerned Scientists
Mr Nicolas Ayala Arboleda, Munich Technical University & ISYP
Prof P. J. Blount, Durham University Space Research Centre
Prof Wang Guoyu, Beijing Institute of Technology
Dr Jyri Kosola, Colonel (ret), Finnish Defence Forces & Aalto University
Moderators:
Dr Katariina Simonen, Adjunct Professor of International Law and Arms Control National Defence University & Pugwash Council
Prof Kjell-Åke Nordquist, University College Stockholm
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 