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The Iranian Nuclear Issue

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COVER: Iran's nuclear negotiator,
Dr. Ali Larijani, at the Pugwash/CSR
conference, April 2006

PHOTO: Jeffrey Boutwell

To the Pugwash Community

Continuing Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Middle East Stability

The first half of 2006 witnessed continuing sectarian violence and domestic insurgency in Iraq and the inability of Iran and the international community to find a politically acceptable means for ensuring adequate transparency and confidence that Iran's nuclear technology program would not be diverted to military purposes. To that end, the Pugwash Conferences and the Center for Strategic Research in Tehran co-sponsored an international conference in April 2006 covering both Iran's nuclear energy program and the equally important issue of Iraq and regional stability (see p. 35). Unfortunately, little progress was made on either issue, whether at the conference or by the international community. When added to the continuing stalemate in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process occasioned by the election of a Hamas government, the outlook for Middle East stability could not have been more bleak.

56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs—Cairo

Accordingly, these and other major challenges to security in the Middle East will be the focus of the *56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs - A Region in Transition: Peace and Reform in the Middle East*, taking place in Cairo, Egypt from 10-15 November 2006. Under the direction of Pugwash Council member Mohamed Kadry Said, and with the help of Ambassadors Mohamed Shaker and Mohamed Ezzeldine Abdel Moneim and other members of the Egyptian Pugwash group, efforts have been underway for more than a year to invite senior policymakers and other specialists from throughout the Middle East, and internationally, to join Pugwash in Cairo. Plenary sessions and working groups at the *56th Pugwash Conference* will focus on such topics as nuclear non-proliferation generally and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in particular; the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Islam and the West; and the future of Iraq.

50th Anniversary of the Pugwash Conferences in 2007

Plans have also been underway for some time to commemorate in 2007 the 50th anniversary of the first Pugwash conference, held at Cyrus Eaton's Thinker's Lodge in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in July 1957. A workshop on *Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament* is scheduled to be held at Thinker's Lodge from 5-7 July 2007, along with events planned by the Pugwash Peace Exchange and the Pugwash Parks Commission. In October 2007, the *57th Pugwash Conference* in Bari, Italy will provide an opportunity for a major retrospective of fifty years of Pugwash efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and discussions of Pugwash strategies for realizing these objectives in the future. Many national Pugwash groups will also be holding commemorative events of the 50th Pugwash anniversary, information on which will be regularly posted on the Pugwash website.

Pugwash Study Group: *Threats without Enemies: The Security*

Aspects of HIV/AIDS

In February 2004, nine specialists on various aspects of HIV/AIDS met in a private house in Betty's Bay, near Cape Town, South Africa, to map out plans for a long-term Pugwash Study Group that would study the security implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in various settings around the world. Led by the chair of the Pugwash Council, Marie Muller, and Nola Dippenaar (South Africa) and Gwyn Prins (UK), that first meeting led to three more specialized HIV/AIDS workshops (two in South Africa and one in India, hosted by Pugwash President M.S. Swaminathan at his institute in Chennai) and a joint workshop in Corsica with the Pugwash Study Group on *Science, Ethics and Society*.

With funding from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the participation of medical, military, security, policy, and corporate specialists, the Study Group produced an impressive body of analysis and reports that had a marked influence on the policy debate over HIV/AIDS in South Africa, while also contributing to a substantive sharing of experiences with colleagues from India and East Africa at the Chennai conference. It also happened during the evolution of the Study Group that Gwyn Prins co-authored (with Tony Barnett) a major report for the United Nations, *HIV/AIDS and Security: Fact, Fiction and Evidence – A Report to UNAIDS* (September 2005).

The Study Group represented the best of the Pugwash tradition of bringing solid science to bear on important policy issues, and several of the papers written for Study Group meetings can be found in the Special Section, on p. 52.

Acknowledgments

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JEFFREY BOUTWELL, EDITOR



Thinker's Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia.

23rd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention: *Achieving a successful outcome of the Sixth Review Conference*

Geneva, Switzerland, 3–4 December 2005

Report by

C. A. McLeish

This was the twenty-third of the current Pugwash workshop series on chemical and biological warfare and the twelfth to be held in Geneva. The workshop was hosted by the Swiss Pugwash Group, and was jointly convened by the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons (HSP). More than fifty-nine people attended the workshop, by invitation and in their personal capacities, from 21 countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (US). This report of the workshop is the sole responsibility of its author, who was asked by the meeting to prepare a short report in consultation with the Steering Committee. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the workshop as a whole, or of the Study Group.

The meeting opened with a welcome from the Swiss Pugwash Group and the observation that this workshop was occurring at a critical moment—one year until the 6th



Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (the BWC)—and at a moment when the situation in arms control and non proliferation was not encouraging. It was observed that the international community, including Pugwash, needs to participate in a common search for answers.

The focus of the workshop was the Sixth Review Conference of the BWC although it was noted that the third Intersessional Meeting of States Parties was due to open in Geneva on 5th December 2005, the day following the close of the workshop. The workshop received its regular report on CWC progress in implementation

and also received an update on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). In addition to these reports on developments outside the BWC during the previous year, the main items for discussion by the workshop came under the rubric of achieving a successful outcome at the Sixth Review Conference including; what might constitute a successful outcome and what needs to be done to achieve a successful outcome. In looking beyond the Sixth Review Conference, the workshop discussed action plans and topics for future Intersessional Meetings.

CWC Progress and Implementation

A report was given on the status of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention including updates in relation to chemical weapons destruction and CWPf destruction and/or conversion; verification overview; action plans; and education and outreach. Other items touched upon included verification system optimization, international cooperation, assistance & protection and institutional issues such as the reelection of the Director-General, the establishment of the working group to prepare for the 2nd CWC Review Conference, and the report by the Director-General, due by mid 2006, evaluating the effects of tenure-policy implementation.

Since the last report to the workshop destruction figures for chemical weapons agent tonnes and items, including munitions and containers, stands at some 12,200 agent tonnes out of a declared total of 71,400 and 2,375,105 items out of a total of 8,671,564 (as of end of October 2005). Whilst destruction of chemical weapons production facilities is on track, the workshop was told that conversion of facilities has been delayed for reasons such as the EC decision-making processes and Libya entering the regime as a latecomer. The workshop was reminded that conversion of such facilities was originally seen as an exception but is now applied to approximately one third of all declared production facilities.

With regard to verification, the workshop was informed that, as of end October 2005, some 2256 inspections had taken place comprising of 124,479 inspector days. Over 70 percent of the total number of inspector days have been at Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities despite there being only 43 such facilities declared to the OPCW by six States Parties. An opinion was expressed that the CWC requires these facilities to be under verification at all times. Such a verification demand has resource implications if efforts to increase the pace of destruction are not matched with an increase in inspectorate size.

The report then turned its attention to the Action Plan on National Implementation of Article VII. It was noted that the plan was based on a recommendation from the First Review Conference (28 April–9 May 2003) and adopted by the Conference of the States Parties at its eighth session (20–24 October 2003). The target adopted then was to have full

Article VII implementation by the tenth session (7–11 November 2005). At that tenth meeting the action plan was reviewed and considered basically a success because the number of countries working on national legislation had increased. However, concerns about CWC national implementation remains—the main concern being the numbers of States Parties without legislation, or with major gaps in their legislation, but with significant chemical activities in production, trade, or use.

In recognition of this ongoing concern the workshop was informed that it was decided at the tenth session of the Conference of the States Parties to adopt a series of follow-up measures focused on improving implementation. For those States Parties without a national authority and legislation, the Technical Secretariat has requested them, by the end of 2005, to submit an implementation plan with target dates. The Technical Secretariat in turn is now required to report to each Executive Council session on the status of implementation. Should full implementation not be fulfilled by the 47th session of the Executive Council in November 2006, or notification of steps submitted to the Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council will consult with those States Parties before a final review, scheduled to take place at the eleventh session of the Conference of the States Parties in December 2006, decides whether any appropriate measures should be taken to ensure full implementation.

Turning to the universality action plan adopted by the Executive Council at its twenty-third meeting (October 2003), the speaker noted that it “was inspired by the idea” of full universality of the Convention by 2007.

In the year since the last update to the workshop, the speaker reported that good progress had been made—since October 2004 seven new states parties had joined the CWC and it is hoped that Iraq will join the CWC in the next year. It was noted that the OPCW has no regional offices and has no plans to establish them so much of the universality work depends on its relationship with regional organisations such as EU, AU, PIF, OAS, ASEAN. It was reported that the OPCW is working actively in the African region and that an exception to the ‘no regional office’ stance might be made for this region. It was reported that communication channels with the Arab League are now open but that there was still no progress regarding North Korea.

Regarding international co-operation the workshop was told that at the tenth session of the Conference of States Parties a decision had been adopted on Article XI implementation. The issue of Article XI implementation has remained unresolved since the PrepCom era so achieving a decision on this issue should be seen as confirming progress. Some of the main elements of the decision outlined to the workshop included: confirming the current portfolio of the TS ICA programmes; encouraging States Parties to develop cooperation projects; exchange scientific/technical information; chemicals & equipment and offers of cooperation; encouraging further programme development; and avoiding duplication of efforts by other International Organisations. The workshop was told that this decision still left many issues unresolved—for example, for some States Parties the main obstacles to Article XI implementation remain trade regulations and the Australia Group.

There are also divergent views as to how much international cooperation programmes should be implemented by the OPCW, and how much by States Parties.

One of the areas of interest to the workshop was the matter of education and outreach. The workshop was told of the joint efforts with IUPAC on how to integrate CWC requirements into professional codes of ethics/conduct and how to integrate CWC awareness and knowledge about its implementation into chemistry education. In October 2005 the material produced by IUPAC was piloted at a conference in Moscow. The next pilot will occur in Seoul in June 2006.

A further area of interest to the workshop was the advancement in technology relevant to the Convention. It was suggested that more attention needs to be given to the non lethal weapons issue. Concern was expressed that asking whether a new technology was covered or not could be eroding the norm contained in the Convention. Although acknowledged as a delicate issue, several participants recommended that an informal discussion process ought to be initiated now. It was believed that such a process need not necessarily be done under the auspices of the OPCW.

In addition to the more general report on the OPCW, the workshop also received a paper on what next for the OPCW. It was noted that in principle the CWC regime was in better health than the other regimes dealing with WMD and that the programme on universality and national implementation was impressive. The issue of national implementation, the workshop was reminded, will continue to be an agenda item because situations and environments will

change. Regarding the balances in verification efforts, it was suggested that changes can take place without changes to the Convention. It was suggested that the current verification effort is not properly supported and, because verification was a basic provision of the Convention, lack of support constituted a serious problem.

It was also noted that the ten-year destruction deadline will not be met. Although not questioning the need to extend that deadline to 15 years, questions were raised about the parameters of the decision that the Convention would necessitate. Several participants asked whether this would be a one-time-only extension or would States Parties to the Convention be forced to consider a new deadline if that extended deadline is not met. Participants also expressed concern that the Convention would be undermined if a second extension was requested because several thousand tonnes of agent remained in tact. It was asked whether it was time to revisit the definition of 'destruction' so that a second extension will not be requested.

UNSCR 1540 (2004)

The workshop was reminded that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 put the United Nations in the front line of arms control efforts again. Since UNSCR 1540 came into force, the 1540 Committee has received 124 responses, of which 35 have been followed up. Of the 67 states that have thus far failed to respond, most are in the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions. The power of UNSCR 1540, the workshop was reminded, is that it applies to both State Parties of the BWC, and also to non State Parties: indeed its measures do not differentiate

between those inside the treaties and those outside of them. However, because the focus of Resolution 1540 is terrorism there is pressure upon even small states to adhere strictly to the resolution so that terrorists cannot exploit them.

It was suggested to the workshop that the respective organizations of the WMD treaties might wish to explore the full possibilities and opportunities offered by Resolution 1540. It was thought there some pressures existed that might lead to the possibilities offered by Resolution 1540 being squandered. These include a lack of experts from developing countries; indifference or lack of support in capitals; and placing too much expectation on this measure whilst it is still new and fragile.

The workshop was told that the greatest threat to Resolution 1540 was bureaucratic: that 1540 would be swallowed up into other counter terrorism proposals and be merged with the other UNSC committees to form some sort of super committee on counter terrorism.

The workshop was informed that Argentina had held a Resolution 1540 workshop in September of this year and that a further workshop will be held in China next April. It seems clear that the mandate of the resolution will be extended beyond 2006 so achieving that extension will be the next hurdle.

The workshop agreed that Resolution 1540 has been a useful tool in raising awareness about the WMD problem and in mobilizing State Parties to work on or pass national implementation legislation. However, participants noted that the measure has also caused problems, such as State Parties prioritising Resolution 1540 reports over their other treaty

obligations. It was thought that this problem was caused by State Parties not understanding that 1540 obligations should have already been met by being a member of one of the WMD treaties—indeed those State Parties that are already in the CWC and BWC are already obliged to enact Resolution 1540 priorities.

As states will be reviewing their obligations under both the BWC and Resolution 1540 during 2006 the workshop considered how the BWC and 1540 could and should interact in the future to achieve a more effective non-proliferation framework.

Despite the complementary nature of the two approaches, the workshop was reminded that certain practical differences in their implementation make the two very different animals. For example, there is a fundamental difference in the scope of the two regimes and in who is legally bound by their provisions. It was thought though that within those differences lay a certain degree of overlap in both purpose and aim. Both, for example, contain similar language and are founded on an international norm against the weaponization of disease (although where the BWC proscribes these weapons in their entirety, the UNSC Resolution 1540 proscriptions only apply to non-state actors). By comparing key elements of Resolution 1540 with texts from the BWC, the workshop was reminded that there is a confluence in the activities pursued under the two regimes. These include

- Endorsing activities to create or strengthen mechanisms for regulating access to certain technologies and resources;
- Enhancing implementation assistance so that those States in a posi-

tion to offer assistance (whether directly or indirectly) do so;

- Pursuing the universalization and strengthening of the BWC;
- Ensuring the effective national implementation of the provisions of the BWC;
- Developing more effective cooperation and enhancing dialogue amongst States as a means of addressing the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons;
- Improving awareness-raising activities for industry and the general public; and
- Regularly reviewing the regimes to facilitate any decisions necessary to strengthen their activities.

It was suggested that the future evolution of Resolution 1540 might include assessing the legislative completeness of states' replies, harmonizing regulations between countries (e.g. harmonization of national control lists) and harmonizing legal jurisdictions.

The workshop was reminded that at present, there is no implementing body or organization in place to support the work of the BWC that is comparable to the OPCW or the IAEA. It was suggested that this lack of institutional presence may be a significant barrier to the integration of the BWC with other control mechanisms, including Resolution 1540, and that this complicates the development of any ongoing relationships. The authors of the report told the workshop that they believed that given the confluence of activities, there was a clear need to develop an operational mechanism for the BWC to cooperate with the 1540 Committee so that duplication of efforts can be avoided and benefits maximised.

An historical note

The workshop received an historical note examining the tension between the taboo against germ weapons and the institutional norms of government secrecy which can be seen to have been present during the offensive BW programmes in the 20th century.

The historical note reminded the workshop that at the same time as prosecuting defeated fascist leaders for crimes against humanity and for conducting a war of aggression in Nuremberg, Allied Forces were suppressing evidence of identical crimes at the Toyko war crimes trial. It was suggested that this was because US intelligence and military officials were brokering a secret amnesty agreement with Japanese biological weapons scientists to protect them from war crimes prosecution—these scientists had been responsible for inhumane research on Chinese civilians and others and for repeated attacks on Chinese cities and towns with lethal and debilitating disease agents.

In discussion the workshop was informed that many interviews were now being conducted in China about this period and that over 20 books (in Chinese) had been written on the subject. The workshop was also informed that the former offensive programme was still a taboo subject in Japan and that consequently discussions about its nature or consequences do not take place. It was suggested that not having these discussions hampers the current development of Japanese thoughts on disease protection. It was also claimed that the Japanese government still has documents about Unit 731 which it refuses to release and that such actions prevent this period from being laid to rest.

The workshop noted that there was much contemporary relevance for this historical study. The paper highlighted for example the unusual and complex circumstances in which national security rationales can justify deviance from widely accepted humanitarian norms. The workshop noted that national security has its own norms based on protection of the state through the pursuit of military or military-related advantage. However, the culture of secrecy that often surrounds national security activities runs counter to the fundamentally humanitarian enterprise of studying and controlling infectious disease outbreaks from *any* source. It was suggested that secrecy would actually increase the health risks to the public because countering outbreaks relies on timely and accurate information in order to make appropriate safe decisions about medical intervention.

The Sixth BWC Review Conference

What would be a successful outcome?

Much discussion during the workshop centred on what might constitute a successful outcome of the upcoming Sixth Review Conference. For some, success would be defined by State Parties realizing tangible products such as a comprehensive review of the operation of the Convention; a Final Declaration with reaffirmations and extended understandings such as a reaffirmation that prohibitions embrace all scientific and technological advances; a reaffirmation that possibility of use is excluded completely and forever; and a reaffirmation that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever. It was also proposed that State Parties needed to

reinforce the importance of ensuring, through national measures, the effective fulfilment of obligations under the Convention in order to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity and it was suggested that this might be done through the adoption of a series of action plans on universal adherence, universal national implementation, and the adoption of measures to enhance the submission of CBM returns by all State Parties.

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It was proposed that State Parties needed to reinforce the importance of ensuring, through national measures, the effective fulfilment of obligations under the Convention in order to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity

Comment was made that there was a need to avoid sending the same message as the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference i.e. that something was seriously wrong. It was thought that this Review Conference ought to *do* something useful. On the issue of reaffirming past commitments the workshop was asked what message might be sent if no reaffirmation could be agreed this time? Some participants felt that there was no need to make these reaffirmations arguing that once something has been agreed then it remains so.

The workshop considered whether the proposals being made for next year's BWC Review Conference might be based on an unduly limited approach. It was thought, for

example, that the proposals aired were thus far based on what was politically possible now in 2005, and centred on today's issues of concern. The opinion was mooted that State Parties need to ask where they wish the BWC to stand in 10 years time, or at the 10th Review Conference. Are, for example, annual meetings a long-term goal for the Convention or just something to see State Parties through the immediate future? It was suggested that perhaps one reason for the lack of ambition in the proposals is that few in any of the delegations will have ever been present for a full review of the Convention.

It was suggested to the workshop that any proposal to strengthen the BWC rests on its broader political appeal and that given the crowded political agenda during 2006 efforts to prevent the spread of biological weapons and to strengthen the BWC are unlikely to be at the top of the agenda unless a lot of effort is expended putting it there.

3. Achieving a successful outcome
A. The Preparatory Committee—what needs to be achieved?

In respects of the preparation of the Review Conference, the workshop received the suggestion that the Prep-Com for the 6th Review Conference ought to last for a whole week so that State Parties have time to consider issues under the general headings:

- Date and duration;
- Provisional agenda;
- Draft rules of procedure;
- Background documentation;
- Publicity; and
- Final document(s).

In terms of date and duration of the Review Conference the workshop was reminded that as this is to be the first time since 1991 that a full review of the Convention is to take place then it should last three weeks. It was agreed however, that if sufficient consultation had taken place prior to the PrepCom then this suggested one week period of meeting for the PrepCom could be reduced.

It was suggested to the workshop that, if it was intended that this Review Conference be deliberately different from the preceding one, a different mandate to the Secretariat might be needed. It was suggested that there was much value in the Secretariat undertaking specific pieces of work between the PrepCom and the actual Review Conference. Whilst the topics for such papers and the extent of those pieces of work are matters to be decided by the States Parties, it was suggested that in addition to the three background documents normally prepared for Review Conferences (participation in CBMs, compliance by States Parties, and information on scientific and technological advances) State Parties might consider additional background documents detailing information on actions taken by States Parties following MSP/2003, MSP/2004 & MSP/2005 and specifically focused papers on the possible modalities for measures such as Action Plans, transparency and CBMs, etc.

Although there was a recognized limit on what the Secretariat can do that is both substantial and innovative, the workshop participants did think that such additional background documents would greatly assist in the necessary collective preparation for this Review Conference.

B. The Outcomes of the Intersessional Process—how to deal with these?

In respect of the outcomes of the intersessional process, the workshop was reminded that the Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of the intersessional meetings and decide on any further action. It was thought that State Parties might consider all the meetings together under one agenda item or consider each of the five topics under the appropriate Article(s) of the Convention—so that national measures to implement will be discussed under Article IV;

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Discussions about codes have turned out to be more complicated than initially expected.
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national biosecurity measures discussed during the review of Articles III & IV; investigation & response to alleged use when Articles VI & VII are discussed, disease surveillance when Article X is reviewed and finally codes of conduct under Article IV discussions.

Under the topic of codes of conduct, the workshop heard two reports from participants interested in the role that ought to be played by scientists in the guardianship of their work. The first report addressed whether the time has come to formulate guidelines, perhaps in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic oath, for the ethical conduct of work performed by life scientists and the second report summarised the recent international biosecurity efforts involving the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, including a report from a con-

ference organized by the International Form on Biosecurity (Como, 20-22 March 2005) and the recent Inter Academy Panel Statement on Biosecurity.

Both reports recognised that the issue of codes of conduct was not new, one participant recalled that at the Third Review Conference in 1991 the Council for Responsible Genetics organised an oath which was similar to what is now being discussed. Furthermore it was also noted that calls had been made in 1992 for postdoctoral students to be the focus of such codes because of the spread of post-docs within the academic community and the scientific industries. However, the importance of codes for all engaged in the life sciences was also recognised.

The observation was made that discussions about codes have turned out to be more complicated than initially expected: regarded as a simple exercise, issues concerning definitions, scope and legalities have proved more complicated than anticipated. For example, whilst participants fully accepted that scientists ought to be guardians of their own work, participants debated whether that meant a purely self-governing system excluding the possibility of external criticism. Some believed that rather than leave this important oversight work to scientists alone, oversight committees were needed to scrutinize the work of scientists. It was argued that representatives of many constituencies, not simply the scientific community, ought to sit on these committees and review individual experiments or programmes of work before the experiments have begun.

On the issue of whistle blowing it was suggested that any code ought to

include some form of words that offer encouragement to those who wish to come forward to report deviations from the accepted standards of behaviour and show that adequate protection will be offered to them. It was noted that the global coalition against corruption 'Transparency International' has developed some thoughts on the issue of whistle blowing and the protection needed, although better wording than presented there would be needed for BW issues.

Both reports stressed the need significantly to increase efforts to educate scientists about the nature of the risks associated with dual-use biological and chemical technologies and the responsibilities of scientists to address and manage those risks. It was suggested that such awareness-raising courses could take place at the university level, and that any universities which undertake to teach such courses ought to be rewarded. At the very least these courses need to make it clear that scientists have obligations under national and international law.

C: Key Elements of the Sixth Review Conference

The workshop received a number of reports concerning key elements of the Sixth Review Conference. Topics covered included: advances in science and technology relevant to the BWC; national implementation; consultation and co-operation including CBMS; international co-operation and development and universality.

