



## Pugwash Consultation on the Syrian Crisis

27 June 2013, 2:00 – 5.30 pm

London, England

REPORT<sup>1</sup>

Pugwash convened a half-day meeting on the Syrian Crisis in London on 27 June 2013. The meeting involved 22 participants, including Syrians, regional experts, chemical weapons experts and current and former policy makers. The meeting explored a current overview of the conflict, claims of chemical weapons use, policy options and questions raised by the sending of arms to the various sides in the conflict, and ways in which to increase prospects for a negotiated settlement. The goal was to determine what, if anything, can be done by the international community and through additional Track II dialogue.



*Lord Hannay, Rim Turkmani*

*Rime Allaf, Rosemary Hollis*

*Alan Semo, Christopher Watson*

### Urgent humanitarian crisis

Syrian participants emphasized at the beginning of the meeting the need, when discussing policy options, to remember the tremendous human tragedy the Syrians are experiencing. On the ground there is an urgent need for some resolution to the humanitarian catastrophe. “The population needs to live to carry out decisions,” said one Syrian.

Increased attention needs to be paid to the members of civil society in Syria who are preparing to build the country back after the violence stops. Currently the focus is on those groups seeking a military solution, but for a durable peace there will need to be a different sort of engagement. One person said, looking in from the outside, the only clear point is that every participant to the conflict – the insurgents, the regime, Russia, Iran, the West and the rest of the international community, have all so far failed to adequately address the crisis. It was noted that Syria is currently the largest

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<sup>1</sup> This report was prepared by Pugwash Senior Program Coordinator Sandra Ionno Butcher, who has sole responsibility for the content (sibutcher@earthlink.net). The meeting was held according to traditional Pugwash/Chatham House rules: participants took part in their individual capacities; statements are not attributed to any individual; and distribution of the substance of discussions is encouraged. The report reflects the fact that the majority of participants were British. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the rapporteur, the Pugwash Conferences or any of the sponsoring organizations. Pugwash appreciates the support for its Middle East project provided by the Norwegian MFA, the Carnegie Corporation, other funders and our national groups.



humanitarian crisis some of the large aid organizations have ever dealt with, and may become within a year the largest in the history of some of these organizations.

In addition, it was noted that with each day of fighting, the country's infrastructure is being destroyed. Combined with an economic collapse, this human crisis demands creative responses.

### **Militarization of the conflict**

Some believe the militarization of what started as a pro-democracy movement was a major mistake, and that policies that cause polarization are not helping. The situation has been further complicated by regional and international interests who have "hijacked" the movement and turned it into a "proxy war." Some think this has played into the hands of the Assad regime, which is weak politically but stronger militarily.

Options have been put forward by various parties for a range of further military intervention, including no-fly zones, arming the opposition, etc. These questions are complicated. Some believe strongly that there is no guarantee that arms sent to the opposition might not end up in the hands of Al Qaeda, Salafists, or other groups. Some believe that arming the opposition would be repeating similar mistakes as in Iraq, and would exacerbate the Sunni/Shia divide. The Free Syria Army is not organized, said one person, "we don't know who they are, who their leaders are, or how they fight." In the end, it might not even help on the ground. One Syrian said, "If you are going to give weapons, they will kill Assad soldiers and Assad will kill them, and the infrastructure will suffer."

One person said the central question is how to make this regime go peacefully without ruining the country. Questions about how to disarm Assad are seen as urgent. Some question the support provided by Russia to the regime. One person noted the Russians have shown no signs that they are willing to stop this support, and have even vetoed a UN resolution that was "designed to give the peace plan strength." Expecting Russia to sign up to some framework (for example for a no-fly zone), is "futile" according to one participant. Others emphasized the need for dialogue with Russia on these issues.

However, some believe strongly that the argument against intervention is moot, because they say there are no other workable options. From this perspective, it is disingenuous to say "let the Syrians work it out for themselves" because there is a lack of support to enable the opposition to make that possible. Another participant said that "the regime has tortured the non-violent activists" so there is no non-violent opposition left to force the regime to step down. It was also noted that while early on there were reports of large scale defections of soldiers, at this point the hardcore of the Assad regime is galvanized. Some warned that further "big changes" in the Assad military are unlikely now, though they noted that a large percentage of soldiers are kept off the battlefield because the regime "doesn't trust them."

Some strongly believe that while negotiations are critical to a resolution of the crisis, they don't believe negotiations alone will produce results, and they argue for some "new elements" in the balance, such as those suggested by the British and French. Saying one doesn't support an embargo and supporting a "military dimension" does not necessarily mean strongly supporting weapons provision, said one participant. If Russia and other countries believe the West is dying to intervene militarily, "they must have bad ambassadors," said one participant, who emphasized that countries



like the UK are not eager to get involved militarily but see little choice. Others disagreed strongly with adding further weaponry to the situation (this is discussed further below).

*Despite these disagreements, most participants repeatedly emphasized that a hypothetical military resolution will not bring a political solution.*

### **Possible chemical weapons use**

There are concerns about the ways in which claims of possible chemical weapons use are being used by both sides to leverage the political process despite the lack of solid proof to support the allegations. One participant noted, it is possible that an unintended consequence of the US declaration of the use of CW as a 'red line' has encouraged the armed opposition to 'prove' that chemical weapons have been used by the government to pressure the US to intervene. This has had the effect of promoting a debate which is, at best, tangential to the human suffering from actual fighting in Syria.

In addition, it was noted that the type of evidence regarding chemical weapons allegations that has been presented publicly up to this point is not legal proof but rather stories and allegations. The reports lack density, in comparison to previous instances where chemical weapons use was confirmed. At the time of the meeting, there had been 7 or 8 incidents where a specific time or place has been indicated, the rest is based on unspecified time or dates. The narratives are lacking supporting visuals, and according to one participant, there has not been one photo provided of a dead person in these reported attacks. All of this is highly unusual.

Experts therefore have raised questions as to the claims, for example, regarding sarin use. The witness statements and available photos and film footage "don't add up". One would expect a random scattering of human and animal carcasses. The victims of a nerve agent would show signs of suffocation – blue lips, blackened extremities/blue or black nails, etc. – but not a single account yet describes this. If sarin is used, victims have excessive sweating and high blood pressure, which can lead to nosebleeds – but for nosebleeds, blast cannot be excluded (if it is also seen in ears in some pictures). Likewise, other photographic evidence of the victims and medical treatment is inconsistent with what one might expect following nerve agent exposure (for example, the Aleppo photos do not show expected signs of muscle convulsions, etc). One participant questioned whether there might be chemical agents in use that are currently unknown. However, those claiming chemical weapons use are saying it is sarin.



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Some say that the agents used might have been at a very low level of use, and that this might explain the unusual reports. However, regarding a possible low level use of sarin, this is questioned since Sarin is fast acting and volatile, with the similar evaporation rate as water and it would be technically difficult to control the doses released at a low level. Reports have indicated that the sarin was colorless and odorless, implying if true a high level of purity. If impure, sarin would smell like paint stripper or other foul odors, and would not be colorless. Alternative explanations need to be explored – for example possible misuse of nerve pre-treatment drugs. It also was noted that the modern battlefield is extremely toxic and that some casualties which superficially look as though they may be victims of chemical weapons attack could actually just be victims of the toxic effects resulting from the use of conventional arms.

Of higher evidentiary value are the reports prepared and submitted to the UN by UK, US, and France reportedly based on some small number of soil or physiological samples that have been analyzed in national labs, combined with related witness statements. However, in and of itself, this sort of evidence is not sufficient for international action, though it could be used to call for an international investigation. There is a need for integrity of the chain of custody of evidence, assurance that inspectors have collected samples from the actual site or victims, and that “each second” from sampling to the lab and in the integrity within the lab can be guaranteed. Because in this case the individual countries have used their own labs, it does not meet international standards. Of these three countries, not one has released a factual report nor even a fact sheet. Some expressed belief that these three countries, in a post-Iraq world, would not be taking such a stand if they did not believe the evidence to be solid. Others felt the lessons of Iraq proved that the publics have a right to question a lack of convincing evidence on these points.

For evidence of the highest value, an international team would need to go in with international experts and use established standards regarding the chain of custody, etc. The OPCW has such a mechanism, but in this case Syria is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, so only the UN can go in. The OPCW is an instrument that can be useful only if the international community agrees on using it via the UN secretary-General’s Investigative Mechanism, and in this case it would depend upon the Syrian authorities allowing access, which they are unlikely to do. The OPCW may someday be helpful in finding evidence that is at present lacking.