Concerning the issue of advancing science and technology, the workshop received two reports and was forewarned about two issues. The first, that the increasing multidisciplinary dimensions of scientific work

needs to be addressed; and the second issue concerned a potential paradigm shift being indicated by the new research agendas. Concern was expressed that together these two issues might result in the dual use dilemma being raised to a new level of complexity. Looking beyond the Sixth Review Conference, both reports suggested that more frequent analysis and review of science and technology advances was needed. Participants believed that scientific and technological advances were occurring too rapidly for a meaningful assessment to take place only at five-year intervals.

There was debate amongst participants at this workshop about the recommendation put forward in both reports that States Parties to the BWC should consider reaffirming that the prohibitions contained in the BWC covered all scientific and technological advances. As before, some participants voiced their concern that continual reaffirmations about commitments or obligations previously made might be construed as a necessary activity before those prohibitions are placed upon the new scientific or technological advancement. For example, it was noted that although nanotechnology is a 'new' technology it is already covered under the General Purpose Criterion contained in Article I.

Participants were reminded that this General Purpose Criterion applies to all science and technology advances and that all participants need to be vigilant against deviant interpretations. It was also suggested that time spent reaffirming commitments and prohibitions could be spent reviewing other aspects of the Convention.

The useful information that

emerged from the 2003 meetings about national implementation, the workshop was told, needed to be further developed before the Review Conference so that something meaningful could be done with it. For example, the suggestion was made that a modular approach was needed whereby an action plan was backed by an implementation support unit which itself fed into a legal advisors network. This latter network was considered to be one way of co-ordinating assistance by states and NGOs and of also gaining experience from other treaties. The workshop was reminded that there was no one way to approach such co-ordination activities because political matchmaking as well as legal-system matchmaking and language matchmaking was required for effective implementation assistance.

The idea that State Parties might consider implementing an action plan using the OPCW's Action Plan on national implementation as a model was discussed by the workshop. Participants were reminded that it took 6 months from the decision being made by the Executive Council to the action plan existing. It was suggested then that an informal consultation process was needed which might consider issues such as objectives and criteria for such plans in the BWC context; the evaluation procedures at the end of such plans; and time frames for such plans.

Agreeing on an action plan for universality was considered as something uncontroversial which the States Parties at the 6th Review Conference might be able to adopt. Indeed it was suggested at the workshop that it might be possible to link that action plan with other activities

such as joint missions and workshops and civil society collaborations. The workshop was told that new approaches would be needed if the BWC was to catch up with the CWC in terms of membership. At the time of writing, the BWC lagged behind by about 20 states, having 155 States Parties out of the 191 UN members. It was thought that these 20-odd states hold no major political objections to the BWC and so might be persuaded to join before attention turns to the common-difficult states. The idea of creating a special role for certain countries to promote regional universality was put forward. If such a role were to be given to the depository states then this role might promote general universality to all WMD related treaties.

The workshop was reminded that central to the issue of universality is the creation of incentives to join a treaty. Once such advantages are visible for all to see then non States Parties, especially those that do not see a direct threat from biological weapons, might wish to be “in the club”. For

example, under the CWC schedule 1 and 2 chemicals are not allowed to be exported to non CWC states parties and although they have failed to agree to ban exports of schedule 3 chemicals to non states parties these access restrictions are persuasive. Similarly in the CTBT member states are given access to a lot of data and given assistance. The Landmine Treaty also recognised the need to create incentives so that states might join the treaty. In its case, certain states took the responsibility to convene ‘open ended workshops’ in an attempt to improve transparency and trust and to build confidence.

One issue raised in connection to increasing transparency and trust was the CBMs. It was suggested that a revamp of the CBM form and content might be timely with States Parties at the Review Conference considering deletion of superfluous topics and introduction of new ones, for example whether codes of conduct existed in relevant areas of science. Old questions remained unanswered however but hotly debated by partici-

pants: how does one get more participation in the CBM process? How does one deal with omission or ambiguities? What ought to be done with the information gathered?

A consensus of sorts was developed concerning the link between non-universality in the BWC and it having no implementing organisation. It was noted that although the depository states have a duty of stewardship to promote universality to the BWC it is not really their role because they have no real authority to be any more proactive than other States Parties. However, it was suggested that the depository states could make common lists of membership.

There was broad agreement amongst the participants at the workshop that all those engaged in the Sixth Review Conference needed to prepare actively for a successful outcome. The focus needs to be on what can be achieved to strengthen the regime prohibiting biological and toxin weapons.

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4th Pugwash Workshop on *Stability, Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia*

Beijing, China, 12–15 January 2006

Report by

Mark B.M. Sub

The 4th Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security co-sponsored by the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) and the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) was held in Beijing from 12th to 15th January 2006. This workshop was locally organized by the Program for Science and National Security Studies (PSNSS) in close cooperation with three sponsoring institutions. Special thanks to Gen. Pan Zhenqiang, Prof. Li Hua and Mr. Niu Qiang for their efficient collaboration in organizing the workshop within little time.

This workshop was not only timely but very important; as the region is beset by the crisis over the dialogue process in search of a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue through the six-party talks is in jeopardy. Due to the financial sanctions against the DPR Korea (North Korea) by the US since last October, the tension between the US and North Korea is increasing and have reached a new height in the region. Participants from major countries in the region, namely the US, China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas plus two from Europe and one from Pakistan attended the three days

meeting and engaged in intensive and serious discussions at a comfortable and beautiful surrounding in Beijing. This meeting had an unusually large participation of Chinese experts on Korea and security matters. Three people from North Korea participated actively and presented papers.

The first session dealt with the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and started out with a brief assessment of developments over the North Korean nuclear issue. One South Korean expert pointed out a repeated pattern of crisis over the North Korean issue and tried to explain why. According to him, the reason behind this problem was basically lack of trust and deeply rooted mutual hostility between the

US and North Korea since the Korean War. He urged the conflicting parties to have more patience and be wiser to resolve the problem.

One of the North Korean participants stressed that the prolonged hostile policy of the US is the real problem and asked for change of this policy to solve the problem. He demanded the financial sanctions to be lifted to remove obstacles to the six-party talks. He also mentioned that having nuclear capability is simply matter of survival for North Korea. He also called for an end of the double standard in the non-proliferation issue, saying that some countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India are accepted and respected by the US as nuclear powers and also





Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and participants at the Beijing workshop.

Japan is allowed to stockpile plutonium which can be used for nuclear weapons. He pointed out that the US might have attacked Iraq because Saddam Hussein had failed to acquire nuclear capability.

Regarding the nuclear capability of North Korea, one of the leading nuclear expert from the US reported about his recent two trips to North Korea including a visit to the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. Being the only Westerner who has seen the plutonium metal first-hand, he shared his view on the North Korean nuclear capability. According to his assessment, North Korea might possess already about 45 kg of plutonium and has acquired necessary technologies to produce nuclear weapons, but he does not believe in actual weaponization. He is rather concerned about plutonium being in wrong hands.

Another US expert assessed the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and called for early resumption of the talks. According to him, the statement is neither a breakthrough nor much ado about nothing. He stressed that the

US needs to do more to improve the atmosphere for dialogue but North Korea should come to the negotiating table without any precondition. The Joint Statement being a vital first-step, he called on the US and North Korea to work hard with more flexibility and creative thinking to make it a breakthrough. He thinks that China, as the host and facilitator for the talks, can persuade North Korea since it is in its national interest to have North Korea return to the talks without precondition.

In the second session on the nuclear non-proliferation issue in Northeast Asia, the Japanese nuclear policy was in the focus of interest. Two Chinese experts drew attention to Japan's nuclear capabilities. One North Korean participant also called attention to Japan's growing nationalism and militarization. He argued that no one could guarantee that Japan would not attack the US as it did with Pearl Harbor. Some Chinese and North Koreans viewed the Japanese stockpiling of plutonium as a serious security threat not only to the region but the whole world and called for a shutting down of the

Rokkasho Maru reprocessing plant which is scheduled to go into operation this year. Japan's current possession of plutonium is enough to produce 4000 nuclear warheads, and the new plant might produce 5 to 12 tons of plutonium per year.

One of the Japanese participants stressed that transparency is the best solution to the problem and explained the Japanese nuclear policy in historical and technical perspectives. He mentioned that due to the lack of nuclear waste storage facilities in Japan, it is cheaper to reprocess the spent fuel rods and to stockpile plutonium. Japan has no intention to go nuclear or misuse the plutonium for military purposes. It is purely for energy self-sufficiency and for nuclear policy as decided in the 1950s and 1970s. Japan is now paying a high price for this policy but it is difficult to reverse it due to the domestic constraints. Nevertheless, Japan is in full safeguard with the IAEA and there is no danger of misuse. Heated debates followed his presentation mostly by the Chinese and North Korean participants. The issue is likely to be seen as a security chal-

lenge in the region as the Rokkasho Maru plant starts operation this year.

The third and fourth session was devoted to the relations of the big powers and their influence on East Asian security. Two Chinese experts assessed the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on the US policy. They pointed out that the Bush administration has refused for three years and is still reluctant to deal directly with North Korea. One Chinese scholar proposed to help North Korea to overcome its economic difficulties and to narrow the gap between North and South Korea. A few North Korean and Chinese participants blamed the US for using the North Korean issue as an excuse in order to encourage Japan to strengthen its military and to build up the Missile Defense system against China. Growing military cooperation between the US and Japan is seen by some as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region.

One of the US participants expressed critical opinion on the Bush administration for provoking North Korea to speed up its nuclear program and to build up nuclear capabilities. As long as the US hostility exists, North Korea is likely to continue to expand its nuclear program. He emphasized that North Korea repeatedly offered to trade off its nuclear capability to end enmity by normalizing political and economic relations and by providing assurances not to attack it, not to interfere in its internal affairs, or impede its economic development by maintaining sanctions or discouraging aid and investment from others. He called for serious change in Washington's hostile policy against North Korea and to end military exercises in the South as well as to give up war

plans. He sees a need for a peace keeping system on the Korean peninsula and for an early resumption of the six-party talks.

Another prominent participant focused the attention on strategic interests of the US and Russia in the Northeast Asian region. He stressed that the US acts according to its international strategic interest and the new Russia has not yet developed a fully fledged strategic policy in the region. He read out a letter signed by President Clinton to the North Korean leader Chairman Kim Jong Il two days prior to the Geneva Framework Agreement in 1994 where Clinton personally assured the North

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***Growing military cooperation
 between the US and Japan is seen
 by some as a serious threat to
 peace and stability in the region.***

Korean leader that two light water reactors would be delivered. The letter went a long way to explain the continuing North Korean demand for the light water reactors. The recent financial restrictions in Macau targeting North Korea are seen as part of the US financial encirclement by Pyongyang. They are, therefore, likely to remain a fundamental roadblock against resumption of the six-party talks. The six-party talks are only on the denuclearization issue which is the interest of the US. But Pyongyang is more interested in talking about security from regime change; as such change can come not only by military intervention but also by human rights agitation and precisely financial sanctions.

The final session focused on confidence building and search for lasting security cooperation in the region. One prominent US participant called on the US to take the first step to break the deadlock, as it is much more powerful and stronger than North Korea. The US can afford to take the risk and solve the problem, the sooner the better. The US should provide security guarantees and economic compensation in return for the North Korean dismantlement of its nuclear program. The plutonium stockpile in North Korea should be neutralized, so terrorists can not get hold of it. He made an interesting suggestion to resolve the problem: All parties including the US and South Korea should help North Korea to modernize and upgrade its complete energy system into a more reliable and sustainable one. In return, North Korea should offer its 20-30 kg plutonium.

One influential South Korean scholar urged the US as the center of the world to be more humble and to show respect to small countries. He suggested that the US use more preventive diplomacy in multilateral forums such as the six-party talks instead of military preemption in unilateral approaches which have their own limits. He strongly warned against exaggerating the situation and talking too much about the worst case scenario on the Korean peninsula. He instead called for more positive thinking and collective wisdom to ensure stability, security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences, Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, in the end stressed that countries should not believe that mere possession of nuclear weapons is reliable deterrence against nuclear

attack or guarantee for security. In contrast, the US would attack any country militarily to prevent from trying to develop nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, he stressed that only full implementation of the September 19th Joint Statement is the best security guarantee, as the US is likely to have no more excuse to attack North Korea and the international community may feel more sympathetic to North Korea.

All in all, the three days workshop was a fruitful and unique opportunity to discuss about sensitive regional issues in different perspectives in order to understand each others interest better. It was clear that lack of trust among countries in the region still exists and needs to be overcome by mutual respect and better information. All participants agreed that the six-party process is the best mechanism at present and should move forward to find a negotiated solution to realize the nuclear-free Korean peninsula. To this end, the Pugwash workshops are not only useful but a much appreciated forum for regional confidence-building and for cooperation in peace building in this conflict ridden region. The fifth workshop is planned to be held this July at the beautiful Kumgang Mountain and Panmunjom, North Korea. The main topic will be the security on the Korean peninsula: How to transform the truce agreement into a peace mechanism.

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Pugwash Workshop on *Prospects for Self-Governance in Jammu & Kashmir and the Present Status of Cooperation and Communication across the Line of Control*

Islamabad, Pakistan, 10-12 March 2006

Report by

Claire Galez

Throughout the document, unless otherwise specified, “Kashmir” or “Jammu and Kashmir” is taken to mean the whole territory comprising both Indian and Pakistani Administered Jammu and Kashmir

The India-Pakistan bilateral composite dialogue intended at implementing normalization measures mainly in the form of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and at consolidating a long awaited peace process has maintained a reasonable pace since April 2003. It remains nonetheless that over the years, the State of Jammu and Kashmir’s approximate total population of over 14 million has been kept hostage of the most conservative ideologies, from claims over the entire territory by either Pakistan or India, to forceful annexation, status quo, re-Partition or secessionism in the form of independence or access to Pakistan

by force through Jihad. At this point, the Himalayan region’s projected future still takes very different shapes in the minds of various stakeholders and remains a prickly issue between the two countries.

Since 2002, Pugwash Conferences pioneered a number of initiatives contributing to an India-Pakistan rapprochement. Several closed-door sessions in India, in Pakistan and abroad were organized with the intention of offering concerned parties and individuals the chance to creatively exchange their views with frankness in a tension-free atmosphere.

In November 2004, after intense consultations with the governments of India, Pakistan and different parties in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) across the Line of Control (LoC), Pugwash initiated its first Kashmir specific meeting in Kathmandu, hosting eminent politicians, diplomats, intellectuals and civil society representatives. The experience was very successful in that it resolved to integrate the Kashmiri leadership and society in a framework of semi-official dialogue with a reach to the formal circles of bilateral negotiators. Moreover, both India and Pakistan responded quite positively to the initiative.

On 10-12 March 2006, Pugwash convened an enlarged meeting, principally of Kashmiri representatives

from Pakistan and Indian Administered Kashmir entitled “*Prospects of Self-Governance in Jammu & Kashmir and the Present Status of Cooperation and Communication across the Line of Control*”. About eighty delegates from Pakistan and Indian Administered Kashmir’s mainstream and opposition political parties and members of the civil society, members of the Kashmiri Diaspora, Indian and Pakistani diplomats, academicians and representatives of both countries’ civil society participated in the meeting. On the eve of President Musharraf’s proposals for formulae of demilitarization, increase of exchanges across the LoC and on self-governance for Kashmir, the meeting held in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, was considerably enriched by an over two hour exchange of views with Pakistan’s President, Pervez Musharraf.

The Pugwash Conferences express deep appreciation to the governments of Pakistan and India for helping facilitate the meeting. Pugwash also expresses its deep appreciation to all participants for the genuine goodwill they showed in attending the meeting and in making free and exceptionally constructive input. Pugwash is especially grateful to President Musharraf for the warmth and candidness with which he welcomed and interacted with the delegation.

Acronyms used in the document:

J&K:	Jammu and Kashmir
IaK:	Indian Administered Kashmir
PaK:	Pakistan Administered Kashmir
NAs:	Northern Areas
LoC:	Line of Control
CBMs:	Confidence Building Measures

Background

In declaring his intention to order a ceasefire along the Line of Control dividing Indian and Pakistani Administered Kashmir in August 2003, Pakistan's President made a breakthrough in the dangerously escalating tensions between his country and India. In October the same year, India responded positively to the ceasefire offer and to President Musharraf's proposal for dialogue by putting a set of 12 Kashmir-specific CBMs on the table. India also announced its readiness to broaden the New Delhi-Kashmir dialogue and make it inclusive of the indigenous separatist leadership. In November 2003 both countries agreed to extend the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan's International Border (IB), the Line of Control (LoC) and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Siachen; a plan that was implemented on 25 November at midnight. Pakistan went an extra mile by announcing it would no longer let its territory be used in support to cross-border terrorism. In spite of opposition at home, President Musharraf also announced that he would consider stepping down from Pakistan's traditional stand on international platforms demanding the implementation of UN Resolutions 1949.

Multi-track bilateral diplomatic exercises ensued with India and Pakistan resuming talks on major issues such as the construction of dams, the opening of roads, bus and rail services, visa regulations, economic cooperation, energy policies, nuclear safeguards, borders security, terrorism and drug trafficking. These diplomatic exercises were occasionally accompanied by goodwill gestures and resulted in the implementation of several CBMs including the

opening of bus services between the two parts of Kashmir. In a joint statement at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2004 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who had taken office in May, and President Musharraf delivered a joint statement where they addressed the issue of Kashmir and "*agreed that possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue should be explored in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner*".

After the earthquake of October 2005 that devastated mostly regions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan Administered Kashmir) and was one of the most colossal human tragedies in decades, Pakistan seldom accepted Indian helping hand in relief operations. On the other hand, reports of the Pakistan Army's dependence on banned Jehadi groups for relief operations, the following resurgence of violent political killings in Indian Administered Kashmir (IaK) and the Delhi bombings of 25 October 2005 which killed over 60 people, made India more elusive in negotiations.

The bilateral normalization process was not derailed but India and Pakistan could ultimately only agree on opening five crossing points on the LoC. For people in Kashmir, on both sides of the LoC, it was felt as '*so little, so late*'.

By December 2005, two rounds of India-Pakistan composite dialogue had been completed, a third round started on January 17, 2006.

In the framework of bilateral dialogue with India, the question of Jammu and Kashmir remains central for the Pakistani establishment which, for various reasons, cannot deceive its local constituencies on its decades' pledge to sympathise fully

with the people of Kashmir on the other side of the LoC as much as it can hardly redraw national security paradigms and compromise on established national security issues, including non-military security. In international circles the question of Kashmir is increasingly perceived as a matter of regional security with worldwide implications, a view shared by most decision-makers in New Delhi but for different reasons. New Delhi has come to the realization that if there is no reason to avoid addressing the issue of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, for both countries the matter is confined to security constraints and the two should abide by the rules of—and respect for—each country's sovereignty while the thrust of conflict resolution lies with the traditional and emerging Kashmiri leaderships of all parts of Kashmir. In Kashmir, on both sides of the LoC, the process is viewed as extremely slow, lacking inclusiveness and lacking perceptible positive effects. Disenchantment towards both countries increases by the day while several key concerned parties, often holding diametrically opposite ideologies, hardly dare stepping down from their maximalist positions.

In an all inclusive effort, Pugwash' meeting in Islamabad offered a platform to major Kashmiri, Pakistani and Indian schools of thought, as varied and opposed as they can be.

The meeting in Islamabad opened with a plenary session, followed by a closed-door session of Kashmiri representatives. In parallel, Indian and Pakistani delegates deliberated on how to reconcile the bilateral peace process of negotiations with the needs and aspirations of the diverse Kashmiri groups and their representatives. What are the self-governance



President Musharraf and Pugwash Council member Pervez Hoodbhoy

formulae that would reconcile Indian and Pakistani constraints with Kashmiri aspirations? What are the measures that each country needs to take to grant “*free political space*” for Kashmiri peoples to express themselves and contribute positively to shaping the future of the State? The meeting reconvened and concluded in plenary session

General debate

On the political front, some delegates noted that there could be no quick fix for the State since a major feature of J&K is its geographic, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity rooted in different historical realities and presently evolving in varied political systems. On the other hand, some delegates warned against the danger of further dividing the State on the basis of its diversity. To view diversity in terms of convergence versus divergence was encouraged by some delegates. There are different models that need to be studied and discussed in order to suitably ascertain the will of the people and implement an appropriate form(s) of self-governance. Some delegates noted that the Kashmiri mainstream and emerging lead-

erships, irrespective of them belonging to Indian Administered Kashmir (IaK) or Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PaK), remain deeply divided on both the projection of a possible settlement or on measures that could ease tensions and improve the current situation.

In terms of conflict resolution most participants expressed their appreciation for the India-Pakistan peace process—or process of normalization—but when it comes to Kashmir, for a majority of the participants the process is viewed as sluggish and both India and Pakistan are perceived as diluting their good will declarations in actual negotiations. Some delegates pointed at the historic reality that if it is essential to acknowledge the centrality of the people of Kashmir this does not lessen the importance of the role India and Pakistan have and should play in resolving their disputes and in creating sustainable political, social and economic space for Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC.

On the question of Kashmir specific CBMs, many delegates noted that although some valuable CBMs had been agreed upon by both coun-

tries, most of these were still too restrictive and inaccessible to the common man. The lack of engagement of the civil society creates increasing disillusionment and alienation. If this perception is not immediately levelled out within the Kashmiri society, it holds the risk, in a medium-long run, to be counter-productive to the peace process. It is essential for the CBMs to be successful that they carry the benefit of a trickle down effect making a qualitative difference to the common man’s personal life in terms of security, humanitarian relief and economic improvement. On the other hand it should be remembered that CBMs are not an end in themselves but stepping stones. In the course of negotiations, India and Pakistan seem to be halted by much apprehension of each other and of the Kashmiri people as demonstrated in the aftermath of the earthquake. Kashmiri delegates at the meeting made the pressing demand that both countries should demonstrate their good will by acting more positively and visibly on the ground.

Status quo not acceptable:

Most delegates agreed that the present status quo within and towards the State was unacceptable. For most delegates, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has the potential to become a bridge of friendship between India and Pakistan rather than a bone of contention. To this end, delegates expressed the view that both India and Pakistan have to overcome their distrust towards the people of Kashmir. Simultaneously, outside and within J&K, on both sides of the LoC, responsible leadership should demonstrate genuine political will to make the State recover from the deep trauma of years of violence and inse-

curity that has affected up to the remotest parts of the State. It was recognized by a majority of participants that the settlement of J&K holds a key to durable peace, security and prosperity in the region. Most participants also agreed that for the people to decide their future by free will in a democratic participatory process they should be essentially freed from violence and intimidation. Mature and able leadership should vigorously engage in bringing to the fold those who still believe in violent means.

In the course of the first plenary session, the participants' input also mainly contributed to reviewing the situation as perceived from different parts of the State.