Some suggestions were put forward on the specific topic of how to better respond to the allegations of chemical weapons use:

1. **Use the provisions of the CWC to the fullest.** While Syria is not a party, all neighboring countries except Israel are. There should be a publicly declared policy that the global community will provide assistance to those countries and will provide immediate treatment to any victims of a chemical weapons attack.
2. To increase confidence in the results, those states claiming to have confirmed in their national labs evidence of chemical weapons use could **allow independent testing of part of the samples at an OPCW certified laboratory in another country** (France used its own OPCW-certified lab.) However, with the current samples this still would not satisfy questions and concerns regarding the chain of custody.



3. **It could be reemphasized that possible transfer of chemical weapons to non-state entities belonging to countries party to the CWC would be a violation of the CWC.** No citizen of a state party can participate in activities counter to the treaty. So, for example, Lebanon would have to act under the CWC in case of a transfer of chemical agents to Hezbollah;
4. **Regarding many foreign people fighting in Syria, if any return to their home country and can be proven to have been associated with chemical weapon activities, each home country should apply their national implementation legislation to fullest for violation of CWC provisions.**
5. Most importantly, **the international community should press for an expansion of the mandate of the UN investigating team**, which includes OPCW and WHO experts (there is a team ready to go). Their mandate should not be limited to Syrian territory, and should include testing of people who have left Syria and claim exposure. This would allow collecting testimonies and medical evidence in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Some expressed concern that Ban Ki-moon perhaps moved too soon, and should have negotiated the terms of reference first.
6. **Political statements about ‘red lines’ over chemical weapons use may have backfired.** Each side has made strong claims about possible use, without sufficient proof. There are, for example, many Free Syria Army videos “all over You Tube” claiming chemical weapons use, appealing to the US to help. This framing of the debate is a direct consequence of the Obama red line. It is further confused since the consequences of crossing such a red line have not been made explicit. Three of the countries supporting the claims are members of the UNSC.
7. Some suggest that a **Chapter 7 resolution might be useful, requiring Syria to admit inspectors for both future and past activities.** Regardless of the past accusations, this might be “the one step to help in the future.” Others question whether this is too “heavy handed” and whether it is feasible given the lack of consensus among the P5. One participant said, “The fact Russia will refuse is not a reason not to ask.”

One participant said that since the Assad regime has chemical weapons, and appears quite capable of using them, it is urgent to stop cornering the regime to stop it from resorting to such tools for its existence. It was also noted, however, that there has not been a single report of a hit on chemical weapons storage sites. Some believe Russia has been pressuring Syria positively in this respect, and that both sides are communicating about this and they are aware of and respecting ‘no go’ areas. The existence of these chemical weapons stocks may provide an imperative for a smooth transition from the Assad regime.

Some believe the emphasis on determining whether or not chemical weapons were used on 150 people has detracted from the fact that each day that many people are dying in this conflict.

Some expressed strong concern that the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention may be undermined by the political manipulation of the issue of chemical use in Syria, and of the so far inadequate technical process of verifying the use or otherwise of chemical weapons in combat in



Syria. This may have serious repercussions for the Chemical Weapons Convention and for other arms control agreements going forward.

## Geneva II

Getting to the negotiating table is urgent. One participant noted that 80% of the deaths in Syria have already happened since Geneva I. Some believe the talks should switch focus from removing Assad to getting Assad to stop killing his own people as a matter of urgency.