In the Valley of IaK, there is still a high level of violence where the confrontation between terrorists, armed militias and mighty state security forces claims innocent lives daily. Beyond human rights violations committed by both the militants and the various security agencies, such climate of destruction and insecurity impedes any meaningful socio-economic and even political development in a context where societal conditions have only degenerated over the years. A large majority of the participants therefore resolved that an immediate end to all forms of violence is a cornerstone for political progress and social reconstruction. It was also felt that an end to all forms of violence was crucial for people to regain confidence in their institutions, and for them to contribute constructively to a genuine intra-Kashmiri rapprochement inclusive of all communities of J&K within and across the divide.

Short of its demand for becoming a Union State Territory within India,

Laddakh for its part, has achieved a certain modicum of autonomy where both its regions (Laddakh and Kargil) are represented in all democratic institutions of governance including at the national level. Although Laddakh has not suffered from violent confrontations in a direct fashion (barring the 1999 Kargil episode) the collateral damage in Laddakh is strongly felt in socio-economic terms. Would the peace process and meaningful CBMs lead to serious reduction of high risk tensions between India and Pakistan, Laddakh would welcome the reopening of its traditional trade routes to Gilgit, Skardu and Central Asia. Concerned participants underlined that divided families in the Laddakh-Baltistan sector should be given equal humanitarian consideration and called for the opening of the traditional Skardu-Kargil route. It was suggested that a healthy development meanwhile would be to allow the Laddakh/Kargil Hill Development Councils to visit the NAs and meet with the Northern Areas Legislative Council. On the other hand, while Laddakh is by and large a self-administered territory, to create a regional dynamic that would have a genuine trickle down effect and bear considerable benefits for the peoples of the region, self-governance would have to be equally applied to the contiguous territories of the Northern Areas.

In the Jammu region, the question of minorities (principally Sikh and Hindu) has to be taken into consideration. Minorities should be duly represented in any breaking-ground development and be part of the process leading to self-governance. The question of internal migration across the State also deserves closer attention. Most Muslim or Hindu

families who left the Valley in the wake of unbearable violence have lost most of their possessions but also much of their cultural and social roots. These communities' voice must be heard and they should participate meaningfully in a process of self-governance and reconstruction.

In Azad Jammu and Kashmir, on the Pakistan side of the divide, some delegates expressed the view that the fact that there is no political violence or active armed resistance does not mean that people have reconciled with their status. This part of the State contributes positively to Pakistan's national economy but remains highly dependent on Pakistan. Left in isolation the region is drawn towards increasing backwardness. Administratively, autonomy is only nominal. The true decision-making process is taking place at the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. In humanitarian terms, people deeply resent the lack of accessibility across the LoC. Many families and communities are divided by the LoC and people feel culturally and emotionally amputated. In the aftermath of the devastating October 2005 earthquake a climate of deep insecurity and lack of trust in the federal government has surfaced in most of the region. Some delegates expressed serious concern at the vacuum left by the Federal agencies in relief operations, a vacuum filled by banned Jehadi groups.

Several delegates were concerned that the Northern Areas, a geographically strategic territory of almost 1.5 million inhabitants, remained statusless either as a part of Kashmir or vis-à-vis Pakistan since 1947. Some delegates expressed concern at the model of governance applied in the Northern Areas (national representation, dispensations for local administration,



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economic dispensations). The issue of infiltration of organized Jehadi elements post 9.11, modifying the traditional peaceful fabric of society in the NAs was also evoked with concern. The delegates generally agreed that if a model of self-governance were to succeed in reflecting peoples' aspirations and in enhancing regional cooperation, this model should apply equally to all parts of Kashmir even if some specificity can be conceded on the basis of ground realities and necessities. In the meantime, there was a large consensus amongst the participants urging for developing contacts and communication between the Northern Areas and the contiguous IAK region of Laddakh.

Key concepts

Delegates to the Islamabad meeting generally agreed on the following principles and recommendations:

Self-governance:

The modelling and implementation of self-governance cannot possibly take place in a context of violence. Violence is incompatible with any form of democratic process where the people of Kashmir's dignity and integrity would be restored and

where they would regain overdue political, economic and social space to their own benefit.

Ideally, in a simultaneous top-to-bottom and bottom-up approach, the process leading to self-governance should be brought about by consensus building mechanisms.

The principle of self-governance is not necessarily based on a concept of constitutional change but on genuine and sustainable political, social and economic devolution in a harmonized legal framework that truly empowers local institutions and sustains a process of cooperation amongst the different actors concerned by the group(s) empowered. States' sovereignty and peoples' sovereignty are not necessarily conflicting concepts.

Good governance within self-governance should be a fundamental resolve.

Self-governance—Kashmir specifics:

Trust has to be restored amongst the people of Kashmir, irrespective of their shade of opinion. A climate of trust amongst all parties concerned (J&K-India-Pakistan) has to prevail in order to move forward and meaningfully improve the political debate as well as peoples' lives.

The concept of self-governance is so far ill defined. In view of the diversity of the territory and the specificity of certain regions of J&K, either by definition of their own populations or in the eyes of India and Pakistan, some ground realities need to be taken into consideration in terms of self-governance and devolution of power.

It remains nonetheless that all regions of Kashmir, across the LoC should benefit simultaneously from the process of self-governance. In order to promote cross-LoC civilian exchanges in the form of relief and humanitarian exchanges or in the form of trade, economic cooperation, political freedoms and other forms of expression, the process of self-governance needs to be harmonized in all regions of J&K.

It should be taken into consideration that certain groups of people on either side of the LoC hold the view that their future lies with India or with Pakistan. The expression of different views on the solution to the J&K problem—if conveyed by non violent and democratic ways—should not prejudice the cooperation amongst citizens on both sides of and across the LoC with the purpose of improving living conditions and define the parameters of a healthy political debate on the future status of the State. Neither should the debate be discriminatory on the basis of class, religion, origin or gender.

There has been ample proof that there is no military/paramilitary solution to the question of J&K. The concept of self-governance also includes the dimension of security. In the process of implementation of self-governance it could be considered that it would be the local authorities/institutions' responsibility to guarantee the

security of all citizens, including minority groups who should be guaranteed their full, equal rights.

Transitory measures towards self-governance

Until and after an institutionalized model of self-governance is put in place in all parts of the State, the military establishments of both India and Pakistan should reduce considerably their interference, either directly or indirectly, in the governance process of the State under their respective administration.

In view of the recent CBMs agreed upon by India and Pakistan on the opening of crossing points on the LoC, people to people contacts should be encouraged and facilitated.

The facilities offered by the CBMs should be made accessible to Kashmiri individuals.

Kashmiri civilian institutions, including educational bodies, parliamentary bodies, cultural groups, pilgrims, traders, media, etc. should be encouraged and facilitated access across the LoC.

Communication, infrastructure, laws and regulations should be adapted both within the whole of J&K and at national level in India and in Pakistan to address the potential of cross-LoC initiatives in areas such free movement of people, goods and capitals, free flow of information, humanitarian relief, tourism (including pilgrimages), sharing of energy resources, preservation of the environment, etc. In the light of emerging privatization and the development of liberal economic models both in India and in Pakistan, institutional mechanisms could be put in place for the Kashmiri legislators, leadership and entrepreneurs to be consulted and take part in the deci-



sion process on these matters as they should become the main beneficiaries of these measures.

Elimination of violence, reduction of military force

There should be increased cooperation between India and Pakistan to end terrorism and violence in all its forms and manifestations.

India, Pakistan and the local J&K authorities on both sides of the LoC should ensure respect of the law and the condemnation of all illegal activities on either side of and across the LoC.

The reduction of military force should result from negotiations; it should avoid key areas to be rendered more vulnerable by either of the protagonists and be motivated by the resolve to de-escalate tensions between the two countries as well as creating a sustainable safer environment for the citizens of J&K.

India and Pakistan should consider a significant reduction of troops on the LoC and in civilian areas on both sides of the LoC, maintaining the minimum necessary troops to ensure the security of the citizens and prevent any unilateral adventurism.

Reduction of force should be simultaneous and reciprocal on the part of India, who still maintains a high level military presence in its part of the State and Pakistan whose terri-

tory is still used by armed groups infiltrating IaK and also maintains large army contingents in key civilian areas on its side of the LoC.

Resolving issues like Siachen, Wullar/Tulbuk and Sir Creek would not impede either country's position on Kashmir and would be greatly helpful in creating an atmosphere conducive to enhancing the peace process.

Although no clear-cut consensus was achieved at the end of the Islamabad meeting, most delegates expressed their support for the peace process between India and Pakistan and urged India and Pakistan to create mechanisms whereby Kashmiris would have a voice in the peace process.

On the side of the meeting, a considerable number of bilateral meetings took place between the Kashmiri representatives from both sides of the LoC as well as with personalities at the highest echelons of power, including with General Musharraf and other Pakistani officials.

The meeting was viewed by most of the delegates as a unique opportunity for leaders and individuals to interact usefully.

A large majority of the participants at the Islamabad meeting suggested there should be more opportunities of the kind.

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Pugwash Workshop: *Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa*

Nairobi, Kenya, 18-19 March 2006

Report by

Meghan Madden

Pugwash held its first workshop on security in the Horn of Africa on 18-19 March, 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. This event was co-sponsored by the Africa Peace Forum and hosted African participants from Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, and Kenya.

The Horn of Africa region consists of seven states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Many of these states face similar patterns of conflict, ranging from internal insurgency to cross border disputes. Common problems include poor governance, lack of accountability, extreme poverty, control of natural resources, small arms trade, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), politics of exclusion, and ethnic rivalries. Conflicts in this region often go beyond their own borders and adversely affect neighboring states. Because of this interrelated nature it is necessary to look at the Horn as a whole in developing a regional security architecture.

It has become imperative to seek new mechanisms for building security in Africa, and in the Horn of Africa in particular. The complex nature of the region's conflicts calls for a unified effort at the local, national,

regional, and international levels. The objective of this workshop was to bring together key stakeholders in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, comprising officials of governmental and inter-governmental organizations, military and security personnel, academics, and the broad civil society to discuss security architecture in the sub-region.

The issues discussed at the workshop were divided into three general categories: case studies of conflict and peacekeeping, regional organizations and mechanisms, and examples of other regional efforts at peacekeeping. The workshop began with a welcome by Ambassador Ochieng Adala of the Pugwash Council and Africa Peace Forum. A meeting in east Africa was first proposed three years ago, and the Africa Peace Forum is glad Pugwash provided this opportunity for discussion. It is hoped that the results of this workshop will be addressed at the Pugwash annual conference in Cairo in November.

Case Studies of Conflict and Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa

Four presentations focused on Somalia, addressing the causes of conflict or the current prospects for stability. The roots of the Somali conflict can be traced as far back as colonialism. Like most of the continent, nomadic

groups were divided by ethnic borders. Following the end of colonialism, these borders were rejected as nationalism and the idea of a Greater Somalia (the uniting of all ethnic Somalis within a single state) became more prevalent. Under the ultimately disastrous leadership of Siad Barre, this led to Somali aggression in wars with Kenya and Ethiopia. Military losses, the withdrawal of foreign support at the end of Cold War, increasing tensions between clans, and the failure of Barre's socialist policies culminated in the collapse of the state.

There has been little improvement in the last decade. International attention turned elsewhere following the failed intervention in 1993. When the US withdrew its support of UNOSOM the UN was unable to sustain the mission, and although it has retained a security presence, it is forced to work out of Nairobi. The current mission is not to create stability, but merely to protect national and international personnel and to collect information. UNDP, UNISEF, etc continue to run aid projects, but they are subject to periodic kidnappings and assassinations, and the mission as a whole is handicapped by a lack of funding. If the UN were to pull out the impact would probably be minimal.

At the regional level, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been working diplomatically to re-form a central authority. A



Ochieng Adala, Njeri Karuru and Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud



Meghan Madden and Oyugi Onono

governance settlement has been reached and the new government has returned to Somalia, although it has been unable to settle in Mogadishu. IGAD has attempted to facilitate talks among the Somali factions, but it does not have the requisite resources to take a forceful approach. Somalia continues to be a threat to its regional neighbors as a source of arms, piracy, large refugee flows, and terrorism (notably the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam). Although IGAD has offered to send troops into Somalia to attempt to restore stability and physical security, it does not have the legal authority to intervene without a mandate from the UN (which has so far been withheld because of the arms embargo). If IGAD were to act unilaterally, it would need approval from Somalia itself (which has been withheld because of opposition from the warlords). Although IGAD has the political will, it will need to work with international partners, the AU, and civil society to be effective.

At the local level, the Somali people have not been involved in the

peace process, nor have they been able to return to normal lives. The old state structure of Somalia is gone and the territory is effectively divided into three regions, including Somaliland and Puntland. The traditional mechanisms for dealing with conflict and justice have reemerged in areas lacking governments, but this is not a long term solution.

A common theme in the discussion was the question of whether Somalia should be held together as a unified state. It is possible the ideal of a Greater Somalia is holding together an artificial state. If this is the case, the peace process is attempting to forestall the natural disintegration of Somalia into its distinct regions. A possible solution would be a carefully structured federation system.

The discussion on **Sudan** focused on the inter-clan conflicts in the south rather than the north-south, Muslim-Christian/Animist conflict that has caught international attention. Because economic and geographic conditions make it very difficult for journalists to find and feed information, there has been very little focus

on the conflict itself. Too few people have visited Sudan to give the world a clear idea of what is happening in the south. Even the combatants themselves do not have information on casualties, number of arms in circulation, etc.

It is estimated that more people have died in conflicts in southern Sudan than in the conflict between the north and south. Historically, each tribe has had a system of chiefs and elders that deal with problems without police, imprisonment, or a formal justice system. Confrontations were dealt with at the community level before they could spread. The introduction of modern government has circumvented the traditional means of preserving the peace; however, these systems are too small to be truly effective. Combined with the ever increasing gluttony of small arms, small sparks can easily turn into major tribal conflicts (generally based on grazing land, water, women/marriage, and position). Today having a gun has essentially become part of the transition to manhood, and most men in southern

Sudan have some kind of weapon. Military position has replaced the traditional justice system.

The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) has restored some measure of peace to the area and the traditional systems are regaining some of their influence. But there are major differences between traditional and modern law. These two systems need to be fused to create traditional authority structures with modern solutions.

The final state specific presentation was on the continuing, yet often overlooked, conflict in **Uganda**. Because it has spanned two decades, the causes of the original conflict (primarily political exclusion) are often neglected as the world focuses on the intransigent Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the north. Many believe that the government has focused the majority of its efforts on entrenching its position rather than attempting to resolve the conflict. There is also a clear divide between the north and south, with the majority of the latter labeling the conflict a local issue and content to remain uninvolved.

Although the government has conducted negotiations, these often appear to be merely token actions, generally in response to international impetus (pressure by international donors, allegations of human rights abuses, etc) and lacking follow through. Government military campaigns are generally conducted under information blackouts and the state wide implications of the conflict are ignored.

On the regional level, both Kenya and Sudan have been active in helping Uganda deal with the LRA (which is on the US terrorist list). Uganda has been viewed by many as a successful case of post-conflict

reconstruction. This is true in the south, but not in the north where the conflict is far from over. Given the lack of commitment by the Ugandan government, a third party intervener (regional or international) will likely be needed to neutralize the LRA.

The final case study dealt with **Ethiopia**, with a focus on the impact of technology and diasporas on African conflicts. Technology on the continent was established primarily for development purposes; however it has been circumvented to support terrorism and to increase the influence of diasporas. In the case of Ethiopia, the government has been unable to provide basic services such as education, health, and security. Instead, these are undertaken by private industries and NGO's, often funded by the diaspora, who has wide ranging financial and political influence. In the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, much of the money, and therefore the command and control capacity, comes from America and Europe. Some estimates put the amount of money flowing from the Ethiopian diaspora as greater than the Ethiopian government's budget. The main problem with the diasporas is that they have all of the rights and none of the responsibilities of citizenship. They carry passports from other countries and are able to encourage revolutions or unrest without having to deal with the repercussions.

A second issue is that there is a large population of highly educated youth who are unable to find jobs in their home country. This is a universal problem of disenfranchised youth who go to Europe, have difficulty assimilating, and become vulnerable to extremists. Projects are underway to merge education and technology,

creating more jobs within Ethiopia and decreasing the number of youth forced to leave.

Regional Organizations and Mechanisms

Three non-governmental organizations in the region were discussed as potential tools in building a regional security architecture.

The **International Development Research Center** works to create north-south cooperation in development, and has a project that focuses on a security in the Horn of Africa. The research looks at four broad areas (physical security, governance, resources, and military), with objectives that include analyzing the effectiveness of current mechanisms and engaging policy makers, intellectuals, and civil society. The priority of the IDRC is to create sustainable structures to ensure the absence of war and to promote human development. The IDRC collaborates with regional organizations (IGAD, COMESA, AU, etc) to work with a comprehensive view of the impediments to security (including corruption, drought, refugees, and abuse of women). The IDRC works by giving governments a vested interest in the success of their research; however, it is somewhat handicapped by its reliance on foreign donors, the difficulty in creating political consensus in implementation, and the lack of government cooperation.

The **Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)** is an organization that works to increase the participation of parliamentarians in discussions on peace. Membership currently includes more than 650 MPs from seven countries in the Great Lakes region. The AMANI Forum supports an African



Salome Katia and Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie

solutions to African problems approach and focuses on increasing the accountability of governments, promoting dialogue between conflicting parties, upholding democratic practices and human security protection, reducing the negative impact of international interest in regional conflicts, and controlling the proliferation of small arms. AMANI has worked in partnership with other organizations such as the AU, IGAD (and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism- CEWARN), the Regional Center on Small Arms (RECSA), and the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region (APPG).

The **Regional Center on Small Arms (RECSA)** was established in June 2005 to implement the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol. These were created in response to the continuing proliferation of small arms throughout the region, and focus on strengthen legislation gov-

erning arms, strengthening the operational capacity of law enforcement, increasing cross border cooperation, collecting and destroying weapons, demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants, improving relations with communities, and enhancing regional cooperation and coordination. RECSA is tasked with facilitating regional and international cooperation in combating illicit arms trade, increasing accountability and law enforcement, and promoting information sharing among governments. Because small arms proliferation is a problem impervious to borders, regional and international collaboration are essential to RECSA's success.

Other Regional Examples of Peacekeeping

Alexander Nikitin (of Pugwash Russia) discussed Russian peacekeeping efforts to offer a parallel to African attempts. The Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) has taken advantage of Chapter VIII of the UN charter, which authorizes regional organizations to undertake missions on behalf of the UN. The UN has increasingly used this measure in peace operations (NATO in the Balkans, ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, AU in Sudan). A extension of this practice would be the establishment of the proposed African Standby Force (a similar proposal by the EU has yet to be implemented). However, as CIS has seen, real capabilities are very different from those on paper, and troop readiness, language barriers, equipment quality, etc are likely to prove more cumbersome than anticipated. The African approach to peace operations should be multifaceted, with different functions for the military, diplomatic, regional, and international components. A general lesson from peacekeeping is that policy forces are just as important as military forces, especially in post-conflict reconstruction.

Egypt has been an active inter-vener in the region, with missions in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and Western Sahara. It has a large military and has worked to improve not just its capacity to participate and lead peace operations, but also the quality of its participation. The Egyptian military now trains specifically for peacekeeping and has established institutes for language and technology training. The African peacekeeping institute trains peacekeepers in both English and French. Recommendations for the future include the creation of a standby force (either African or Euro-Asian), increasing capacity for disaster relief operations and maritime activities, and improving cooperation in updating and understanding technology.

Conclusion

The workshop concluded with a presentation by Prof. Gwyn Prins that looked at the changing mentality in peacekeeping and the future challenges facing the African continent. In recent years there has been an ideological shift from non-interventionism to a responsibility to protect. Basic Principle “B” of *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (December 2001) says, “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal wars, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international

responsibility to protect.” As humanitarian interventions became more frequent through the 1990’s, the pre-eminence of national sovereignty began to erode. Today the responsibility to protect supersedes sovereignty if the situation fulfils certain “just cause” criteria (including (actual or apprehended) serious and irreparable harm to human beings, large scale loss of life, or large scale ethnic cleansing).

Since 1999 the responsibility to protect has led to missions in Liberia, Sierra-Leone, and Sudan (among others). These have all had similar features such as subcontracting by the UNSC, action by unilateral states or ad hoc coalitions, “normal” military operations (not the peace keeping or

peace enforcement that dominated the 1990’s), and fulfilment of the “just cause” criteria. The question that now arises is who is the *efficient* and *legitimate* authority to become involved in a situation (the best example of this from workshop discussions is IGAD in Somalia)? Similarly, we have to look at *whose interest* is it to do what, and who has the *political will* to do what? As we have seen in recent conflicts, the AU and IGAD have the desire to key players in conflict management and building security in Africa. Answering the questions about their efficiency and legitimacy is key in analyzing their potential in the Horn of Africa region.

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Pugwash Conference on HIV/AIDS: *Sharing of Experiences, What Works?*

M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai, India, 7–9 April 2006

Concept Note

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein convened the first Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in 1957 to bring together scientists from around the world to address the new threat faced by humanity in the form of nuclear weapons. Since then, influential scholars and public figures from around the world have attended more than 275 Pugwash events in an effort to find cooperative solutions to armed conflict and other threats to human security. Because of the stature of many of the Pugwash participants in their own countries, insights from Pugwash discussions tend to penetrate quickly to the appropriate levels of official policy-making. In 1995, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs was awarded the Nobel Peace prize along with Sir Joseph Rotblat for “bring(ing) scientific insight and reason to bear on threats to human security arising from science and technology in general, and above all from the catastrophic threat posed to humanity by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction”.

HIV/AIDS: A threat to human security

HIV/AIDS is a threat to international peace and security and should be

considered on par with conventional defense and security issues, particularly in the most affected regions. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1308, which recognizes HIV/AIDS as a security threat. This represents the first time that the Security Council linked its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

HIV/AIDS represents a threat to human security through its impact on society. In the countries that have been hit the hardest by HIV/AIDS (the “first wave” countries), life expectancy has fallen precipitously. For example, life expectancy has declined from 60 to 47 in South Africa. As a result, these countries will face serious social and cultural challenges in the coming years. AIDS has also resulted in the breakdown of social and family structures and produced a generation of orphans. This will impair the reproduction of society and increase insecurity.

HIV/AIDS also represents a threat to human security through its impact on the military, which is charged with maintaining internal and external security. Due to their mobility, separation from family, and more relaxed attitudes towards risk, military personnel are highly vulnerable to HIV-infection. This impairs the military’s ability to perform its function. It also hampers its ability to engage in regional and international peacekeep-

ing efforts, which are key to bringing stability to places immersed in civil conflict.

The long-range nature of the epidemic and the inadequacy of existing statistical and analytical models make it easy for policy makers to avoid confronting the security dimensions and implication of the HIV epidemic.


Pugwash Conferences on HIV/AIDS

Initially the Pugwash Conferences on Science & World Affairs concentrated on the nuclear peril. However, with the start of the new millennium, the Pugwash Council reviewed its basic mission in light of new threats to human security, particularly those, such as HIV, that cannot be attributed to an enemy. As a result, it gave the green light to the South African Pugwash Group to convene two exploratory workshops to consider how Pugwash could leverage its authority to stimulate greater dialogue among policy makers, political leaders and experts on the threat posed by HIV/AIDS to human security.

In the first workshop, participants discussed why the epidemic had become so bad in South Africa, going from near 0% prevalence in 1990 to nearly 20% in 2002. They concluded that the wrong analytical tools have been used. The response had focused too much on sexual behavior, and not enough on larger social and economic processes, such as mobility,



Mary Crewe discussing a point



Pierre Canonne, Naggapan Parasuraman, Jeffrey Boutwell

violence, gender inequality and poverty. The inability of political leaders to confront the reality of the epidemic was also discussed at length as a major reason for the failure to mount an effective state response to the disease in South Africa. The

dearth of and misuse of HIV statistics makes this denial possible. Participants agreed that current methods for studying complex security problems, like HIV/AIDS, are inadequate and a new way of thinking is essential. Several of the following areas

were flagged for future research: 1) the validity of the CIA's estimation of 10% HIV prevalence as an indicator of social and political breakdown; 2) the costs and benefits of a security analysis of HIV/AIDS; and 3) security issues related to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in "second wave" countries like India and China.

The second workshop built on the discussions of the first. Participants called for a refinement in the statistical methods used to analyze the HIV epidemic in order to ensure that policy makers do not underestimate the severity of the epidemic and its security implications. They highlighted the need to broaden economic assessments of the impact of HIV to take into account such "externalities" as the social cost of HIV. Participants also singled out nutritional interventions (e.g. micronutrient supplementation, food fortification and the addition of essential micronutrients to fertilizers) as a cost-effective means of preventing the spread of HIV and improving the health of HIV-infected people, especially those who do not have access to ARVs. It was recognized that, while ARVs provide the best treatment option, drug resistance poses a danger and more attention needs to be focused on prevention. Participants noted that women are at greater risk of HIV-infection than men, because sexual inequality makes it difficult to negotiate safe sex. Therefore, they called for the development and dissemination of female controlled methods of prevention that may be used either without the knowledge or permission of men, such as microbicides and female condoms. They recognized the need to study more closely the social construction of sexuality and the conditions of sexual intercourse.

Pugwash Conference on HIV/AIDS: Sharing of Experiences, What Works?

In recognition of the global nature of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it was decided to bring together experts from “first wave” countries where the epidemic has struck first and with great intensity (e.g. South Africa and Uganda) and those from “second wave” countries where the epidemic threatens to spiral out of control (e.g. India) to exchange successful and replicable strategies for the prevention, management and mitigation of HIV and AIDS. India was selected to host the 5th Pugwash Conference on HIV/AIDS due to the fact that it has the second largest population living with HIV in the world and is poised on the verge of a generalized epidemic. It is envisioned that this con-

ference will result in invigorated and more effective national responses to the HIV epidemic as well as increased inter-regional cooperation.

The focus will be on policies and interventions that have successfully reversed the spread of HIV and improved the health and quality of life of people infected by HIV. The programme will comprise 8 plenary sessions organized around the following themes:

- Policy and state responses to HIV/AIDS and TB co-infection in Africa and India
- Translating awareness into behaviour change
- Ensuring access and adherence to anti-retroviral therapy

- Improving the nutrition and food security of people infected and affected by HIV and AIDS
- Improving awareness and preventing infections among young people, especially young women
- Sexual violence and the social construction of male and female sexuality in the face of HIV/AIDS
- Preventing paediatric HIV
- Controlling HIV within the defence services

The cross-cutting themes: nutrition and gender inequality.

Session 6 will consist of the presentation of a proposal to conduct research on sexual violence and the social construction of male and female sexuality in the face of HIV/AIDS.

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International Conference on Recent Developments in Iraq and the Prospects for Regional Security

Iran's Nuclear Energy Program: Policies and Prospects

Co-Sponsored by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
and the Center for Strategic Research, Tehran

Tehran, Iran, 24-26 April 2006

Report by

Emile El-Hoyakem

This two-part conference on the situation in Iraq, and Iran's nuclear program, was held in Tehran on April 24-25 2006 and was hosted by the Expediency Council's Center for Strategic Research. The first part of the conference looked at developments in Iraq and their implications for Iran, Iraq's other neighbors and regional stability. The second part of the conference examined Iran's nuclear program and regional security. Part of the conference was open to the public and the media and distinguished speakers included Expediency Council Chairman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki, and former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and head of the Center for Strategic Research Hassan Rohani. Closed-door, expert-only workshops delved into more detailed and technical discussions of the topics at hand.

As is customary with Pugwash meetings, most of the discussion was held on a non-attribution basis, thus this report is the sole responsibility of

the author and has not been endorsed by any of the participants.

Recent Developments in Iraq and the Prospects for Regional Security

The first day was dedicated to an in-depth discussion of political developments in Iraq and their impact for the region. In addition to Iranian presenters and Pugwash foreign guests, the Center for Strategic Studies invited several Iraqi political leaders and analysts to address the participants.

As Iraq's eastern neighbor and longtime foe, Iran has vital and legiti-

mate interests in what happens next door. Indeed, Iran's recent history is marked by the long and bloody war it fought with Iraq. The legacy of this war is still vivid in both a psychological and political dimension. The world's support of Saddam Hussein during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, the heavy Iranian death toll, and Iraq's use of chemical weapons still shape how Iran articulates and promotes its national interests. At the same time, the historical, religious and societal ties that link the two countries guarantee that Iran will have a major say in Iraq's future.



Tehran



Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Many Iranian participants held ambivalent views about the US invasion of Iraq. Paradoxically, in Iranian eyes, the US failure to build strong institutions, deliver key public services and goods and create a secure environment does not imply that Iraq is a failing state on the verge of civil war, a view largely held in the West. This disconnect seems to have much to do with the sense that Iran has succeeded in cultivating good ties with Iraq's most powerful factions, positioning itself as a key power-broker in Iraq, and bogging down the United States.

While US intentions and objectives were largely condemned, there was a sense that the US intervention removed from power Iran's most potent and committed foe and redefined the regional balance of power in its favor. Moreover, there was a significant measure of confidence about Iraq's future direction. Many Iranian participants lauded the democratic achievements that brought to power Iraqi parties with strong ties to Teheran and greeted with enthusiasm the appointment of Jawad al-Maliki as Iraq's new Prime Minister. Indeed, from Tehran's perspective, the electoral and constitutional processes have established the preeminence of

Shia parties such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in Iraqi politics. Iran patiently cultivated its ties to these parties opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime and now sees this investment as having brought the substantive political benefits it expected.

After decades of bloody enmity and strategic rivalry, Iran now sees itself as Iraq's natural mentor and partner. Participants asserted that Iraq was following Iran's steps in establishing a religiously-inspired system of governance, suggesting that the Iranian model of an Islamic republic could very well inspire future developments in Iraq. The viability of Iraq's democratic institutions was linked to the necessity to abide by edicts from Shia authorities, in particular Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's most revered *marja'*. Moreover, Iranian officials strongly recommended that Iraq's constitution, approved by referendum in December 2005, be not reviewed or amended, as is allowed for a period of four months under a formal agreement between the different Iraqi parties. Reviewing the Constitution is widely viewed as a Sunni attempt to re-negotiate some of the most contentious clauses of the Constitution, including

the nature of federalism in Iraq and the distribution of oil revenues.

The issue of security was hotly debated. While Iranian participants put much of the blame for the current security situation on the United States, they suggested that a fully-empowered Iraqi government would be able to restore security. Iran recommends a quick withdrawal of US and British troops from Iraq and a regional dialogue about Iraq's future. Foreign participants doubted this judgment, stressing that Iraq's police and military forces need to be better trained and organized, lest they be overtaken by sectarian militias.

In addition, there was some confusion regarding the nature and potency of the threat to Iraq's stability. Those who maintained that violence in Iraq is the product of an unlawful war and occupation and that the insurgency in Iraq is a legitimate resistance movement also claimed that there is a terrorist threat that endangers the survival and unity of Iraq. However, when asked to clarify their definition and understanding of this terrorist threat, Iranians participants generally shied away from the question. Indeed, Sunni-Shia tensions in Iraq and their regional repercussions shadowed the discussions but were rarely mentioned. Shias are identified as the victims and Baathists as the perpetrators of terrorism. Participants had mixed views about the role of Iraq's neighbors in contributing to Iraq's stability. It was asserted that some countries were actively encouraging terrorists

Moreover, while a small minority held that the United States had an interest in stirring sectarian tensions, most participants identified US incompetence and lack of knowledge of Iraq's society as the key reasons for

its failure to provide security to the Iraqi citizenry.

In the same way, the reasons why the United States invaded Iraq were passionately debated. Chief among them was the perception that America was driven by deeply-ingrained, oil-centered imperialistic ambitions. By invading Iraq, the United States sought to dominate the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. Some argued that the need to counter a region-wide, Iranian-inspired Islamic awakening, dishonestly defined by the United States as terrorism, compelled it to intervene in Iraq and pressure Muslim nations, casting the current conflict as one of cultures and civilizations. Others identified Israel as the key beneficiary of US policy in the Middle East, and argued that the need to secure Israel drove the United States into Iraq. The demonizing of Iraq as a WMD proliferator and a state sponsor of terrorism, followed by the failure to find WMD and the now disproved allegations of ties between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, added to a widely shared sense that the United States had a hegemonic agenda dressed in benevolent intentions. Few credited the United States with a sincere desire to promote democratic values in a region plagued with authoritarianism. On the contrary, the United States was criticized for its perceived hypocrisy, especially in the light of its opposition to Hamas, despite the latter having achieved power through the very democratic elections that the Bush administration espouses.

Foreign participants offered a more nuanced view of US objectives in the Middle East and put US foreign policy in the context of the post-9/11 world. They stressed that President Bush, driven by the need to

respond to the 9/11 attacks, re-arranged America's strategic interests, prioritized threats emanating from Islamic extremist movements, and embarked on a mission to change the fundamental dynamics of the Middle East.

Iran's Nuclear Energy Program: Policies and Prospects

The second day was devoted to a discussion of Iran's nuclear program and regional security. It featured former and current officials from several Iranian agencies in charge of Iran's security and nuclear policy. *[Note: The workshop was held days prior to an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna to consider Iran's compliance with its NPT obligations, and two weeks after Iran announced it had enriched uranium for the first time.]*

Under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, countries signatories to the NPT have the right to develop a nuclear program *for peaceful, civilian purposes*. The IAEA is tasked with facilitating and monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology. Since 2002, the IAEA has issued several reports about Iran's nuclear program, alternating praise and criticism of Iran's cooperation, and culminating with the February 2006 referral of the Iran issue to the UN Security Council.

Iranian participants, including top officials, reiterated Iran's peaceful nuclear intentions, stressing the economic and technological benefits Iran would derive from possessing home-grown civil nuclear capabilities. In particular, some Iranian participants emphasized that exporting electrical power as well as gas and oil would dramatically improve Iran's trade and current accounts, shoring up Iran's finances and benefiting Iran's population. In Iranian eyes, pursuing civil



Hassan Rohani

nuclear energy is a key element of Iran's development strategy and its response to the looming energy crunch. Iran's nuclear program also has a research dimension (medical and university research, agriculture etc.) that is essential for any country seeking to establish a scientific reputation.

All Iranian speakers insisted that Iran would never give up any of its technological achievements in the nuclear domain. According to one participant, Iran's nuclear program is similar to "a bullet fired from a gun. You can't put it back in the barrel. What has been learned cannot be unlearned." The nuclear program enjoys considerable support among the Iranian population and is an achievement borne of the national consensus in line with the Islamic Revolution. The international community has to accept and adjust to this new reality.

In parallel, Iranian participants vehemently denied any intention to build nuclear weapons. Iran understands its obligations under the NPT and seeks to respect IAEA rules. This

unfair and politicized charge damages any effort to reach a lasting solution to the crisis. As evidence of Iran's peaceful intentions, Iran refrained from using WMD even after being attacked by Iraq with chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, Iran's security doctrine expressly forbids the development of nuclear weapons.

Iranian participants deplored the referral of the Iran file from the International Atomic Energy Agency to the UN Security Council, calling it a politicized move that undermined the credibility of the IAEA as a guarantor of the right of NPT signatories to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In Iranian eyes, the breaches identified by the IAEA in its successive reports since 2002 did not warrant or justify this move, especially in view of Iran's subsequent cooperation with the UN agency and volunteer suspension of

uranium enrichment activities until January 2006. This episode has done much to tarnish the IAEA's standing in Iran and worldwide. It sets a dangerous precedent for other states members of the NPT that seek to acquire homegrown nuclear know-how. Some Iranian participants threatened to end all cooperation with the IAEA or leave the NPT should the UN Security Council adopt a resolution imposing for sanctions against Iran. Iran would make no distinction between comprehensive and targeted sanctions. Similarly, even sanctions imposed by one or several countries could irremediably damage relations with the IAEA.

Nevertheless, as a sign of goodwill, if its file were returned from the UN Security Council to the IAEA, Iran would again resume its dialogue and cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian participants stressed that Iran

would abide by all the standard IAEA safeguards and offer additional guarantees on a volunteer basis. Nevertheless, Iran would rebuff any IAEA effort to impose additional safeguards specifically designed for Iran. It would interpret this as an unfair encroachment on Iran's rights under the NPT.

International participants inquired about Iran's compliance with IAEA safeguards—or lack thereof—and its procurement of nuclear technology. In particular, questions regarding how and where Iran acquired the designs and prototypes of centrifuges necessary for enriching uranium, about the delays and ambiguity in declaring key nuclear activities, and about the resumption of uranium enrichment despite IAEA demands, were raised. Moreover, some questioned Iran's economic rationales. For an oil-rich country such as Iran, developing nuclear capabilities comes at great financial cost. Moreover, the civilian technology is outdated, especially the Bushehr reactor. Finally, as pointed out by a foreign speaker, only one-third of the countries that use nuclear energy enrich their own uranium.

Foreign and Iranian participants agreed that the crisis was of a political, not technical nature. Foreign speakers outlined technical proposals that could emerge as solutions with sufficient diplomatic momentum and political will:

- the multi-nationalization of Iran's uranium enrichment activities, described by one participant as "putting a UN flag on the Natanz facility;"
- the establishment under IAEA auspices of international fuel centers that would guarantee fuel supply to



Foreign Minister Mottaki

all nations and deal with spent uranium;

- the Russian proposal to enrich and take back spent uranium on Russian soil.

Foreign participants asked about the confidence-building measures Iran could announce to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. They suggested that ratifying the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and adhering to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would send positive signals to the international community and create positive momentum to reach a fair and sustainable solution. Other participants described in detail additional verification and safeguard measures that Iran could implement.

Asked which model Iran considered the most appropriate for its own nuclear project, an Iranian speaker dismissed the North Korean and Libyan models and advocated the Japanese model. By demonstrating full transparency, total cooperation with the IAEA and its peaceful intentions, Japan has developed top-notch nuclear capabilities, including the mastery of the complete fuel cycle. For many, the reluctance of the international community to allow Iran to adopt this model arises from Iran's lack of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA prior to the 2002 revelation that Iran was building a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and a heavy-water reactor in Arak.

Iran's history with its pre-Islamic Revolution nuclear suppliers informs much of its current stance on the nuclear issue. Iran's most senior officials reminded the audience that prior to 1979, the United States, France, and Germany, today the driving forces behind the international



Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

community's effort to obtain a permanent suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities, were Iran's major partners in developing its nuclear sector. For Iranians, the memory of the bitter disputes over these suspended contracts between Iran and its Western partners in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution acts as a powerful reminder of the need to assert complete control over Iran's nuclear program. Even Iran's current partners of necessity, Russia and China, are considered unreliable when it comes to nuclear issues. Iran's officials recalled several instances when these two countries, under US pressure, reneged on their commitments at great financial and political cost for Iran.

Iranian participants blamed the West in general, and the United States in particular, for what they perceive to be double standards in dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iranians complain about the nuclear apartheid forced on the developing world. For Iranians, this attitude reveals lasting evidence of colonial-

ism. The issue of Israel's undeclared nuclear capabilities dominated much of the discussion. Israel, which did not adhere to the NPT, is suspected of having a large arsenal of nuclear weapons and maintains a policy of "nuclear ambiguity." The fact that the IAEA does not have access to Israel's nuclear program amounts to intolerable uncertainty for Tehran. Moreover, it stands in the way of any effort to create a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, Iran's stated preference. Similarly, the US-India deal suggested to many that the United States prioritizes its own expedient interests over international norms and obligations. Under this deal that has yet to be approved by the US Congress, the United States proposes to support India's own civil nuclear program in exchange for some guarantees and concessions deemed insufficient by many non-proliferation experts.

International Diplomacy and Regional Security

The Pugwash-CSR conference took place in the midst of the debate over

US and international options vis-à-vis Iran and a few days before the April 28 meeting of the IAEA on Iran.

Conference participants discussed Iran's strategic environment and threat perceptions. Iran operates in what it perceives to be a hostile environment, surrounded by four nuclear powers (Pakistan, Russia, Israel and the United States) and two potential failing states (Iraq and Afghanistan). It must also deal with rising Sunni-Shia tensions, terrorism in the Khuzestan region, and attacks by Kurdish separatists in northern Iran. The US rhetoric, captured by the "Axis of Evil" speech, and aggressive diplomacy, evidenced by the push for coercive action at the UN, aggravates what is already a tense situation.

In this volatile environment, Iran must preserve its independence, territorial integrity, vital interests, and strategic depth. In particular, it must assert its role in the Persian Gulf by strengthening its relations with its Arab neighbors. The latter worry that Iran's nuclear program, especially the Bushehr reactor with its outdated and unreliable design, comes at considerable environmental risks to their own populations and basic infrastructure. To demonstrate Iran's goodwill and willingness to assuage Arab concerns, Iranian participants suggested joint scientific activities with its Arab and other neighbors. Iran believes that, instead of being a point of tension, nuclear technology can become a key area of economic and scientific cooperation. Iranian participants stressed Iran's good diplomatic ties with most of its neighbors and other middle powers throughout the world.

In this charged atmosphere, the question of US-Iran relations and

their role in the current crisis was on everyone's mind. Not surprisingly, there is deep distrust in Iran for US intentions. Iran views the United States as prone to provocation, adventurism and aggression. For Iran, as evidenced by the threats of force emanating from the United States, the United States is using the nuclear crisis to further its real objective, regime change. The perceived US unwillingness to respond to Iranian overtures during the Khatami presidency illustrates its malevolent intentions.

In contrast, foreign participants at the meeting pointed out the deep continued distrust of Iran felt in the international community, stemming from Iran's rejection of Israel's right to exist, exemplified by statements of President Ahmadinejad, and of continued Iranian support for what are considered terrorist organizations. It is also for these reasons, these participants explained, that Iran is fundamentally different from a Japan or Brazil when it comes to considerations of being a civil nuclear power with indigenous fuel cycle capabilities.

Though disappointed by the European position, Iranian officials left the door open for more negotiations with the E3. They deplored that the E3 had rejected its March

2005 proposal and presented a meager counter-offer in August 2005. Nevertheless, these nations have an interest in preventing a showdown. At its core, their worldview, based on mutual respect and cooperation, differs significantly with America's.

Iranian and foreign participants mentioned the need for a framework for regional security in the Persian Gulf. Concerned nations should build on UN Security Council resolution 598, which called for such a security architecture. In particular, UNSCR 598 could become the backbone of a region-wide WMD-free zone.



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24th Workshop of the Study Group on Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions: *Achieving a Successful Outcome of the Second CWC Review*

Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 13–14 May 2006

Report by

Katie Smallwood

This was the twelfth of the current Pugwash CBW workshop series to be hosted by Pugwash Netherlands. The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs provided financial assistance for the meeting.

Attending the workshop were 20 participants from 9 countries (Argentina, Germany, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, the UK and the USA), all by invitation and in their personal capacities. This report is the sole responsibility of its author, who was asked by the meeting to prepare a brief account of the proceedings in consultation with the Steering Committee. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the workshop as a whole, nor of the Study Group. As always, the workshop was governed by the 'Chatham House Rule', so the speakers on particular points are not identified here.

The workshop opened with an authoritative presentation on progress in implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This presentation focused on two topics, preparations for the second CWC Review Conference (hereafter CWC RevCon) and chemical weapon destruction, which then stimulated

discussion summarised below under the first two headings.

Preparations for the Second CWC Review Conference

The second CWC RevCon, which is scheduled for 2008, faces a number of challenges:

Universality: So far 178 states have joined the Convention, but decisive pressure must be placed on those states that have not yet done so.

Industry verification: although the industrial inspections carried out by the OPCW are advancing on relatively solid ground, a number of issues are still unresolved:

- Currently, there are disproportionate numbers of inspections in certain countries, but states parties have yet to agree on an appropriate selection methodology.
- OPCW activities in general, and Schedule 2 sampling activities in particular, must continue to receive happy support from the chemical industry.
- A proposal for a 10% increase in inspections of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) has been made, but a balance between not over-burdening industry and maintaining the effectiveness of inspections must be found. Consensus must also be found with a number of developing countries that oppose this initiative towards heavier OCPF inspection.

Developments in science and technology (S&T): the work of the OPCW must remain sensitive to developments in this area. The OPCW Director General has recently accepted a proposal from the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) for the establishment of a new temporary working group on "advances in technology and their potential impact on the implementation of the Convention".

Functioning of the OPCW: the OPCW's commitment to excellence must be maintained and the practice of adequate geographical representa-



tion must be enforced through the actions of the OPCW Director General.

Tenure policy at the OPCW: the discussion on tenure highlighted a number of issues including the need to balance the retention of talent and experience with a renewal of expertise. Additionally, whilst acknowledging that the OPCW is not a career organisation, it was recognised that scientists and engineers encounter a number of difficulties when re-entering industrial or research organizations after time away.

External factors: such as the current crisis in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the dynamics of the “post-post-Cold War” era.

Chemical facility protection: the implications of possible attacks on chemical plants have recently been given increased attention. This will have implications for supply chains and the bulk storage of chemicals.

The Destruction of Chemical Weapons

There have been two important developments concerning the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. First, Russia (with 2% of its stockpile destroyed so far) has initiated destruction operations at Kambarka and is soon to start at Maradikovskiy. Russia has also redesigned its destruction programme to enable it to meet the CWC’s 2012 deadline, but has stated that international financial support will be essential. Secondly, the United States has recently announced it does not expect to meet its 2012 deadline. The United States has invested some \$8 billion on seven destruction facilities with only two having completed destruction activities thus far.

A number of important questions surrounding the 2012 deadline



remain unanswered, notably how non-compliance in these terms affect the validity of future deadlines? And how non-compliance will be addressed by the OPCW in 2012?

An option for the OPCW should the 2012 deadline be missed is that the treaty’s non-compliance measures be explored. However, the emphasis should be placed on re-instating compliance rather than finger-pointing and punishment. In this case, the non-compliant state party should be required to come back into compliance within a period of time.

The notion of intensified verification as a condition for an extension of the destruction deadline was discussed by the workshop, but it was noted that intensified verification on destruction would remove vital resources from industry inspections.