1. Some believe it is critical to **revisit the Geneva communique<sup>2</sup>**, which was a comprehensive and clear call to negotiations.
2. **There is an urgent demand for an international conference with everyone present and with no preconditions**, and with pressure on every side participating in the war. “All players should go, no matter how much blood is on their hands,” said one person.
3. **Some believed the Syrian National Coalition will need to be forced to accept an end to violence**. They say there is little to no support for the Syrian National Council or the opposition coalition, which are seen as Western constructs with few links to people in Syria and little legitimacy. By not including Christians or Kurds, for example, this is “dividing, not assisting.” The international community bears some responsibility for the increasing polarization of the conflict in Syria by forcing the opposition to identify one representative. And yet, one person noted that if the opposition goes to Geneva with 10 delegations, and the regime has one, the regime “will win.”
4. **Some think it best to go ahead without the opposition for the first meeting**. Many diplomats believe the Syrian opposition is the main problem in convening Geneva II.
5. **Negotiations should focus on details about the transition**, including identifying people from the current regime who can be involved in ensuring a transition while also guaranteeing accountability for the ‘perpetrators’.
6. **An international consensus from Geneva II that violence will not solve the problem could be a step forward**. An end to the violence is essential.
7. **Some say the vision is a political settlement along the lines of Kofi Anan’s plan**, starting with the end to the bloodshed.
8. **The Assad regime is brutal, but it must go peacefully**, said one participant. However, others believe strongly that the key figures of the Assad regime and their collaborators cannot stay. To one Syrian participant, the most important question is to try to identify who from the regime will stay to hold the state together for the transition. “Perpetrators cannot be part of the solution,” said one Syrian participant, who noted that documented crimes against humanity will need to be addressed. However, another person cautioned against over-emphasis on questions like does Assad go before or after a transition, saying “he is not worth” 60,000 – 80,000 lives.
9. Some believe that **firm “red lines” are needed**, and may be more important than the questions of whether arms are sent to the opposition. Others disagreed.
10. “The results of **negotiations should be decided based on the needs and priorities of the people, not the warlords**,” said one participant.

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<sup>2</sup> Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué, 30.06.2012

<http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf>



11. **A Marshall-type plan for Syria is currently lacking** from all talks. Such a plan can be a “light at the end of the tunnel” and help provide an incentive for the different parties in Syria to move forward. A plan for internal rebuilding of the infrastructure after two years of fighting, and addressing the needs of the displaced population is also urgent. However, some pointed out that Western countries would be very reluctant to invest money at this moment for a Marshall plan for Syria.
12. While the first stage will need to be an end to the violence and formation of a coalition, the country also needs to be prepared for the second stage, where a constitution will be written, building a new “social contract.”

### **Post conflict society**

Syria is a multicultural nation with a complex history that has left various parties with a historical feeling of social injustice. Emphasis should be focused on promoting non-violent means to express needs and desires and ways in which to peacefully manage the conflict.

People in Syria want some sort of change, and they want the cessation of all sorts of armed conflict. This has to be the basis of a lasting solution for the country, based on civil co-existence. However, many emphasize the need to avoid revenge attacks and to ensure some sort of accountability, even if steps are incremental.

The discussion should change instead toward what a dictatorship means, and in moving the power of the presidency to a coalition government. “If you force a dictator to share power, then he is not a dictator anymore,” said one participant.

The vast majority of Syrians, including family loyalists, no longer want the current regime, which is “politically dead.” But the emphasis should not focus on particular players. Some believe that there is an absence of political thinking by the opposition on how to how to change the regime, and that they are looking too much to the international community for a solution. The political strategy of the Syrians is “difficult to discern.” Some groups, like the Kurds, have put forward some ideas, but some question if these can be applied more broadly.

Some strongly object to characterizing the problem as being sectarian, as it can oversimplify the many parameters by which people describe themselves—social class, tribe, etc. One person said the majority of Syrians are willing to fight for the Syrian state as defined 100 years ago. Others point out that there seems to be an increasing trend that people are now suffering for their religious/ethnic connotations where in the past this was mostly if they were opposed to the regime.

1. **The importance of working with the local coordinating committees in preserving Syrian society was stressed.** The Syrians present said they are more legitimate than the SNC and have good links with civil society/are part of civil society. Their role in reconstruction will be vital, and yet these local committees on the ground are being neglected. There is a need to look carefully at who the world and Syrians will be dealing with in the future.
2. **Existing networks should be utilized.** Syria does not have a tradition of a strong civil society. It has never had a third option beyond the “street versus the army.” Since the conflict, however, the “space has opened up” and there are now networks that are being ignored by



the outside world. While it is extremely difficult it is “not impossible,” said one participant, to identify whom to support in Syrian civil society.