The workshop also heard a presentation on global chemical weapon destruction. It was observed that Russia probably began its destruction process too late and with too little financial investment to meet the 2012 deadline. In the United States a number of technical glitches (for example fires and the discovery of heavy metal contamination) and political compli-

cations across states have slowed the process leading to the recent announcement that the US too will not meet the deadline (current predictions are for 2018 / 2019).

In other possessor states such as Albania and Libya, the lack of international funding is hindering the destruction process. The lack of political will to complete chemical weapon destruction was also identified as a problem that must be addressed, as well as the need to promote discussion which would lead to a deeper understanding of the practical problems of destruction.

The workshop then moved into a discussion of its main agenda topic – the Second CWC Review. Preceding this was a short authoritative presentation regarding preparations for the Tenth Anniversary of the OPCW, which falls in April/May 2007.

The proceedings of the OPCW’s Tenth Anniversary celebrations will be an important staging post for the CWC RevCon in 2008. The events will promote participation from a variety of actors and will celebrate issues including the commitment to

multilateralism and the effectiveness of the OPCW, and will stress the challenges the Organisation must address. There will be events held internationally (such as in Brussels, Geneva, New York) and “academic events” will cover topics such as awareness, implementation, multilateralism, developments in science and technology and the second CWC RevCon.

Weaknesses of the First CWC RevCon

With regard to the first CWC RevCon, held in 2003, the workshop participants felt the whole process was started too late, which reflected the political situation at the time and the change of OPCW Director General. In addition, there was an insufficient engagement of key stakeholders (industrial, scientific and academic) and the Conference proceedings were largely driven by Hague-based delegations rather than capital-based experts.

For the Second CWC RevCon, preparations are being directed by an Open-Ended Working Group for the Second Review Conference (WGRC). The provisional structure for this group is to have one delegation acting as Chair and four delegations as Vice Chairs to avoid the group being dominated by any one delegation. The Executive Council of the OPCW, during its impending 45th session, is due to decide these issues. [Note: in the event, EC-45 decided that the UK would chair the WGRC, with Iran, Mexico, Russia and the Sudan as vice-chairs.] Importance was placed on the need to incorporate a wider range of participants, such as the chemical industry, and facilitators to help resolve contentious areas.

Advances in Science and Technology (S&T)

The paper addressing the topic of technical change was situated in the context of the cost-benefit balance that in effect determines whether member states remain inside the CWC. The presentation thereby sought to identify the S&T topics it might be essential for the Second Review to address. For two of these topics, the presentation argued that political factors were likely to impede adequate examination within the structures of the OPCW and therefore proposed that Pugwash itself should take on the task and make the resultant study reports available to the OPCW member states and Technical Secretariat. The topics identified were (1) the challenges to the CWC inherent in novel disabling chemicals, including such attractions as these chemicals present as counter-terrorist weapons; and (2) how enhanced implementation of the General Purpose Criterion could ensure that newly emergent toxicants are properly controlled under the CWC. The question for Pugwash to consider was how its various resources, including the expertise of Study-Group members, might best be brought to bear on the projected studies.

It was stated that the verification tools used by the OPCW are running behind technological developments, and that it would be very difficult to detect the production of chemical weapons; for this reason the focus of the CWC was on deterring production.

The structure, activities and transparency of the SAB were discussed: there is a need to balance the independence of the SAB against its isolation; balance its transparency against

it becoming a “recipe book” for terrorists; and a need for more funds to be allocated for more frequent meetings that might lead to more innovative thinking.

It was also noted that, of the two mechanisms envisaged in the CWC for altering its provisions, namely the full-blown amendments procedure set out in art XV.1-3 and the change procedure of Art XV.4-5, the second of the two could be used to accommodate many forms of technical change; indeed this had already occurred in two cases: the storage and transport provisions for Saxitoxin and destruction deadlines for states ratifying the CWC after 1997.

Factors Outside the CWC Framework

The next presentation dealt with European Union (EU) involvement with chemical and biological non-proliferation activities. The EU has increased its presence in these areas since 2000 and has moved from rhetoric to action through a number of renewable Joint Action projects. The EU has funded the OPCW (2004) for universality and national implementation, and the BWC (2005) through the Bioweapons Prevention Project (BWPP) thus setting an NGO precedent for the BWC.

However the EU’s Joint Action projects are not without their problems; the decision-making procedures within the EU are slow, leading to long-term rather than immediate planning which is not efficient.

The workshop then discussed the preparations for the upcoming BWC RevCon later in 2006. The participants of the workshop heard an account of the proceedings of the

Preparatory Committee for the BWC Sixth RevCon, and concluded that they had been successful.

The Preparatory Committee agreed that the Sixth BWC RevCon will take place over three weeks (20th November – 8th December 2006), a provisional agenda was adopted and the Secretariat was requested to provide six background papers, rather than four as in previous years. The positive outcomes from the Preparatory Committee benefited from the determination of the Chair for such a result, but the success of the BWC RevCon will still rest on the willingness of states parties to negotiate.

Linkages Between Upcoming BWC and CWC Review Conferences

The next presentation identified a number of short-term synergies between the impending BWC RevCon and the CWC RevCon in 2008 and highlighted precedent and areas of technological change that promote the long-term convergence of the two treaties. For example, the emergence of chemical biology and other sciences combining chemistry and biology will provide the opportunity for convergence to be discussed in the context of the next two RevCons. Furthermore, it was noted that the taboo surrounding the two types of weapons is founded on the same fear, that of disease. There was advocacy of the idea that the CWC, being the more rigorous treaty, should have some of its procedures, including verification, expanded into the overlap between the two treaties.

Practical questions to be asked are: can the OPCW be helpful to the BWC? Would this have member state support considering that a number of CWC member states are not party to the BWC?

Successful Outcomes for the Sixth BWC Review Conference

A paper was presented on the measures of success for the approaching BWC RevCon. The conference should reaffirm the validity of the treaty; should identify areas of agreement and issues to be discussed during the inter-sessional meetings; and should provide an opportunity to achieve agreement on certain areas such as universality and implementation.

However the Conference must not be over ambitious, a pattern of failure must not be set after the collapse of the 2001 Protocol negotiations, the poor outcome of the fifth BWC RevCon and the failure of the NPT RevCon last year. The paper proposes an electronic information-sharing network to aid the implementation of the BWC and calls for a declaration to be issued at the Pugwash Annual Conference in Cairo (November 2006) regarding the implementation of the BWC, immediately before the BWC RevCon.

The final paper addressed measures required to ensure successful outcomes for the BWC RevCon. During the discussion it was emphasised that the most important outcomes would be:

- Final document – this should be drafted to be as consensual as possible; a particularly contentious area could be the formation of any type of support system for the treaty's implementation.
- Implementation plan – assistance guidelines need to be established for countries able to offer such assistance, this could be achieved through the electronic network outlined above. The focus however

should be on the benefits of the treaty i.e. the protection it affords.

- International cooperation on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) – concrete measures to bring these together must not be delayed by long debates over principles and wording.

Future Work

The meeting concluded with remarks on the high quality of the discussions during the workshop despite the reduced number of participants and late organisation. There was also attention to the aforementioned Pugwash Annual Conference in Cairo. It was proposed that the next workshop of the 'Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions' should take place at the time of the Sixth BWC Review Conference in November 2006.

Papers presented

Serguei Batsanov: On the way to the Second CWC Review Conference.

Serguei Batsanov: Sixth BWC Review Conference – The Measure of Success.

Daniel Feakes: Recent EU Action on CBW Proliferation.

Graham S. Pearson and Nicholas A. Sims: Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference.

J P. Perry Robinson: Accommodating Technical Change: A Challenge for the Second CWC Review.

Nicholas A. Sims: Linkages between the BWC Sixth Review Conference and the CWC Second Review Conference.

Paul Walker: Update on Chemical Weapons Destruction Globally.

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Pugwash Workshop on *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—The Role of Europe*

Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 7–8 June 2006

Report by

Bob van der Zwaan

The International Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the Dutch Pugwash Group co-organized, with financial support from the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, a two-day workshop on the general status and specific problems of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, with a particular focus on the role of Europe in mitigating the current crisis. The meeting was held on 7 and 8 June 2006 in the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW, Trippenhuis) in Amsterdam, gathering 25 participants from 10 different countries. Three sessions were dedicated to, respectively, (I) the prospects and challenges of nuclear

energy and the NPT, (II) the present situation in the Middle East and particularly Iran, and (III) the nuclear policy of NATO and nuclear weapons in Europe as well as its role in advancing the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. In a fourth session open to the press an ensemble of subjects were assessed related to the Iranian impasse and NPT compliance issues.

Introduction

The global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort is experiencing one of its deepest crises to date. Despite intense IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities over the past few years and elaborate European diplomacy to convince the authorities in Teheran to temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment activities, important questions regarding its enrichment program remain. The interna-

tional community cannot exclude the possibility that Iran is gradually working towards the expansion of its civil nuclear activities to the development of nuclear weapons. Continuing six-party talks have so far not succeeded in persuading the regime in North Korea that it is in the benefit of the People's Republic to dismantle its military nuclear complex. Other nuclear proliferation concerns in especially the Middle East and South Asia add to the continuous nuclear threat the world faces today. While it is universally recognized that achieving full implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference is essential, virtually no progress has been booked since then nor at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Ten years after its opening for signature, the CTBT has still not entered into force and negotiations on an FMCT are at a limbo, such that the future of both these treaties remains highly uncertain.

Also in the nuclear disarmament process progress has recently been practically absent. Over the past years, the US has shifted from its policy in which nuclear weapons were regarded as weapons of last resort to one in which it may use nuclear weapons for preemptive purposes. The likely development of a new generation of American nuclear weapons constitutes a menace to the non-proliferation regime. Strategic nuclear arms agreements between the Russian Federation



Amsterdam workshop participants.

and the US are at a standstill and reduced warheads and their delivery systems are not dismantled irreversibly in a transparent and verifiable manner, while remaining deployed Russian and US nuclear weapons systems are kept at high-alert operational status. The other official and *de facto* nuclear weapons states have no intention to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the 480 American nuclear gravity bombs deployed under NATO auspices in five European states are not subjected to plans for reduction or elimination, and the reduction of American and Russian tactical nuclear weapons remains excluded from any current disarmament negotiations. The process of improving worldwide the accounting and control of fissile materials remains largely insufficient. Given the present situation, the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is urgently in need of a serious examination.

Prospects and challenges of nuclear energy and the NPT

While the future of nuclear power remains strongly affected by its five problematic features (waste, safety, proliferation, economics, and acceptance) there are at least three socio-economic and/or environmental concerns that it could contribute to alleviate (climate change, air pollution, energy security). The increasing attention to these concerns explains the current renewed interest in the civil use of nuclear energy for power production. The coming decades the installed nuclear capacity in Europe is unlikely to change significantly, while the relative benefits and drawbacks of nuclear power, as well as sustainability arguments related to all energy resources, will determine its prospects for the longer run. World-wide, until

2050, the contribution of nuclear energy to electricity generation is likely to remain between a lower bound of constant capacity (i.e. in absolute terms) and an upper bound of constant share (i.e. in relative terms). Given the intimacy between the civil, military, and terrorist applications of nuclear technology and materials, there will be even more reason than exists today for all countries to fulfill their NPT obligations, on the one hand, and engage in a gradually more stringent nuclear control system of fissile and radioactive materials, on the other hand. It has to be urgently analyzed to what extent a possible revival of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the associated construction of new nuclear power plants can be reconciled with the increasing worries world-wide over the proliferation and terrorist risks involved with the multiple stages (front-end and back-end) of the nuclear fuel cycle. Technology can play an important role in reducing the inherent and dynamic risks of nuclear energy, but techniques such as lifetime reduction and transmutation of radioactive waste and proliferation-risk reducing reactors with passive safety features can only be part of the solution. The establishment of institutions and the building of trust are essential elements in advancing the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, while allowing the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Internationally a consensus is growing that a full internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle is desirable, including e.g. Internationally Monitored Waste Repositories (IMWR), international fuel banks, multi-nation enrichment plants and reprocessing facilities, in order to guarantee the civil use only of nuclear technologies and materials.

During the Cold War, global nuclear relations rested on two mutually supportive arrangements: the elaborate structure of nuclear deterrence and the non-proliferation regime. A rough equality of military power was measured in terms of assured mutual destruction, while an uneven distribution of military nuclear capabilities assured a rank ordering among nuclear weapon powers. This balance of terror created a semblance of order, based primarily on the unprecedented common interest of all states in avoiding a nuclear holocaust. Thanks to the NPT, nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states found a common ground in averting the spread of nuclear weapons with all undertaking respective obligations. During the past 15 years, this nuclear weapons control regime of which the NPT still constitutes the cornerstone, has been tested as never before, and has gone through at least three major crises (involving, respectively, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) none of which have been satisfactorily solved. While some modestly positive developments took place – as it was decided, for example, in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely – the challenges ahead to maintain and strengthen the NPT are large and multiple, relating to issues of consistency, commitment, jurisdiction, inspection, and enforcement. Among the long list of challenges figures also the evidence that the US today no longer sees nuclear arms control as an essential part of its nuclear policy and is instigating substantial changes in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as exemplified by the recent nuclear deal between the US and India. Considerable unease also exists about combining the campaign against terrorism with

preventive or preemptive counter-proliferation. With possibilities of a nuclear response to chemical or biological attack, a danger exists of an even further potential use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear war has been avoided so far because of the taboo against the military use of nuclear weapons during the nuclear era. Any such use in the future, accidental or deliberate, could destroy whatever remains of that taboo.

The Middle East and Iran

Even while a new package of incentives to solve the controversy over Iran's nuclear program has just been proposed by the US, Europe, China, and Russia, there is not yet an apparent concrete settlement of the dispute in view. Article IV of the NPT as well as its negotiating history clearly indicate that uranium enrichment is not banned from any nuclear program as long as it is for peaceful purposes only. Hence, eventually the West will need to acquiesce in Iran's right to enrich uranium according to the NPT, but this should not relieve it from a constant and thorough investigation of its current nuclear activities as well as of the period preceding 2003 when advanced Iranian uranium enrichment activities were revealed. While over the past few years the IAEA has undertaken more extensive inspections in Iran than it has probably ever done before regarding any other nuclear program, it has evidently not yet done so to full satisfaction. The IAEA should therefore be given the opportunity to continue far-reaching inspections, but insisting that Iran should stop or suspend enrichment indefinitely does not facilitate its task in its safeguards activities to render the Iranian nuclear program more transparent. Insistence on suspension

could delay if not hamper the ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol. While it may be good as trust-building measure to temporarily suspend its enrichment technology development, in the longer run Iran cannot be denied the operation of domestic enrichment facilities. A solution could be to create requirements, in the case of Iran as elsewhere, that any future uranium enrichment activities may only take place in the context of international consortia, e.g. similar to the existing ones of URENCO and ABACC.

The initiative by the five nuclear weapons states and Germany to propose a package with a number of incentives in exchange for Iran accepting to temporarily renounce its enrichment program could be a development on the right track. It would allow building confidence, while it would not preclude recognizing Iran's inalienable right to eventually possess the full nuclear full cycle as long as it is employed for peaceful purposes only. Especially an offer that would include European support for a NWFZ in the Middle East and a regional forum to discuss and reach regional security arrangements is interesting. The Iranian nuclear file cannot be discussed in isolation of the region's political environment, security requirements, and threat perceptions. Indeed, the Iranian proliferation crisis can only be handled in the larger regional context, and should include the Arab perspective that has so far not been given due attention. In order to understand the reasons behind nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, one needs to examine the overall political and security landscape in the region with its complex dilemmas of conflicts and threat perceptions, including a variety of

topics like the international non-proliferation situation and the NPT, the Israeli nuclear arsenal, the interests of external powers, and the position of Arab states regarding these issues. The Middle East *problematique* cannot be solved without addressing the Israeli nuclear-weapon capabilities and the need to bring Israel into a level playing field system that allows it to adhere to the NPT and support the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

NATO and the role of Europe

Clear ambiguity exists in the NATO defense doctrine, since 23 of the 26 NATO member countries are defined as being 'non-nuclear-weapon states' that simultaneously belong to an alliance that regards nuclear deterrence as a key part of its military doctrine, while NATO condemns the adoption of a nuclear deterrent by any other state. This contradiction has long exerted a negative influence over attempts by the international community to take serious steps towards global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. With no real progress in nuclear disarmament in Russia and the US, and in the absence of a popular mass movement against nuclear weapons, pressure from within NATO may persuade the Alliance's three nuclear-weapon states that the international control and reduction of nuclear arms is not only a viable option but is also more rational than attempts to impose unilaterally non-proliferation policies on other countries. In addition to NATO nuclear weapon states France and the United Kingdom, especially countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – that all four have American nuclear weapons on their soil – could become more vocal in

favor of nuclear reform: their joint call for concrete nuclear weapons reduction may provide the best opportunity to advance the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda and thereby counter a renewal of the nuclear arms race in some parts of the world.

Since the European Council adopted in 2003 two key documents describing its major security strategies – the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the associated EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (referred to as the Non-Proliferation Strategy, NPS) – the European non-proliferation strategy has gained in coherence, but only conditionally in effectiveness. In dealing with the so far most difficult test cases, the NPT and Iran, the EU has maintained unity, and widely opposing views within the Union, like in the run-up to the Iraq conflict, could be avoided. Under the surface, however, internal differences remain, and notably on nuclear disarmament the approaches of different European states vary substantially. The largest obstacle for a stronger European engagement for a WMD-free world remains the contradiction between the “peace power” Europe as a whole and the policy of the nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom in particular. A discussion on the need of nuclear weapons for European security is overdue. Such a discussion would not only need to address the nuclear doctrines of France and the UK, but also the purpose of the approximately 480 US nuclear weapons still deployed in five European states in the framework of NATO.

With the difficult but steady development towards an increasingly binding Union between European states,

the EU may well get into a position enabling it to launch a European initiative: using the British and French nuclear arsenals as a bargaining chip to help the NPT out of its current crisis. Such an initiative could, for example, relate nuclear weapons reductions in France and the United Kingdom to reductions in the third European nuclear weapon state, the Russian Federation, as well as the US. An important question remains how US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be included in future nuclear disarmament negotiations. Like in the context of NATO, also in the integrating European policy framework the four EU non-nuclear weapon states on whose territory US tactical nuclear weapons are deployed under NATO auspices could influence the negotiating process. The fact that today most of the European states still regard their security under a nuclear protective screen as better guaranteed than without nuclear weapons weakens the credibility of European demands for nuclear abstinence of other states like Iran. One of the fundamental reasons that the NPT is undergoing one of its biggest crises to date, is the fact that article VI on nuclear disarmament has not been obeyed sufficiently by the nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. Europe could contribute to resolving this crisis by reconsidering the necessity of the presence of nuclear weapons in both European nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states on the one hand, and by continuing its diplomatic role as negotiator in international disputes and conflict situations on the other hand.

Concluding remarks

The current regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons is in a crisis and the nuclear disarmament process has stagnated. Since the development and use of the first nuclear fission bombs over six decades ago, the global nuclear threat remains un-mitigated. This threat has recently even intensified, and the nuclear non-proliferation process today probably faces its greatest challenge since the end of the Cold War. Most apparent at present are the nuclear impasses related to Iran and North Korea, but other proliferation intricacies, in especially the Middle East and South Asia, add to the world's nuclear concerns.

The participants of this workshop, key experts from around the world in the many aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation conundrum, discussed the general status and present problems of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament process. The workshop constituted an independent forum for authoritative scientists and policy makers assessing and bringing forward solutions to the current crisis, as well as providing suggestions for adapting the current political and legal nuclear regime. In particular, the workshop has investigated what the role of European policies could be to advance the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Lessons have been brought forward regarding how the currently most pertinent nuclear proliferation problems could be mitigated, among which the case of Iran, and to what extent European initiatives can be undertaken embedded in the broader ongoing process of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This process, both desirable and feasible, should and could ultimately lead towards the universal elimination and abolition of nuclear weapons.

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Papers from the Pugwash Study Group: *Threats without enemies: the security aspects of HIV/AIDS*

Marie Muller and Gwyn Prins

HIV/AIDS represents a category of new challenges to Human Security that may be grouped under the heading of *threats without enemies*. There is no question that it is a threat to human security. It is a security threat as destabilising as any war; it has enormous social, economic and political implications and has been recognised as a security threat by the Security Council of the United Nations in terms of Resolution 1308 of 2000.

Southern Africa is the hardest hit by the epidemic; South Africa, not the hardest, but very hard. In South Africa the life expectancy has gone down from sixty to forty-seven in just a decade. It has also been said that the epidemic has become the most politicised issue in present-day South Africa. Apart from the enormous social, economic and political consequences, the HIV/AIDS epidemic will have a range of security consequences for South Africa, some of which in the “new” human security meaning of the word and others in the “old fashioned” sense of the term.

As a result of the seriousness of the HIV/AIDS epidemic for South and Southern Africa, but also its growing impact elsewhere, in the so-called second wave countries,¹ the South African Pugwash Group requested the Pugwash Council that a study group be established to deal with this “threat without enemy”.

This was approved in 2003. Looking back, we realise that we knew very little at the time about the epidemic and about its security aspects. Some of us—the small group that forms the core of the study group – had some expertise on aspects relating to the issue and some background in fields relevant to the problem. Two members of the group come from a medical/hard sciences background with thorough grounding in biochemistry and physiology—and had some very good contacts in the virology field. Other members, had some background and expertise in the security field. We knew without a doubt that the issue required an interdisciplinary approach and that we could provide that between us.

We decided to start with a very small workshop, held in the holiday cottages belonging to our parents. With no funding in place yet, we were prepared to foot the food and incidentals bill personally. Participants were warned that they might have to pay for travel themselves if funding did not come through. Fortunately, funding came through shortly before the workshop. But we did run the workshop on a shoestring, we made beds and cooked and participants helped with the dishes. The irony is that we were later accused by the journalist, Rian Malan, who accepted the invitation to attend, but on the day and without apology, did

not arrive, of squandering money as part of an “AIDS Industry”.

The first workshop, held in February 2004 at Betty’s Bay, Cape, was attended by nine persons and was designed to be exploratory. Both South Africans and experts from abroad came and included were some of the foremost experts. The discussion was extremely worthwhile and the way forward became much clearer to us, the core group.

The second workshop took place in June of the same year at Mabula Lodge, Limpopo (near the Pretoria/Gauteng area). Seventeen persons attended, again including both South Africans and colleagues from abroad. However, the venue was chosen specifically because it would be easier for a number of persons from the Gauteng area to attend. The workshop was intended to focus much more specifically on the security aspects, including the military angle, but also to highlight the micro-nutritional aspect of combating the epidemic. It also further explored the possibilities of modelling and statistical issues.

The third workshop in the Study Group “*Threats without enemies*” Series took place in April 2005 in Gordon’s Bay, east of Cape Town. By this time the core group was convinced that it was important to convey lessons to, but also to learn from others in the so-called “second wave”

countries, such as India. The group of twenty-three included two colleagues from that country and afforded an opportunity to begin to think comparatively. The workshop also further explored the modelling angle and heard interesting research findings pertaining to vectoring patterns.

The next workshop, in September 2005, was a joint undertaking by the core group—composed mainly but not exclusively of Pugwash South African members – and members of the Pugwash group that had been convening workshops on Science and Ethics. In this workshop, held in Corsica, the focus would be specifically on the moral-ethical aspects relating to the epidemic and responses to it. The perspective was further broadened by the inclusion of persons working in the field of HIV/AIDS in the Arab world.

The fifth and final workshop in the current series took place in Chennai, India in April 2006. It was

organised by the President of Pugwash, Professor Swaminathan, in cooperation with the core group. The workshop afforded excellent opportunity to exchange experiences and expertise between the mainly South African core group and their Indian colleagues, but the invitation of others including other Africans (from Uganda and Kenya) broadened the perspective even further.

By the end of the series, the Study Group believed that it had really much deepened and broadened its understanding of the issue. A number of by-products had also resulted from the process and some meaningful contacts, networks and research arrangements had come out of the workshops. At the annual Pugwash conferences that took place in the course of the series, Working Group 6 gave opportunity to the Study Group to report on progress and to interact with other Pugwashites. Some local, small seminars had also

been held by the South African Group to further disseminate results.

What is contained here are some of the most pertinent of contributions made at these workshops. It is hoped that their publication here will contribute to filling some gaps in knowledge and understanding of the epidemic, will lead to some new ways of thinking about the problem and to the better management of it globally.

In closing, the Study Group and the Pugwash Conferences would like to express their thanks to Stephen Heintz, Nancy Muirhead and Priscilla Lewis of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in New York for their support of our efforts.

NOTE

¹ These are north-eastern and west Africa, Russia and surrounding countries especially India and China. The first wave of large scale infections was over central and southern Africa.

² Special thanks to Celeste LeRoux, Pugwash research assistant, for additional editing of these papers.



(left to right) Marie Muller, Alan Whiteside, Hussein Solomon, Lorraine Dodd, Gus Stewart, Gwyn Prins, Mary Crewe, and Lindy Heinecken at Betty's Bay workshop, February 2004 PHOTO BY NOLA DIPPENAAR

Some important and significant epidemiological features and risk determinants of the HIV epidemic in Southern Africa

Dr Clive Evian

AIDS Management and Support and JHB Hospital HIV Clinic

Despite the severity and magnitude of the HIV epidemic, one of the most outstanding and in my opinion most critical features of the epidemic is its silence and invisibility. This invisibility is one of the most unique and intractable aspects of the epidemic and which ultimately mitigates against its control and management. Factors promoting this phenomenon include the following:

- Most people are unaware that they have HIV and have not been tested
- Those who know of their HIV positive status still choose to keep this fact a secret from their partners, family members, friends and from the society at large
- The diseases resulting from HIV/AIDS can masquerade as common everyday conditions such as skin rashes, pneumonia, diarrhoea, weight loss TB etc
- With severe illness or incapacity or death the reasons are often related to the above non-specific disease entities (TB, pneumonia etc)
- In many situations it is illegal to divulge someone else's HIV status without their permission
- Health care personnel are not permitted to divulge an HIV diagnosis without the person's permission.

There are many good and bad reasons why the above occur, e.g. stigma, fear, denial, ignorance, the nature of the disease and its sympto-

matology etc. However, 'national collective denial', misinformation and disinformation, scandal, myth and misconception, inappropriate use of public media and political interference (all of these features exemplified in South Africa) all contribute significantly to keeping this disease away from the public eye and in turn propagate its spread.

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Despite the severity and magnitude of the HIV epidemic, one of the most outstanding and most critical features of the epidemic is its silence and invisibility.... By colluding with the silence we are colluding with the virus.
.....

Not only is there a 'silence' around the disease and the epidemic in general, but there is often, in many countries especially in the higher prevalence ones, a deficiency in the description of the epidemic i.e. it's epidemiology – how the disease is distributed, in whom and for what reason. The stigma and political overtures often promote a denial as to who are most vulnerable, who are most affected and the reasons for this.

Lack of research into the sexuality or sexual practices of those most affected further promotes denial and misconception.

In order to really deal with the HIV/AIDS and manage and control it appropriately, it is imperative that the disease and the epidemic need to be made more visible and tangible and that we need to face up to its realities, 'warts and all' and honestly face and admit to it. By colluding with the silence we are colluding with the virus.

HIV is also a long term epidemic, maybe a 100-200 year or more phenomena, and changes in all aspects (the spread of HIV, the social determinants of HIV infection, the impact of interventions, the impact of the epidemic itself) are 'long wave' events and we should not expect short term success or evidence of impact. Even the changes in the epidemic or the perception of it, or in the society response to it will often be somewhat hidden and silent for a long time. We need decades rather than years into the future to know and understand this change and we should therefore not jump to conclusions too soon or too early.

The paper presented illustrated various aspects of the South African epidemic highlighting various epidemiological features.

Graph 1 below, highlights the dynamic of the epidemic by way of a hypothetical epidemic curve attempting to follow the epidemic over a 25 year period from its onset, initially developing an HIV epidemic curve, followed by an illness epidemic and then the resulting mortality. It also should be noted that the plateau of the HIV curve is partly due to the increasing mortality and should not be regarded as a control of the epidemic until the HIV epidemic curve reduces systematically and persistently over time.

Graph 2 below presents data col-


lected by the Department of Health on the HIV prevalence among pregnant women attending public health services (generally a lower socio-economic sector of the society). The surveillance data collected since 1990 shows a typical epidemic curve. Data of this nature serve best as an indicator of epidemic trends rather than of actual prevalence rates among the general population, as ante-natal data excludes men, non-pregnant women and age groups outside of the reproductive ages. In addition, ante-natal data in the teenage years may not be typical of non-pregnant teenage girls.

Furthermore the trend curve provided by this data suggests that the impact of the epidemic is set to rise 3 to 4 fold from the current impact i.e. the likely impact of the epidemic (deaths, serious illness, hospital burden, economic burden, etc) is reflective of the epidemic size as it was approximately 10 years ago (as it takes about 10 years from infection to death). Since approximately 2005 the epidemic has risen 3-4 fold, and therefore the impact will rise this magnitude given no substantial impact of the ARV rollout.


Graph 3 below illustrates the provincial variation in HIV prevalence, and Graph 4 the age specific HIV prevalence in the ante-natal survey highlighting the diverse nature of HIV epidemics, and helps to illustrate the point that national epidemics are not a homogenous or generalisable phenomena, but rather a conglomeration of many micro-epidemics. HIV prevalence can change significantly in different provinces, cities and even suburbs within cities.

The HIV epidemic is determined by many non-biological influences such as social stability, population


Graph 1¹: Typical HIV/AIDS Epidemic curve (for the 15-40 year age group) for a hypothetical Southern African Region (figures and dates are not actual)




Graph 2²: HIV prevalence among pregnant women (first time attendance for the pregnancy) in the public health services in South Africa 1990-2004 (Department of Health)




Graph 3³: HIV prevalence among pregnant women in the public health services in South African Provinces 2004



Graph 4:



Graph 5:



mobility and migration, gender equality and empowerment, education and literacy, economic empowerment and poverty, substance use and abuse etc. Prevalence may also differ significantly in different gender, age, race, groups etc.

In addressing the epidemic it is important to understand these influences and determinants and to further ‘deconstruct’ these and then take appropriate steps to counteract these epidemiological forces

Graph 4 further illustrates the very serious impact of HIV on teenage girls i.e. a 16% prevalence and a severe rise in infection in the next age group (20-24 yrs) to approximately 31% i.e the 2000 15-19 year prevalence has almost doubled by 2004 in the next age cohort, highlighting the ‘malignant’ nature of the epidemic among young women.

Graph 5 illustrates a study done by the Reproductive Health Research Unit (RHRU) and further highlights

the vulnerability of teenage girls and young women compared to boys and men. The study reveals a common finding whereby teenage girls get infected much more rapidly and their overall prevalence is much higher than the boys in similar population groups. As HIV is generally a poorly transmitted virus (see below), it is therefore clear that these girls must be acquiring HIV from older men, and in many situations these men are considerably older. Teenage girls and young female adults living in socially disadvantaged situations are highly vulnerable to the sexual exploitation of older men (men who are also socially dislocated or displaced). This social phenomena sets up high prevalence levels in young women and this in turn provides an artificial boost to the epidemic (young adults being most sexually adventurous). Transactional sex may be one of the most important determinants of high prevalent epidemic and more research is needed in this context.


Men tend to get infected at a relatively older age compared to women i.e. the peak prevalence in women is in the 25-29 year age band and in men it tends to be in the 30-34 year band. Graphs 6-10⁶ below illustrate the following epidemiological features in South Africa

- HIV is invariably higher among contract employees compared to permanent employees. This vulnerability is likely to be due to social instability and issues relating to migrancy and possibly also to education and literacy levels. Contract employees in South Africa in the main tend to be of a lower skill level and often include security, cleaners, canteen workers and unskilled and semi-skilled labour.


- HIV prevalence is higher among lower income or skill groups and lower in the higher income groups. This linear relationship is well illustrated in Graph X i.e. a prevalence study of over 6000 employees across 8 operations in a manufacturing company
- Low income or contract women employees tend to be more vulnerable than their male counterparts
- Seasonal employees similar to contract employees are also highly vulnerable suggesting that migration and mobility are important determinants of risk
- Employees living in hostel accommodation – often single sex hostels in South Africa, are also likely to be more vulnerable to HIV infection.

HIV is generally a poorly transmitted virus compared to other pathogens. It is generally accepted that the risk of HIV transmission on a single sexual exposure to HIV is very low i.e less than 1% and considerably less in most circumstances. The lack of such knowledge has both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, if people believe HIV is more infectious they are less likely to chance their luck. However, if most people believe HIV is very infectious (which most do indeed believe) then most people in high prevalent countries believe that they must have acquired HIV. This stems from the fact that in these circumstances there must be a very high prevalence of multiple partner sexual activity. As such the natural conclusion of most is that they probably have acquired HIV. Believing one has HIV can be a very disempowering process whereby one may not listen to preventive messages or not believe


Graph 6:




Graph 7:




Graph 8:



Graph 9:



Graph 10:



there is any point in HIV prevention, and for many this is a belief in a 'hopeless life situation' or a 'death sentence'. Avoidance of HIV testing for fear of finding out the worst prevents many from having an HIV test and in fact finding out that they are actually HIV negative. This latter finding would help promote more responsible sexual behaviour or in the very least make people more receptive to HIV prevention education and awareness. It is therefore critical that individuals in groups such as workplaces, educational institutions, schools, etc know the prevailing HIV prevalence and the

meaning of this prevalence in terms of their own risk.

The nature of the HIV virus and the disease lends itself to myths and misconception, unfounded claims of treatment success or reasons why the prevalence is higher or lower in different areas or communities or countries. Sexually transmitted diseases have always been associated with stigma and or cultural myth or punishment or ancestral spirits. HIV also finds a home in various religious attitudes and beliefs. Vested economic or commercial interests also have their impact. Media portrayal also forms community perceptions and attitudes

and in South Africa the political influence has been very damaging and misleading. It is therefore imperative that the epidemiological features and aspects of this epidemic are clearly appreciated and understood.

Research in this context is imperative even if it means unravelling epidemic determinants which are embarrassing or unpopular or which point to deep fault lines in the society. However, unless these determinants are revealed, and placed in the public domain and debate, the epidemic is likely to rage on for many more decades.

¹ Hypothetical epidemic curve of the first 20-25 years of an HIV epidemic as typically seen in a Southern African country

² HIV prevalence among pregnant women attending public health services in South Africa 1990-2004. Department of Health South Africa 2004

³ HIV prevalence among pregnant women in South Africa – Provincial prevalence. Department of Health South Africa 2004

⁴ HIV prevalence among pregnant women in South Africa – Age specific HIV prevalence 2000-2004. Department of Health South Africa 2004

⁵ National HIV and Sexual Behavior Survey of 15-24 year old South African Youth, Reproductive Health Research Unit, University of Witwatersrand 2003

⁶ HIV prevalence studies done in workplaces in various corporations in Southern Africa by Author (C. Evian 2000-2005)

The Political Management of the AIDS Epidemic in South Africa

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Introduction

Since AIDS first appeared in the country in 1982 there have been numerous good policy documents written by successive South African governments—yet the epidemic shows little sign of abating. This paper demonstrates that successive South African governments have defined the policy problem in different ways: moving from a moralistic to a biomedical approach, the most recent public policy response has been to (discursively at least) view the epidemic as a developmental and human rights-based problem.

However, despite the drafting of broadly inclusive and well-conceptualised policies, the previous as well as the current South African governments suffer from a *crisis of implementation*. This is the result of a failure on the part of South African governments to consistently and correctly define the AIDS policy problem itself. This has resulted in a contested policy environment, particularly in terms of the appropriate policy responses required. As a consequence, the initial close relationship between the new South African government and AIDS civil society has been badly eroded. Civil society has turned to a strategy of bypassing the national government altogether, by appealing to the courts in an effort to ensure the implementation of AIDS policies.

The paper concludes that, unless public policy makers address the structural drivers of the AIDS epi-

demical (race relations, sexual violence and cultural factors), South Africans will continue to suffer the ravages of the epidemic, nullifying some recent successes of provinces and local governments in demonstrating some policy implementation capacity.

A very political epidemic

According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS 2004), more than 5.3 million South Africans were HIV-positive at the end of 2003; AIDS is killing the population at a rate of between 600 and 1,000 people each day; the country will have around two million AIDS orphans by 2010; and between 1,400 and 2,000 additional South Africans are becoming infected daily.

The sad irony is that AIDS was late in arriving in South Africa. In 1990 only 0.1 per cent of all South Africans were HIV-positive; a mere 10 years later this number had catapulted to 11.7 per cent, with almost 25 per cent of all pregnant women tested for the HI virus at antenatal clinics having sero-converted (Dorrington & Johnson 2002:34). Clearly, the relative isolation resulting from apartheid initially shielded many of us from the vectors of infection, whilst at the same time insidiously creating a fertile breeding ground for a future South African epidemic.

South Africans are living in an all too visible killing field. If UNAIDS statistics are to be believed, we are

dying of AIDS at a rate equivalent of more than one 11 September 2001 attack on South Africans every three days, 365 days a year—and this number is steadily increasing. Yet the South African government has not declared AIDS a national emergency, and (to take the analogy even further) for some years now President Thabo Mbeki has been casting doubt on the existence of the terrorist aeroplanes themselves. More than a decade into the democratic South African political dispensation, the government is still prevaricating on the rollout of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to people living with the virus, despite court action on more than one occasion ordering the state to provide these drugs as a basic human right to health.

Since AIDS first made its appearance in this country in 1982, South Africa's policy response to HIV and AIDS has been ineffectual, despite the formulation and ostensible introduction of several public policy HIV and AIDS interventions by consecutive governments. Analysts are in agreement that national infection rates will only stabilise after 2006—this will not be on account of effective policies, ~~however~~, but rather as a consequence of the natural maturation of the epidemic. However, stabilisation does not mean that the impact of HIV and AIDS in South Africa will decrease: at the household level families will have to cope with the ongoing tragedy of losing loved ones, whilst the economy will continue to suffer under the impact of the epidemic. By this year (2006), in the absence of effective treatment HIV and AIDS are expected to infect more than 600,000 people every year in South Africa, and since these people are—in the absence of ARVs—sure to

die within a few years, the imperative to effectively implement an appropriate public programmatic response is clear.

Some commentators have claimed that AIDS has become one burden too many for the democratic South African government; that its failure to respond effectively to the epidemic is due to the fact that, given the socio-economic and cultural risk environment within which we live and the structural variables that need to be addressed in order to turn the situation around, HIV and AIDS have served as cruel indicators of the state's impotence in dealing with a crisis of this scale.

Rather than focusing on the technical contents of actual AIDS public policy documents (which since 1992 have not been contentious) the main focus of this paper is the *environment* and the *process* of policy making and implementation itself. It is the aim of this paper to identify the reasons for the failure of public HIV and AIDS policies in South Africa. In order to improve on the process that is policy making (identification of the problem, setting the policy agenda, formulating, implementing and evaluating programmatic responses) one should evaluate the instances of public policy making on AIDS in the past as well as in the present. This should be done in an effort to ascertain which inappropriate or erroneous policies were formulated in the past, and why. Armed with such systematically gathered information, one would be better placed to improve the quality of public policy making on this issue. This is done to find some answers to a number of questions:

- Has the public policy response to HIV and AIDS in South Africa since 1982 been effective?



Gwyn Prins and Pieter Fourie.

- What public policies have been formulated to combat the disease?
- What—if any—were the gaps in the policy formulation and implementation process?
- What structural impediments were and remain present that might have and continue to sabotage the successful implementation of appropriate policies?
- How should public policy on this issue be conceptualised, formulated, implemented and evaluated differently in an effort to make such policies more effective?

The phase/stage approach to policy making

The *problem identification* stage of the policy making process on HIV and AIDS in South Africa is at the heart of the current as well as previous governments' difficulties in the appropriate implementation of state responses to the epidemic. Policy making and implementation is an iterative process, which means that there is a continual re-evaluation of the appropriateness and accuracy of

preceding stages in the policy process. This is the analytical ideal, namely that the policy process remains a generic process, where one stage in the process is not completed and left behind before moving on and exploring the next phase—there is a continual re-conceptualisation and reshaping of the policy response to any public problem. However, the problem identification stage, since it is the motive force for the entire policy process, is a particularly seminal step along the way.

In a society like South Africa, where the policy problem of AIDS first made it onto the public agenda in the early 1980s, the identification of the policy problem was particularly important given the duration of this problem. The challenge of HIV and AIDS did not appear on the scene more than two decades ago only to be challenged by a single value set or normative policy environment which then drafted a response to that policy problem. Rather, HIV and AIDS remained a feature of the policy environment and continue to exist to this day. This fact

has important implications for the manner in which South African society can and have been responding to this epidemic since 1982—through conflict, ideological strife, value shifts and immense socio-political change. By way of analogy: in the stage production of HIV and AIDS in South Africa the main variable (the epidemic) has remained and even worsened, but at the same time the décor against which it operated (the socio-political policy environment) experienced radical changes. This has had an immense impact on the manner in which the state (through different governments) has defined the very policy problem of AIDS itself.

Deadly dialectics: apartheid and the evolution of the South African epidemic

During the National Party (NP) government’s handling of the epidemic (1982-1994) HIV and AIDS was first defined as a moral issue. This led to an unwritten policy response steeped in a moralist discourse: the real problem that needed to be addressed was not so much a biomedical response combating a virus, rather the immoral actions of homosexuals, intravenous drug users, commercial sex workers and black migrant workers were blamed for the spread of the epidemic. Legal measures were enacted to punish these four groups within the rest of ‘normal’ South African society. As AIDS made its way into normal society, however, the identification of the policy problem shifted: as more and more South Africans became the victims of AIDS, the growing epidemic became increasingly identified with the black sector of society. This served to *racialise* and *politicise* the epidemic, with the apartheid government using

AIDS as an excuse to exclude foreign mine workers and in some instances blaming liberation movements for infiltrating South African society with AIDS as a new weapon.

As AIDS entered white South African society, the state increasingly made use of biomedical discourse to counter its effects. Rather than to dismantle the legal and social infrastructure of apartheid, which com-

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The NAP was morally and programmatically over-ambitious: it assumed the presence of sufficient resources and capacity to rapidly and effectively counter the epidemic.

pounded the sexual risk factors for all South Africans, the government gradually reconceptualised AIDS as a biomedical problem, creating medical bodies and legislation to facilitate a biomedical response to the growing epidemic. As political changes occurred in the late 1980s, this moral-biomedical response policy environment and problem conceptualisation also shifted: by the early 1990s it was clear that radical constitutional changes were afoot, and this led the government to allow greater room for human rights-based perspectives on the epidemic to enter the policy discourse. As social values were changing on the high political level, so too did the response imperatives of the executive branch of government. The latter’s status in South African politics had to accommodate previously excluded sectors of society: the liberation movements and AIDS civil society embraced the new human

rights approach to politics and economics in the country, and applied this new and evolving value set to the conceptualisation of a response to HIV and AIDS in South Africa. This political evolution culminated in the National AIDS Co-ordinating Committee of South Africa (NACOSA) process of 1992-1994, which entrenched the view that AIDS was to be a *developmental* and *human rights* issue or problem in South Africa, and led to the drafting of the democratic National AIDS Plan (NAP) of 1994 with these values in mind.

The discursive policy environment and problem identification mould thus shifted from blaming and targeting infected carriers of the HIV virus to the conceptualisation of a biomedical response in the late 1980s to the entrenchment of a human rights-based approach in the 1990s. By the time the Mandela government took office in 1994, this value set was deeply entrenched, not only as the high political value underpinning the manner in which AIDS would be seen by the government, but also in terms of the programmatic response that was drafted in 1994. However, the NAP was morally and programmatically over-ambitious: it assumed the presence of sufficient resources and capacity to rapidly and effectively counter the epidemic. When this did not happen, the Mandela government quickly reverted to a biomedical conceptualisation of the AIDS policy problem. The search was on for a quick fix for AIDS, which was only one policy problem among many. Medical science held the promise for such a rapid solution, and in its haste to resolve the AIDS policy problem, the Mandela government erred, and erred again.

The Virodene debacle (1997),

coupled with the obduracy resulting from the government's mishandling of the Sarafina II scandal (1996) effectively corrupted the AIDS policy environment to this day: in a desperate attempt to embrace the promise of medical science, and in failing to do so, the Mandela government reconceptualised the AIDS policy problem yet again. This reconceptualisation was not, however, made explicit: whilst maintaining the human rights discourse surrounding the epidemic, the government in 1998 abandoned its intentions of supplying rape survivors with ARVs, clearly backtracking on a human rights orientation in the process. The tension that this created between the government and the South African AIDS civil society soon became a gulf when the state in 1999 exacerbated the policy problem by reneging on its intention not to declare AIDS a medically notifiable disease. The scale of the AIDS epidemic and the reality of the pragmatism required to respond effectively and appropriately became one burden too many for the new South African government.

This has remained the situation since the Mbeki government took office in 1999. Mbeki has made the situation worse by questioning the fundamental tenets of medical science, forcing politics to enter the biomedical domain and obdurately refusing to make a graceful exit. A key feature of Mbeki's handling of the AIDS policy problem has been his reconceptualisation of the problem as a *monetary* issue: blaming large pharmaceutical companies and the profit motive, the Mbeki government has used paranoid language in an effort to deflect the responsibility for an appropriate treatment response to the epidemic away from the state. The

confusion in the policy environment that this has created is made worse by the fact that Mbeki and his health ministry seem to be increasingly isolated within the broader governing alliance: the African National Congress (ANC's) own governing partners and the ANC provincial AIDS managers are acting in contravention of the national government's prescriptions. A tacit alliance has been developing from below, with members of South Africa's AIDS civil society working with sub-national (provincial) governments in an effort to ensure the rollout of treatment strategies.