3. **Overcoming sectarianism will be important.** One participant felt strongly that words such as “minority,” “majority,” and “sects” should be banned from the general discourse and that more emphasis needs to be on “citizenship.” However, others point out it is difficult not to acknowledge and address the fact that the sectarian divides have been increasingly exacerbated and various communities feeling vulnerable whether Sunni, Shia, Allawite, Christian, Kurdish, etc.
4. **Not enough attention is being paid to the various visions about the future of Syria as a unitary society.** “What does winning mean?” asked one participant. Is it a civil war, with one side a victor and the other a loser? Is the goal to reconsolidate under either a Sunni or Shia leadership? Is the goal a unitary society? What are the goals of the various sides? The question must become, how to get these parties together to identify a similar vision of the future.
5. **Outside actors don’t share the same vision for Syria’s future** (US-Russia; Saudi Arabia-Iran; Iran – Hezbollah; AlQaeda, etc). “There are a number of players that have something more important to them than peace” in Syria, said one participant. Someone else pointed out that in the end, this will play out, maybe in 5-10 years, and outside parties will “eventually cut a deal over Syrian heads.”

#### **Options for UK and Western policy**

The UK and Western governments are trying to respond to the Syrian crisis, but are reacting in ways that can further exacerbate the crisis. In most capitals, policy makers are genuinely perplexed as to the best way forward. In the UK, the government has expressed intention lift the arms embargo. Many – but not all - in our meeting questioned whether sending more arms and ammunition will help the Syrian people.

1. **Before lifting the embargo, the UK government should outline a clear strategy for what it hopes to achieve** by sending weapons, beyond using this as a tool to bring sides to the negotiating table.
2. **The UK government should uphold its pledge to have a full debate on the issue of sending arms.** While the prime minister is committed to sending arms, it was noted that 80+ Conservative MPs objected. Parliamentary debate should include greater transparency on whether or the UK will supply military training or other means of support short of supplying weaponry.
3. **The UK government should encourage all sides to be present at Geneva II**, including importantly, Iran.
4. **The UK government (along with other Western governments) must respond to the ‘war weariness’** their populations are experiencing. Using appeals of some humanitarian groups as an indicator, the public is not responding. Some believe this dynamic would change if governments were seen to be investing resources in a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
5. **Agreeing to cut the flow of ammunition** to both sides might prove a useful place to start. However, others say this is not enough and not politically viable as the regime can survive for six months without additional ammunition. A cut of ammunition flow – either



announced or done quietly - could be combined with pressure for a ceasefire for a short time.

6. **A commitment for no violence** is most important. According to one participant, in the past two years, the only time when there was a dramatic drop in casualties (from 150 to five per day), was during a ceasefire. It did not last long enough, however, due to the lack of international monitors. Even if ceasefires are “never watertight” they can provide “a breather” and a time during which some progress can be made.
7. **Chapter Six of the UN Charter could be invoked** in conjunction with a negotiated ceasefire and monitors. (It was noted that Brahimi does not currently have mandate to send monitors for a ceasefire, while Anan did have that mandate.)
8. **Sealing the borders** might help, especially the Turkish border.
9. **A no-fly zone** might cut down casualties (though this too will lead to some casualties in enforcement). Some see this as unlikely given Russian opposition. In this case, said one participant underlining the need for greater dialogue among all parties, “convince them.”
10. **Russian and Iranian views and concerns need to be better understood.** The UK and others need to explore further what Russia will ask, whether some sort of guarantee for Assad, etc. If this is not acceptable, said one participant, then all parties bear the responsibility for the continuing loss of life.
11. **The international community could reemphasize they will have no international confrontation with each other on Syrian land.**
12. **The UK and other countries could make better use of the EU**, which has a fairly good presence in Beirut and regular shuttles to Damascus.
13. **The G20 meeting in September is another opportunity for progress**, as this could bring in Iran, Israel, etc.
14. **The UK and others could make better use of Israel’s “powerful” ties with Russia.** It was noted that Israel is not interested in further escalation of the violence in Syria, and that some influential Russians in Israel could be brought into the debate..
15. **Many believe that in the end, the only lasting solution will be one in which all sides in Syria and including civil society, will be involved.** This can be pushed now, or after several more years of fighting and destruction. The UK and other Western governments have not yet demonstrated the political will needed to push a lasting resolution of the crisis at this time. Meanwhile, there is a sense that the international community continues to miss opportunities and that such moments may not come again for a very long time.  
**The UK and the international community need to explore options to increase the prospects for real discussion among Syrians regarding the political future of the country.** It was noted that their conflict resolution capabilities in the Middle East are very low at the moment. The outside parties need to carefully explore how to encourage this dialogue without emphasizing one party over another. This may prove difficult since, as one participant noted, “the self-discipline of the international community is not forthcoming.” It was noted that there have been several such initiatives underway, and quite a few Syrians are working on these scenarios, but not many inside Syria currently are engaged due to complicated logistical issues. These discussions “have to get outside of the hotel lobbies,” said one participant.