Within this context, HIV and AIDS has become probably the most politicised issue in South African society. What should be a relatively simple response, namely the definition of the policy problem in biomedical terms and the response emanating from a human rights perspective, was not implemented. Instead, the public sector in this country remains for all intents and purposes at war with itself. Mbeki and his senior health technocrats continue to phrase the AIDS policy problem in discourse that run counter to the rest of South African and international society. The very policy problem remains an area of contention.

The continued controversy surrounding the conceptualisation of the AIDS policy problem itself has rendered the other stages of the policy making environment a web of indecision, resulting in ineffective as well as inconsistent policy implementation. If there is no certainty as to what the policy problem is, then it becomes impossible for the public sector to respond coherently and consistently. Answers to the questions 'Who/what is the enemy?', 'Who should take

responsibility to respond?', 'What should this response look like?', 'Who is to be held accountable?' and so on remain unanswerable—and (in a discursive environment caught between racism and political correctness) ultimately closed to real discourse. Rather, the AIDS policy environment degenerates—as it has in this country—into a political arena for blame and efforts at auto-exculpation.

Significantly, the public gaps that this situation creates have been filled by actors for the most part outside of government. Under the NP government the absence of a coherent and appropriately conceptualised policy response led to the mobilisation of three key sets of other policy actors: the private sector (the mining industry in particular), the biomedical community and the legal fraternity came to be important actors and agents in the policy environment. Even within the public sector, segments of the health institutions responded to contradict the erroneous or ineffective responses of the national government. Under the successive ANC governments, this situation has continued: most recently provincial ANC governments have been mobilising in an effort to get localised treatment responses off the ground, whereas the South African AIDS civil society increasingly has been making use of legal strategies to force the government into action. This has led to a situation where the government has actually been bypassed: civil society has taken the AIDS fight straight to the courts, which then use constitutional measures to get the government to fulfil its constitutional obligations in terms of the provision of health measures.

Gradually then the policy environment seems to be shifting towards

the operationalisation of the NAP and the Strategic Plan for the rollout of ARV drugs (which remain couched in the human rights approach established in the early 1990s). Although this is creating greater effectiveness in the achievement for the rights of PWAs, there still is no great rapprochement between the high levels of national government on the one hand, and the broader AIDS civil society on the other. The result has been some successes in the rollout of treatment for PWAs, but the reality remains one where these advances come only slowly and intermittently. Although the South African government has now been forced by the courts to implement the terms of the Strategic Plan for the rollout of ARV drugs, the policy agenda regarding HIV and AIDS remains as contested as ever. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in 1998 entered the policy environment as a key policy entrepreneur, but the chasm between itself and the government remains as wide as ever.

Ironically, actual policy formulation has gone relatively smoothly since the NACOSA process of 1992-1994, which led to the formulation of the NAP of 1994. The iterative process of such formulation and reformulation has been successful on more than one occasion—first with the National Health Review in 1997, which established the Government AIDS Action Plan (GAAP) in 1998, and then again with the drafting of the Strategic Plan in 1999/2000. Key to the success of these processes of reformulation has been the fact that they were so inclusive of all sectors of the South African AIDS community. However, the inclusiveness of the policy formulation and adoption phases has never been followed through at the level of policy implementation.

Time and again the South African government acts on a proclivity to want to monopolise such implementation, and when this fails, it reverts to casting blame on extra-governmental forces. Instead of allowing the explicit bottom-up implementation of these appropriate policy documents, the government has insisted on a top-down approach. This creates a situation where the rest of the South African AIDS community is not only virtually excluded from implementation; it also excuses these potential policy agents from accountability of the policies' contents.

The result is inevitable failure on the part of the government to implement plans effectively, which opens it to attack from AIDS civil society. And soon this context recreates the patterns of the past: counter-attack, blame, the invocation of racist politics, and a total breakdown in any possible constructive engagement in the policy environment. This also means that the policy evaluation phase becomes deeply flawed, with the government refusing to acknowledge regular benchmarks for policy success or failure, such as biomedical peer review, statistical measures and so on. In embracing the latter, the South African AIDS civil society effectively places itself in a different evaluatory paradigm to that of the government, who then defensively accuses civil society of Eurocentrism or blatant racism. Again it is worth noting that this environment of strong policy contestation does not reflect the contents of the actual policies; rather, the manner in which these policies are or are not implemented become the arena for contestation—and all of this is the result of antagonistic definitions of the actual AIDS policy problem itself.

Quo vadis AIDS policy in South Africa?

Three clusters of issues in particular require further enquiry—both in the context of HIV and AIDS in South Africa as well as in the context of other policy issues:

Firstly, in terms of policy implementation specifically, the problem identification phase has been demonstrated to be an essential and undervalued step in the process of AIDS policy making. Further enquiry should explore manners in which policy actors can and should attain sufficient consensus on the conceptualisation of HIV and AIDS as a policy issue. Only in identifying a common conception of a policy problem is the appropriate and effective formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation of policies assured.

HIV and AIDS have become emblematic in South Africa as an area of contention in the specific case of bringing policies to fruition through implementation. The breakdown between policy and implementation needs further exploration. History has taught us that a bottom-up approach to policy implementation has led to the greatest effectiveness of policies—even in spite of opposition from central government. Further research needs to be done on how policy actors in- and outside of government can co-operate in an effort to make policy implementation more effective. This is the case particularly when evaluating the role of provincial and local governments, as well as members of civil society (NGOs and CBOs in particular).

The second cluster of issues relate to the relationship between the government and other policy actors and agents. Since the mid-1990s a chasm has appeared between the govern-

ment's and AIDS civil society's respective perspectives on the most appropriate way forward for AIDS policy design: the government has been pushing for the continual drafting of AIDS *prevention* strategies, whereas the TAC in particular has been emphasising the importance of *treatment* strategies. Increasingly analysts are in agreement that these two strategies (AIDS prevention and AIDS treatment) should not be seen in zero-sum, but rather in complementary terms. This is an under-researched area in terms of the literature on AIDS policy formulation in South Africa.

The use of *litigation* and *legislation* strategies to combating AIDS has proven to be extremely successful in operationalising the principles underpinning appropriate AIDS policies. Litigation in particular will probably continue to be used as a vector to implement AIDS policies. This strategy is profoundly under-researched. Successive South African governments have used anti-intellectual discourses in an effort to protect themselves from blame within the high political environment of public policy making on HIV and AIDS. Research needs to be conducted into the socio-political structures which enable the political application of this as a delay strategy in the implementation of policies.

The third cluster of issues refers to the broadly identified discursive environment that should be further researched. Paradoxically, the state has used anti-intellectual arguments by applying highly technical discourses in an effort to exclude non-state policy actors from exercising the right to make statements on and define the very problem of AIDS policies themselves. Research should be

conducted to explore manners in which technical knowledge and discourses can be democratised in an effort to preclude such abuse of certain epistemologies.

AIDS has become a metaphor for the entire gamut of societal ills facing South Africa. There is significant scope for exploring these metaphors in an effort to enable social learning or insight from HIV and AIDS. In this manner the epidemic might actually lead to some national introspection about the deeper structural or systemic issues that plague our society. Also, sex and morality are at the centre of the South African AIDS epidemic. Research on the interplay and ostensible tensions between sexual relations and the context of morality should continue.

AIDS has been demonstrated to be an event that is the result of social patterns of sexual and political interaction. Politically, apartheid has created a context of risk for all South Africans. Socially, however, politicians and other policy actors and agents appear steadfast in their reticence to address the structural variables upon which these patterns of interaction rest: the impact of culture, and the history of racism and exploitative gender relations. Research should be conducted to explore manners in which South Africa as a society can overcome shying away from these issues.

Recent developments— and the road ahead...

After the April 2004 elections, President Mbeki reappointed Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang for a second term as the Minister of Health. This explicit approval of the Minister's record from the Office of the Presidency was immediately slammed by the

official opposition in the South African Parliament as a 'slap in the face' of PWAs (*Washington Post* 29 April 2004). The TAC also expressed disappointment with the President's decision, citing the Minister's record of tardy implementation of HIV and AIDS policies.

If newspaper reports are to be believed, such opposition to Mbeki's decision to reappoint Tshabalala-Msimang also came from within the National Department of Health itself, with the Head of the government's AIDS Directorate, Dr Nono Similela, resigning within weeks of Mbeki's announcement (*Mail & Guardian* 4 June 2004). Within the first month of the Minister's reappointment, her historical difficulties in relating to South Africa's AIDS civil society and the broader medical community continued: her Department had to face two legal challenges from medical bodies representing South African health care workers, who were unhappy with the directives coming from the Health Department regarding job specifications with regards to the distribution of drugs.

Any hopes of a rapprochement between the Minister and AIDS civil society were dashed during the 15th International AIDS Conference, which was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in July 2004. Tshabalala-Msimang reacted badly to suggestions from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Special Envoy on HIV and AIDS in Africa, Dr Stephen Lewis, that the South African government was 'dragging its feet' on the roll-out of ARVs (*Reuters NewMedia* 16 July 2004). The Minister accused Lewis—despite his numerous visits to South Africa—of being ignorant about the South African epidemic (*Sunday Times* 18 July 2004).



The Gordon's Bay workshop, April 2005.

This context of animosity at the Bangkok conference was made worse by the Minister's continued questioning of the efficacy and safety of the use of the ARV Nevirapine for the purpose of preventing mother-to-child transmission (MTCT). Despite evidence to the contrary, the Minister repeated her oft-stated claims that the drug was toxic, and that its application for MTCT prevention was irresponsible (*Sunday Herald* 18 July 2004). The public spat between the Minister and the TAC over this issue dominated the rest of the Bangkok conference. The situation was exacerbated when the Minister—citing official obligations in South Africa—decided to leave Bangkok after attending the conference for only one day. This led to members of South Africa's AIDS civil society again questioning Tshabalala-Msimang's commitment to the fight against the epidemic.

Since the Bangkok conference, the battle between the Health Department and the TAC has heated up. The latter has—since the announcement of the government's Treatment Plan in November 2003—been struggling to get access to the government's timetable for the actual implementation of this latest policy

venture. Citing the government's failure to implement its stated intentions to have 53,000 HIV-positive South Africans on ARV treatment by March 2004 (the government has by October 2004 only succeeded in rolling out such treatment to 15,000 PWAs [TAC 2004: Internet source]), the TAC in November 2004 has once again turned to the Courts to force the government to make public its proposed treatment schedule. This time the TAC hopes to invoke the *Open Democracy Act*, which guarantees South Africans the right to view the contents of all public (government) documents. At the time of writing, this latest fracas was still continuing (*News24.com* 14 December 2004).

President Mbeki has also come under fire for his continued silence on the AIDS epidemic. In October 2004 the Parliamentary opposition's spokesperson on health, Ryan Coetzee, during official question time in Parliament asked Mbeki whether the government was not concerned that the high incidence of rape in South Africa is fuelling the AIDS epidemic. Mbeki refused to answer the question, instead attacking Coetzee and the official opposition in a thinly veiled attempt to (once again)

emphasize the fact that racism was a bigger problem for South Africans. Mbeki has since then come under some criticism from the media and other policy actors, who accuse the President of once again attempting to monopolise the right to determine the public policy agenda (*Cape Times* 22 October 2004).

In addition, Archbishop Desmond Tutu was in late November 2004 involved in a public spat with the President after the Archbishop questioned what he saw as the culture of sycophancy within the ruling party, and Mbeki's reticence to answer questions regarding AIDS (amongst other issues). This has led to some acrimonious exchanges between Tutu and ANC spokespeople, as well as directly with the President (Jack 2004:9). Mbeki has also been criticised for not owning up to South Africa's bad track record on sexual violence—in October the President launched a scathing attack on journalist Charlene Smith and UNAIDS's Deputy Director, Dr Kathleen Cravero, for emphasising the need in the country to address the issue of rape. Such emphases were, in Mbeki's analysis, really just racist attempts to discredit the new South Africa.

In December 2004 elements within the ANC also repeated their earlier attacks on the TAC, namely that the organisation is in bed with large pharmaceutical companies, using poor South Africans as guinea pigs in a ploy to distribute toxic drugs to the indigent (*ANC Today* 17 December 2004). The TAC hit back by pointing out that the government is trying to detract attention from the fact that, by the end of 2004, fewer than 20,000 people in the public sector were on ARV therapy while more than 45,000 people in the private sec-

tor have access to ARVs: 'Those of us who can afford to have the chance to live, while poor and mainly black people die because of bureaucratic neglect. A section of the ANC leadership frequently misuses the allegation of racism to cover up mistakes or lies' (*News24.com* 18 January 2005).

To drive their point home, the government around the same time pointed out that the South African National Blood Service (SANBS) was still applying outdated racist criteria in deciding which blood donations to accept (*Sunday Independent* 12 December 2004; *Mail & Guardian* 10-16 December 2004). The SANBS until early 2005 was excluding the serum of black people, since such blood had been found to contain high levels of HIV. The vitriol that resulted from this revelation of racial profiling in the health services eventually led to the institution of a more expensive but racially blind system to make the South African blood supply safer. This positive outcome was, however, clouded by the re-racialising of the issue of the national blood supply, providing the government with an opportunity to deflect attention from their slack roll-out of ARV treatment. A year later, however, we once again seem to have fallen prey to the 'one step forward, two steps back' syndrome: the SANBS in January 2006 indicated that (as it was 21 years before, under apartheid) blood from gays would be excluded—despite the fact that the South African epidemic is an eminently heterosexually transmitted one. *Plus ça change...*

In January 2005 this context of contestation became even more political when the head of the Catholic Bishops Conference in Southern Africa, Cardinal Wilfred Napier, criticised the government for promoting

condoms in the fight against HIV and AIDS 'when it's clearly not working' (*News24.com* 24 January 2005).

Confusing theology with sociology, the Catholic Church used the most recent AIDS fracas in an attempt to drive their own anachronistic and moralistic agenda—at the expense of tried and tested methods for preventing the spread of HIV.

By the end of January 2005 the Health Department admitted that their ARV roll-out programme was lagging. The National Department of Health's new Director for HIV and AIDS, Dr. Nomonde Xundu, reported that only 33,000 people with full-blown AIDS were receiving free drugs by the end of January. Xundu noted that the Department's biggest challenge was to get the human resources capacity up to the level where it needs to be—the Health Department set a goal of hiring 220 doctors by March 2005, but only 111 had been found. Also, out of the 271 pharmacists needed to help roll out the ARV treatment programme, only 90 were hired, and 64 of the 136 dieticians required were hired. Members of AIDS civil society reacted to this admission by saying that missed targets were rooted in a lack of political will from a government whose leader has in the past openly shown his scepticism over the need to make the fight against the AIDS epidemic a priority (*News24.com* 14 March 2005).

Responding to the 2005-06 national budget allocation to health, these activists also criticised the government for not keeping up with inflation or with health practitioners' salaries, and for focusing so exclusively on the expansion of health infrastructure that inadequate planning goes into expanding the actual

delivery of services where they are needed (*Mail & Guardian* 25 February to 3 March 2005).

Perhaps the most significant recent development in the world of HIV and AIDS in South Africa occurred in February 2005, when the South African Medical Research Council announced national mortality figures for the country. The data showed that deaths amongst adults had risen by around 60 per cent between 1997 and 2003, and the researchers concluded that the under-reporting of deaths related to AIDS was the greatest cause for this increase (*News24.com* 18 February 2005; *Sunday Independent* 20 February 2005). An editorial in the eminent international journal *Lancet* (12 February 2005) used this information to lambast the Mbeki government for its continued denialism and foot-dragging on the roll-out of ARV drugs:

Social stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, tacitly perpetuated by the government's reluctance to bring the crisis out in the open and face it head on, prevents many from speaking out about causes of illness and deaths of loved ones and leads doctors to record uncontroversial diagnoses on death certificates... The South African government needs to stop being defensive and show backbone and courage to acknowledge and seriously tackle the HIV/AIDS crisis of its people. The progress in provision of [ARV] treatment to all people with advanced HIV has been painfully slow since the Government's first report of a planned programme in August, 2003.

Despite this potentially explosive information, the government seems to be continuing its intransigent position on ARVs, and continues to prevaricate on the roll-out of ARV treatments. In fact, if recent media reports are to be believed the government (with the blessing of Mbeki himself) has in recent years been acting surreptitiously to establish a dissident AIDS activist organisation to serve as a counterweight to the TAC (*Mail & Guardian* 24-31 March 2005).

Reviewing these events since the second Mbeki administration came to power in April 2004, it is clear that the negative patterns of public rhetoric and actions on HIV and AIDS established during 1999-2004 seem to be continuing. Negative aspects centre around the fact that Mbeki and his Minister of Health seem to be continuing their policy of neglect and foot-dragging on ARV roll-out. The approach from the top continues to include the questioning of medical science, casting doubt on any data demonstrating the affordability and imperative of life-saving drugs, or the negative impact that AIDS is having on national mortality and morbidity levels.

However, not all is lost. There are clear signals in and around government that some positive forces are at work to undo some of the damage done under the Mbeki government. These positive aspects include:

- A greater willingness from the Ministry of Finance to provide the capital to improve the roll-out of ARV treatment;
- Some provinces and local authorities have demonstrated an increase in their capacity to provide essential services;

- AIDS civil society in South Africa seems to be succeeding in bypassing those at the very top of government, using the courts to force through legal sanctions to create the programmatic infrastructure for future success, and

- Inside the National Department of Health a number of newly appointed officials seem to have a genuine desire to speed up the delivery of essential services to combat AIDS: Dr Nomonde Xundu and Deputy Minister of Health Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge are driving real efforts to integrate HIV into the areas of healthcare and AIDS treatment. Importantly, Madlala-Routledge also seems more amenable than her Minister to see the TAC and other members of AIDS civil society as allies, rather than as foes (*Sunday Times* 13 March 2005).

One hopes that these developments will in the not too distant future create an institutional tipping point to change the AIDS policy landscape in this country. For unless the government (particularly at the provincial and local levels) and civil society work together and stop viewing prevention and treatment strategies as mutually exclusive, all of South Africa will lose in the long run. But in order to get there, it is imperative that we find a way of addressing the real vectors underpinning the spread of HIV in this country: perversely unequal and violent gender relations, cultural practices that act to lubricate the spread of the virus in our society, and government denial about the impact (and very existence) of the horror that is AIDS. The bottom line is that we should learn to take *individual* responsibility for our own sex

lives—and not defer that questionable privilege to the state. In order to achieve all of this, we need to become a society that is unafraid to speak the truth to power, wherever it may lurk.

As for the government, this paper's central message to Thabo Mbeki is that his administration's history of denial, prevarication and obfuscation regarding HIV and AIDS might postpone or temporarily hide some *ad hoc* consequences, but unless the lessons of AIDS are heeded, generations hence will judge you harshly. Soon the dividends earned from the apartheid struggle will seem distant to the leaders and opinion shapers coming to the fore; AIDS is the new arena of the struggle. Denial and an anti-intellectual stance will only take you so far, for so long—as the warning goes, 'This fence around your garden won't keep the ice from falling'.¹

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“UNDP/HARPAS Religious Leaders Initiative on HIV/AIDS in The Arab Region: the Ethics of a Developmental approach”

Khadija Moalla, Ehab El Kharrat, Sayed El Zenari

This paper will give a background on the Religious Leaders (RLs) Initiative launched by the UNDP, HIV/AIDS regional programme in the Arab States (HARPAS) and the ethical dilemmas that it provoked from its very start, as well as what is thought of the lessons learned in this process. The initiative was launched in April 2004, a peak event was its Cairo regional colloquium, in December 2004 where 80 first rank Muslim and Christian leaders representing all denominations came together to discuss the rising threat of the HIV/AIDS to the region and establish a basis for responding to it. The result was the Cairo Declaration, described as revolutionary by some, as well as a Muslim and a Christian Manual of religious lessons tackling stigma, discrimination against HIV/AIDS and providing a platform for a human rights-based response to the issues. The action plan laid down in Cairo involved 5 sub-regional workshops for leaders and a structured national response to train and motivate religious leaders. All the workshops were carried out and this plan has led to the mobilization of thousands of Muslim Imams and Christian Ministers to date. The ethical issues raised here start from whether to involve RLs or not in the response, what are the ethical problems relating to the concept of God's punishment, protected sex, vulnerable groups and women rights.

The Background: Why Involve Religious Leaders?

Years of experience have shown us that any effective response to HIV/AIDS can not stop at the health approach, it must involve many sectors of the society in a concerted developmental effort. HIV/AIDS provokes deep ethical issues and dilemmas. A developmental approach implies empowering ordinary people to do extraordinary things; dealing with the ethical dilemmas relevant to HIV/AIDS is an essential part of such empowerment. People thinking that HIV/AIDS is God's punishment upon the wicked are probably less likely to respect and promote the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), let alone reach out to them or support vulnerable groups. Dealing with sexuality, with a taboo mentality, may lead to less inclination to talk about HIV/AIDS and its modes of transmission and effective preventive measures.

The issue in the Arab world becomes more complicated if we examine cultural and developmental challenges. Globalization has led to paradoxical rise of fundamentalism/terrorism in the region, which may be partly explained as an attempt to maintain identity against the overwhelming cultural, economical and political impacts of globalization. Disenchantment with “western culture” may provide a basis for doubt of any



Andy Mogotlane, Col. A.J. Loubser, and Bob Mtonga at the Mabula workshop, June 2004.

experience exchange from other areas of the world, particularly if it touches on issues like “sexual morality” and “religious interpretations of major events”. Far from being absolute terms of references, human rights are enclosed with marked ambiguity in the minds and sentiments of most of the region’s population. The whole progress toward a democratic society is at best in an embryonic stage in most of the Arab states. Access to information is hindered by a long list of political, cultural and ideological concerns and the gaps in women rights are still enormous.

Compassion, breaking the silence, overcoming denial and a proactive stance can be challenged by moral concerns about modesty, chastity, avoiding undue alarming of the public and a conviction that there are other priorities towards which we should direct the limited resources available.

There are views that call for avoiding involving religious leaders (RL) in the Arab region, claiming that they are hopelessly reactionary,

too rigid or close minded and that working with them may backfire. Another concern is that involving religious leaders may actually hinder the process of democratization in the region. UNDP/HIV AIDS Regional Programme in the Arab States (HARPAS) endorsed a view that RLs are key-players in the region, they have enormous impact on people’s values and attitudes, avoiding them would lead to isolating developmental efforts from the public and that it is both possible and worthwhile to win their support to proven and human rights based responses to the epidemic.

The History of the Religious Leaders Initiative in the Arab States

Mapping and a technical meeting:

The RLs initiative started in April 2004, and involved a mapping of the Muslim and Christian Religious Leaders existing efforts in response to HIV/AIDS in the region as well as a relevant review of the literature done by two consultants in preparation for a technical Meeting held in Damas-

cus (28th June – 1st July 2004), attended by thirty RLs, many of whom had previous experience with HIV/AIDS.