## Conclusion

Repeatedly participants emphasized the need for and urgency of developing a better articulated political strategy among the Syrian opposition and outside powers. The militarization of what began as a political and peaceful protest has detracted focus from those civil society groups in Syria who seek to create a peaceful and inclusive future for their country. To the extent possible, all parties should be encouraged and induced to drawing back from violence, since at the end of the day – whether in the near term or after several more years of death and destruction – only a political solution can provide the basis for the future society. Pugwash was urged to hold further track II dialogues on these issues and including a range of international participants.



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## Pugwash Consultation on the Syrian Crisis

27 June 2013, 2:00 – 5.30 pm

One Birdcage Walk, Westminster  
London, SW1H 9JJ

### Final Participant List

Rime Allaf	Syrian writer and adviser
Athem Alsabti	Iraqi Pugwash
Julien Barnes-Dacey	European Council and Foreign Relations
Nomi Bar-Yaacov	Foreign policy adviser on Middle Eastern affairs
Martin Butcher	Oxfam
Sandra Butcher	Pugwash Conferences (International Secretariat)
Poul-Erik Christiansen	International Student/Young Pugwash
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino	International Pugwash Secretary General
Chris Doyle	The Council for Arab-British Understanding
John Finney	International Pugwash Executive Committee, former Chair UK Pugwash
Lord David Hannay	Chair, All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, former ambassador/permanent representative to the UN
Rosemary Hollis	City University, London
Michael Keating	Chatham House, former UN Deputy Envoy to Afghanistan
Dominic Mauro-Todd	International Student/Young Pugwash
Scarlett MccGwire	Communications consultant
Roberta Mulas	International Student/Young Pugwash
Alan Semo	Democratic Union Party (PYD)
Nadim Shehadi	Chatham House
Rim Turkmani	Dorothy Hodgkin Research Fellow, Royal Society; Imperial College London
Marc Vogelaar	Former Ambassador to Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Christopher Watson	Chair UK Pugwash
Jean Pascal Zanders	The-Trench.org; Former Senior Research Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS)

*For more information about our activities and related meeting reports, please see [www.pugwash.org](http://www.pugwash.org)*





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27 June 2013, 2:00 – 5.30 pm  
(coffee/tea/light refreshments from 1.30)

One Birdcage Walk, Westminster  
London, SW1H 9JJ

### **Provisional Agenda**

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|---------|--|
| 1.30 pm | Coffee/Tea/Light refreshments  |
| 2.00 pm | Welcome & introductions, Pugwash Secretary General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino  |
| 2.15 pm | Current overview (brief introduction by Rime Allaf) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• the course of the conflict so far</li><li>• conflicting interests of outside parties</li><li>• dangers of further regional destabilization</li></ul>   |
| 2.45 pm | Claims of chemical weapons use (brief introduction by Jean Pascal Zanders) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• assessment of claims of chemical weapons use</li><li>• appropriate mechanisms the international community can use to verify such claims</li></ul>   |
| 3.15 pm | Coffee break   |
| 3.30 pm | Policy options (brief introduction by Martin Butcher) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• policy questions raised by the UK government's recent support for lifting the EU arms embargo, as well as other external actors' supplies of arms to belligerents;</li><li>• ways in which ceasefires, withdrawal of arms supplies, etc. might assist with a political solution to address the need and interests of all parties to the conflict</li><li>• prospects for a political solution and the proposed Geneva conference (including the diplomatic process and the battle of wills leading up to setting the agenda for Geneva).</li></ul> |
| 5.00 pm | Wrap up and looking forward <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What, if anything, can be done by the international community &amp; Track II dialogue?</li></ul>   |