Initial Endorsement: This was followed by an “Endorsement Phase” where person to person as well as group meetings were held with some key RLs including the scholars of the Syrian Kaftaro Institute, the Egyptian Sheikh of El Azhar (considered by some the most influential Sunni institute in the world), as well as the Coptic Pope, in Tunisia. Scholars of the Zeitouna University endorsed the initiative and in Sudan the Chief of Ullama as well as the Sudan Council of Churches did the same. The initiative was also endorsed by prominent leaders in Morocco including the Religious Advisor of the King.

The Major Regional Colloquium:

This set the ground for the major Cairo Colloquium, which was held under the auspices of the Arab league and involved 80 top Muslim and Christian leaders from 19 different Arab countries, including Sunni, Shia, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant leaders. They produced a progressive Declaration. Described as revolutionary by reporters covering the story, the event received intensive media coverage by more than 40 agencies, including major news papers and regional TV stations.

The Cairo Declaration emphasizes the urgency of responding to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, calling for awareness campaigns, outreach to vulnerable groups, treatment and care for those infected and affected by the virus. It even explicitly supports a woman’s right not to be infected, implying a possible review of the age-old power imbalance of gendered sexual relations in the region.

Penal views explaining away the epidemic as an expression of “God’s wrath upon the unrighteous” are easily subscribed to in this region and elsewhere, but after the courageous stance of the Cairo RLs Declaration, these views became more difficult. The declaration says: “(AIDS) *Patients are our brothers and sisters, and we stand by them seeking God’s healing for each one of them...People living with HIV/AIDS and their families deserve care, support, treatment, and education, whether or not they are responsible for their illness*”.

Another important ethical breakthrough came with the Declaration statement: “*We emphasize the importance of reaching out to vulnerable groups... including commercial sex workers and their clients, injecting drug users, men having sex with men, and those who are involved in harmful practices*”. Here members of these groups were named and recognized as “real people” and, perhaps for the first time in this region, religious leaders did not call for the most stern punishment for them.

The heated ‘harm reduction’ debate in the colloquium ended up with the following statement in the declaration “*We reiterate that abstinence and faithfulness are the two cornerstones of our preventive strategies but we understand the medical call for the use of different preventive means to reduce the harm to oneself and others*”.

Another outcome of the Cairo meeting was the two HIV/AIDS manuals written by and for Muslim and Christian religious leaders; these contain suggested material for sermons and religious lessons on HIV/AIDS-related issues, which integrate fact-based messaging from not only the medical but also the broader develop-

ment perspective, and a human rights based approach based on references from the Koran and Hadith, or the Bible and its scriptures.

An action plan was laid down in the colloquium that involved the formation of a steering committee, printing of the kits, sub-regional and national training workshops and preparation for a network of RLs in response to HIV/AIDS.

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Years of experience have shown us that any effective response to HIV/AIDS can not stop at the health approach, it must involve many sectors of the society in a concerted developmental effort.
.....

The Steering committee: 12 Religious Leaders (8 Muslim and 4 Christian) met for the first time in Cairo, May 2005 and prioritized the action plan items, reviewed the final version of the Religious Kit and decided the next steps in the region. They also provided an initial plan for sustained networking and facilitation of future activities. A significant outcome of this meeting was the detailed plan for holding five sub-regional training workshops to promote the kits.

Sub-regional Training workshops: The five workshops (40-50 mid-level RL participants in each workshop) were organized by UNDP’s HARPAS between July and September 2005, and national initiatives mushroomed as a result in almost every Arab country, creating a regional transformation. The declaration has thus been endorsed by thousands and probably tens of thousands of Muslim Imams

and Christian Ministers in the region. A remarkable moment came when a poor former sex worker shared her testimony in one of the workshops. Following the AIDS-stricken lady’s story, a hard-line Imam from Morocco tried to comment, his words were choked by tears while other Imams asked the lady to forgive them and to pray for them. In another UNDP workshop, in Damascus, a prominent Imam from Syria volunteered to undergo the HIV test following a doctor’s explanation of the test and its meanings. Tens of Christian and Muslim leaders entered hand in hand, to the huge Caftaro Mosque in Syria where a Lebanese Shiite Imam, a Palestinian Orthodox Priest and a first rank Azhar scholar all shared messages about HIV/AIDS. The night before, all religions were represented in a major church meeting in the village of Sahnaya to discuss HIV/AIDS. The leaders shared laughter and sincere words as they enjoyed the magic of this Syrian village hospitality after the services in the presence of the area Bishop.

These workshops go beyond the tears and laughter they evoked, to action, transformation, and commitment. A dynamic Imam from one of the biggest Mosques in Cairo went home from the workshop to deliver the Friday sermon to 6,000 worshippers which he dedicated to HIV/AIDS. He then proposed a plan to the minister of Awqaf to share the training he received with tens of his peers. A prominent Imam from Morocco started without any funding a training scheme aiming at ten Imams from each of the 14 governorates, his own leaders developed this to an ambitious plan to train all thirty thousand Moroccan Imams and they secured the funding and

expertise for this enormous task.

All leaders understand the role of health specialists in providing proven methods in HIV prevention; some agree to endorse the use of condoms while others are still reluctant and prefer to speak about abstinence and faithfulness only. But the issue has certainly been recognized, high risk behavior including unprotected sex and intravenous drug use are frankly discussed and effective methods to deal with these behaviors are suggested. Facing HIV/AIDS provokes either rigidity or open mindedness and compassion. RLs in the Arab region are moving in the right direction, and this may have long term repercussions in their reactions to many developmental issues including women rights, governance and access to knowledge. All of these aspects are essential components in any effective response to HIV/AIDS.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the promising results of this initiative include the value and methods of building trust, the importance of an empathetic and motivational approach, the effectiveness of RLs in either promoting or hindering developmental approaches, the gradual nature of the mechanisms of transformation and the possibility of discovering new meanings of virtue and spiritual values even among the most conservative circles.

The Process of Change: The change of heart individually among religious leaders takes place not only through sharing accurate information but also through religious leaders meeting face to face with People Living with HIV and AIDS. Participants also benefit from a package of leadership development exercises which encour-

age them to go beyond statistics and intellectual arguments, in order to develop an empathetic understanding of the issues that surround HIV/AIDS.

A Pluralistic Society Possible: The greatest challenge faced was to hold the colloquium at all. Inviting religious leaders from all denominations and religions within the Arab States to a colloquium that would discuss sensitive issues such as sex and HIV/AIDS was extremely difficult. Thus the Colloquium Organizers started by adopting the following motto: "Responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic requires a human accord that surpasses all religious and denominational variation. It must be an accord that derives from spiritual heritage and creates courageous responses to the problems posed by the pandemic. It is an accord that inspires something greater and deeper than any challenge!" As a symbol of such human accord, the organizers took as a logo a mosaic decoration of unknown origin; it could equally be taken from either a mosque or a church. The experience of this initiative may teach us that a pluralistic society is achievable in this part of the world, as Sunni, Shiite, Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants all convened together. Some were conservatives, others more liberal. The accord took place not through doctrinal dialogue but through an honest confrontation of developmental challenges in a warm and humane atmosphere.

Lack of trust in the UN and conspiracy theories: How is the UN related to the United States of America? Does Israel export HIV/AIDS to the Arabs? These were two of the first questions asked by some religious

leaders at the Damascus gathering before the event started. Other theories were also voiced, such as the notion that discussion of HIV/AIDS was being imposed on them by the West to distract them from focusing on their real problems. These concerns were addressed through the fact that all the participants were Arabs. Even the UN organizers of the Colloquium were Arabs. The workshops also demonstrated the hazardous situation within the Arab World – as evident by the constant increase in the number of newly infected people.

The initiative belonged to the religious leaders in that they voiced their views liberally. The UN did not impose any ideas on them, directly or indirectly. The atmosphere allowed all participants to express their views and remarks freely. The Regional Programme ensured this atmosphere by not allowing journalists or media personnel to attend any of the sessions except for the inaugural and closing sessions.

Providing a Safe and Warm Environment: Extra care was given to show respect for all ideas and to incorporate the results of deliberations without bias within the outcomes of each event. By listening, allowing space, and showing respect to the religious leaders throughout the workshops trust was gradually built, even in a short time frame.

Dealing with Denial: Silence and denial are prevailing phenomena within the Arab region both in general, and relating to HIV/AIDS in particular. The roots of such phenomena in the case of HIV/AIDS may be found in the lack of information and may also be ascribed to the prevailing notion that only particular groups are vulnerable to HIV/AIDS

and that such groups are far removed from mosque and church congregations. Moreover, the notion may even go as far as to suggest that such groups are non-existent in some Arab states. It is indeed often believed that faith-oriented societies are not vulnerable to the fatal pandemic. When people know very little about a disease related to sex, death and shame, fear becomes the dominant emotion, and the easiest way to deal with such fear is completely to avoid discussing the matter, to deny that the pandemic exists within society or to try to underestimate the volume of the problem. This problem was resolved not only through providing the participants with accurate information but through the testimonies of PLWHA from the Arab World which served to give a human face to HIV/AIDS.

Stigmatization, condemnation, lack of information and misconceptions: We need to realize that the roots of condemnation lie in the attempt to sustain the principled majority, and likewise the purity of the moral code. Undoubtedly, embarrassment of appearing lenient, morally loose and liberal played a crucial role in creating exaggerated rigidity and unbalanced viewpoints. Stigmatization and condemnation have their causes within the conscience of religious leaders. Yet, when there is more room to uncover the truth, and when people are not competing to prove themselves the greatest defenders of virtue, the atmosphere changes to one of mercy and compassion. Having consulted religious texts exhorting mercy and compassion toward the sick, the religious leaders independently reached the conclusion

that these are the true principles called for by every heavenly religion.

Empathetic and Motivational approaches: not telling the leaders what to do; rather providing the platform for them to explore the issues in a **safe** and **warm** environment and trust that they will find the right answers.

The meanings of Virtue: Connecting HIV/AIDS to committing adultery provokes a certain type of zeal for virtue. With the rise in awareness of the facts comes the realization that confronting HIV/AIDS requires avoiding labeling and condemnations. A call for love and compassion in action toward vulnerable groups and PLWHA emerges and a sense that since all human beings are sinners (obviously the notion of sin is central to both Islam and Christian-



Participants at the Gordon's Bay workshop, April 2005.

ity) the compassion and forgiveness of God is to be sought for and by all. This may fall short of the aspirations of some humanists, but it is definitely a huge step forward for PLWHA and members of vulnerable groups.

Steps forward while maintaining a balanced stance: Doctrinal and denominational diversity as well as national and ethnic diversity were evident in all workshops and events of the initiative. Another source of pressure came from UN human rights positions which sometime differ and conflict not only with the RLs norms but with each other. All this and the sensitivity of the issues at hand made progress very difficult, but it was possible in the end.

What cannot be fully attained is not to be totally left out: Some would argue that not advocating homosexuality as a lifestyle in the Cairo Declaration is a violation of the rights of men who have sex with men. However, these people are currently killed or imprisoned in many and harshly condemned in all Arab states. Therefore, the mere fact that they were recognized and not called upon to be harshly punished is a huge step forward. Similar arguments are applicable to intravenous drug users and commercial sex workers. The fact that direct mention of the condom was avoided in the Declaration was lamented by some AIDS activists, however, the use of the term “all sci-

entifically proven measures” can definitely be interpreted as inclusive of condoms and is a decisive step forward again.

The challenge of hard work may result in a more gratifying meeting:

Long hours, intensive work but a growing bond and a gratifying response were observed in the sub-regional workshops repeatedly.

The declaration and kits are essential but not enough: The leading RLs progressive views were not automatically endorsed by mid-level leaders. The process had to be repeated, some even retreated from previously attained positions.

The process of change needs consistent action to be maintained: To assume that a one-time effort will achieve constant change is unrealistic. Facing HIV/AIDS provokes either rigidity or open mindedness and compassion. Religious leaders in our region are moving in the right direction. This may have long-term repercussions in their reactions to many developmental issues including women’s rights, governance and access to knowledge. All of these aspects are essential components in any effective response to HIV/AIDS.

Issues and questions calling for further Study

In the current situation, the programme is trying to convince religious leaders to talk to and learn

from scientists. But there is a need for research on the role of religion in democratisation. The hope is that the acknowledgment of the existence of a pluralistic Arab society could act as a first step towards the freedom of thought and the freedom of science.

Further questions on harmful traditional practices (including Female Genital Mutilation) and new kinds of marriage, the roots of models of sexuality in religious ethics, the religious approach to harm reduction and other issues need to be further studied.

The experience is likely to be repeatable in other regions of the world but further studies on how it may evolve in different contexts are also called for.

The Future of this Initiative

The next step is to hold another major regional conference in order to create a regional network of all the RLs who actually started action within their communities conveying the messages agreed upon and implementing the principles of this initiative.

The Arabic first letters of the words that mean: “Network of Faith Based Agencies Working in the Field Of AIDS”, form a word that sounds like “Chahama.” In Arabic this word is difficult to translate, but it does carry the meanings of generosity, courage and gallantry. These are some of the ethical values the Arab world needs in order to face the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

The Russian Pugwash Committee

Mikhail Lebedev

In 2005, the Russian Pugwash Committee, along with the world-wide international scientific and non-governmental community, marked the 50th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. The Organizing Committee for jubilee events was headed by Academicians Nikolay Plate and Yuri Ryzhov, and Professor Sergey Kapitza, Alexander Nikitin, and Alexander Ginzburg. Meetings were sponsored by the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Russian Foundation for Basic Research and the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation.

With deep grief, Committee members learned of the death of Sir Joseph Rotblat on August 31, 2005. He was our good friend and colleague. On October 4 we organized a memorial service “The Russell-Einstein Manifesto and the Legacy of Sir J. Rotblat”. Famous scientists, including member of the Pugwash Council Prof. F. Calogero, gave talks in memory of Jo. Participants at this memorial decided to organize an annual Russian Rotblat memorial lecture series in the future.

A scientific session of the RAS Presidium titled “International Security, Non-Proliferation and Social Responsibility of Scientists” was held on November 29, 2005 as the main jubilee event in Russia of the Russell-Einstein 50th anniversary. In his opening address Chairman of the Russian Pugwash Committee and member of the Pugwash Council Academician Yu. Ryzhov stressed that scientists bear high moral and professional authority and therefore can exercise unbiased influence on politics. In his view Russia now faces an enormous problem of dialogue between the government and society –

in this case the gap is almost as great as in the income rates of the rich and the poor. Such gaps are fraught with unpredictable consequences, and Pugwash must pay attention to this problem.

Vice President of the RAS, Academician N. Plate, noted the lack of global ideas in world affairs which could gather the support of the entire international community. To help fill this need, Pugwash should seek new dynamics in the aspiration for the resolution of global problems, especially the problems of terrorism and extremism. He also mentioned that the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian scientific community must expand the participation in Pugwash of high levels of scientific and moral leadership.

Professor S. Kapitza touched on the crucial differences between the scientific community and political elites when analyzing the relations between these two groups. Scientists possess a freedom of action and opinion not available to political leaders, which is one reason that politicians do not always want, or are able, to acknowledge the importance of the advice and recommendations of scientists. Accordingly, Pugwash must continue to play a key role in supporting high-level and positive dialogue between scientists and political leaders.

Other Committee meetings celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto were held at the Federation for Peace and Conciliation (Moscow), University for Aerospace Instrumentation (St. Petersburg), and Obninsk Center for Science and Technology (Kaluga Region). More than 100 participants attended these meetings to discuss scientific cooperation and



Kirill Babievsky, Alexander Ginzburg, Mikhail Lebedev, Yuri Ryzhov

terrorism counter-measures, as well as the development of new technologies in Russia.

On November 10-14, 2005, I visited Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. This visit was sponsored by the Grozny State Oil Institute, which bears the name of Academician M. Millionshchikov, Chairman of the Soviet Pugwash Committee in 1964–1973. Discussions with members of the Government of Chechnya and leaders of science and education were characterized by the necessity for reconstruction of the Republic’s economy, educational system, and society. Murders, kidnappings, government corruption and the slow process of the reconstruction of dwellings and industry are very serious problems for Chechnya. Especially valuable would be the creation of civil society organizations and special programs for the rehabilitation of Chechen youth. In spite of a painful

impression after my visit to destroyed Grozny, I have a ‘prudent pessimism’ that Russian and Chechen leaders can carry the newly-started peace process to its conclusion.

Finally, we are pleased to announce that the Russian Pugwash Committee has started its own scientific and media internet project in Russian and English at www.pugwash.ru, and that the Russian Pugwash Committee will organize a series of event and publications in 2007 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Pugwash Conferences.

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International Student/Young Pugwash

Report by

Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra

During the first half of 2006, International Student/Young Pugwash engaged in several activities that resulted in an increase of both the size and scope of our community and, in addition, to the fostering of a closer relation with senior Pugwash.

In late April 2006, Aleksandra Dzisiow, Benjamin Rusek and Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra had the unique opportunity to attend the conference “Iran’s nuclear energy program: policies and prospects” in Tehran, Iran. Jointly organized by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the Center for Strategic Research in Tehran, this event allowed the three international students to analyze in closer detail the elements that comprise the nuclear issue in the region. But, just as importantly, this event allowed existing members of the student Pugwash community to meet with some of their peers, in particular, graduate students in social and political studies in Iran. Hopefully, this encounter will become the first of many such interactions between students from the Middle East and the broader ISYP community.

Then, from the 14-16 June 2006, 23 students and young professionals from various countries participated in the ISYP workshop on “New Challenges to Human Security” in Wageningen, The Netherlands. Organized by the local senior and student/young Pugwash groups under the auspices of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the workshop allowed the participants to go beyond the traditional core topics of the Pugwash movement and view the multifarious threats confronted by humankind from a different, yet interesting, perspective. In particular, the workshop presented students the possibility to adopt a multidisciplinary perspective on the causes of conflict, thus going beyond the perceptions that prevail both in academia and the political sphere. A selection of the articles sub-

mitted by conference participants as well as by keynote speakers will be published in future issues of the *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs* at www.scienceand-worldaffairs.org.

In parallel to these events, the Executive Board of ISYP, in close collaboration with Karim Kadry (Egypt) and other members of the local organizing committee, has continued the preparations for the 2006 ISYP Conference, which will take place on the 9th and 10th of November 2006 in Cairo, Egypt. As an event that will join new and existing members of the student Pugwash community with senior Pugwashites, the 2006 ISYP Conference will serve as an ideal venue to discuss the interconnected themes of conflict, politics, science, technology and development with a focus on the Middle East.

Finally, the Executive Board of ISYP has continued its search for an organizational arrangement better suited to deal with the fluid nature of the student community and with the renewed relationship of ISYP with senior Pugwash. Many challenges lay ahead in this respect, although creative solutions are being sought that will ensure the healthy development of ISYP as well as a constructive partnership with the senior Pugwash community.



ISYP participants in Hiroshima, July 2005.

Iwao Ogawa (1921–2006)

Iwao Ogawa, a Japanese physicist, Professor Emeritus of Rikkyo University (St. Paul University) in Tokyo and a participant in the First Pugwash Conference held at Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada in 1957, died on June 13, 2006 in Tokyo at the age of 84.

Born in Tokyo in August 1921, as a small child he met often with his uncle Hideki Yukawa, a signatory of the Russell-Einstein Manifest in 1955 and a Nobel Prize Laureate in physics in 1949. After graduation from the University of Tokyo in 1943, Iwao Ogawa became a teacher of mechanics at the Naval Academy located at Edajima, 16 km south from Hiroshima.

On August 6, 1945 at the grounds of the Academy he was shocked by a sudden flash, then a blast. He observed a mushroom cloud growing in the north sky. It was the atomic bomb explosion over Hiroshima. His place was however so far from the hypocenter of the explosion that he was not injured by the heat rays and radioactivity.

After World War II he became an associate professor at the University of Tokyo and in 1955 he moved to the Faculty of Science, Rikkyo University, where he later held the position of Director, Institute for Atomic Energy. His

works included the analyses of the mechanism of instruments measuring radioactivity and its improvements.

In those days there were many atmospheric nuclear weapon tests by the USA, the Soviet Union and the UK. As a result, the atmosphere in the world, especially in the northern hemisphere, was polluted by radioactivity. Ogawa and the Rikkyo group measured and analysed the radioactive materials contained in the air.

Ogawa was one of three Japanese participants, along with Prof. Yukawa and Prof. S. Tomonaga, at the first conference in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 1957, and he then attended more than 10 subsequent Pugwash workshops and conferences over the next four decades, including the 40th anniversary symposium held at Thinker's Lodge in July 1997. He also attended the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for the Pugwash Conferences and Joseph Rotblat in Oslo, Norway in December 1995.

With a frank personality and a wide intellectual curiosity, Ogawa wrote and lectured widely about Pugwash topics and nuclear disarmament.

—Michiji Konuma, Pugwash Japan

Robert William Reford (1921–2006)

Robert (Bob) Reford, a longtime member of the Canadian Pugwash group, died on May 9, 2006 at his home in Nova Scotia at the age of 85.

Born in 1921 in London, to Canadian parents, Robert was educated at Winchester College and New College, Oxford, and later served with the Irish Guards from 1940–1946 with the rank of Captain, seeing action as an intelligence officer in France, Germany and Malaysia.

After the war, he began a career in journalism, and then joined the staff of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research as special assistant to the director. In 1971, he was appointed Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, where he served until 1978.

A prolific writer, he edited and wrote several books, notably *Canada and Three Crises*, on Canada's foreign

policy during the international crises of the offshore islands of China, Suez and Cuba.

Robert had a lifelong involvement in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, attending his first conference in 1973 in Finland, and seven more through the 1992 annual conference in Berlin. He and his wife Stephanie also played an important part when Halifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia hosted the 53rd Pugwash Conference in July 2003.

An avid bird-watcher, he was also an excellent golfer and skier. With his exceptional height and full head of white curly hair, Bob was a striking figure wherever he travelled. Even after a stroke diminished his mobility, his twinkle and charm never left him and he often bested his friends and family with his repartee and wordplay.

—Stephanie Reford, Pugwash Canada

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Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings

7–8 June 2006 Amsterdam, The Netherlands	<i>Pugwash Meeting no. 320: Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: <i>The role of Europe</i></i>
16–18 June 2006 Wageningen, The Netherlands	<i>Pugwash Meeting no. 321: Pugwash Netherlands Workshop on <i>New Challenges to Human Security</i></i>
25–28 September 2006 Xiamen, Fujian Province China	ISODARCO Meeting <i>10th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security: <i>Harmony Makes the World Stable and Secure</i></i>
10–15 November 2006 Cairo, Egypt	56th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: <i>A Region in Transition: Peace and Reform in the Middle East</i>
14–21 January 2007 Andalo, Italy	20th ISODARCO Winter Course: <i>Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Human Rights</i>

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5–7 July 2007 Pugwash, Nova Scotia	Pugwash 50 th Anniversary Workshop: <i>Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament</i>
October 2007 Bari, Italy	57 th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: <i>The Fiftieth Anniversary of Pugwash</i>

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