

Statement at the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

Remarks

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I am pleased to have the opportunity to join you in Berlin for this conference and specifically to discuss progress on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Last month, I spoke at the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in Vienna. I will convey to you the same words I said there which were: "I would like to assure you of President Obama's unshakeable commitment to ratification of the CTBT by the United States and its entry into force at the earliest possible date."

When President Obama spoke in Prague in April 2009 about "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," among the many steps he said the United States would take to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, was the pursuit of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

U.S. ratification of the CTBT is in our national security interest. As stated in the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review: "Ratification of the CTBT is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear disarmament."

The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992, in keeping with our moratorium on nuclear testing. Thus, as a practical matter, our policies and practices are consistent with the central prohibition of the Treaty. But ratification of the CTBT would be a significant affirmation of the importance the United States attributes to the international nonproliferation regime and, when the Treaty enters into force, to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in international security.

The U.S. can maintain a safe and effective nuclear deterrent without conducting explosive nuclear tests, but would-be proliferators could not develop, with confidence, advanced nuclear weapon designs without

conducting an explosive nuclear test. The CTBT would subject suspected violators to the threat of intrusive on-site inspections and, if warranted, international sanctions.

Much has changed since the U.S. Senate declined to provide its consent to ratification of the CTBT in 1999. At that time the Senate expressed concerns about the verifiability of the Treaty and the continuing safety and reliability of America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.

Today, we have a much stronger case to make in support of ratification.

In Vienna last month, I complimented the PrepCom, its member States, and the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat on the great progress made toward establishing the Treaty's verification regime in the last decade.

In 1999, the International Monitoring System (IMS) existed only on paper. Today, the IMS is roughly 85 percent complete and, when completed, there will be IMS facilities in 89 countries spanning the globe.

Although operating only in test mode, a partially constructed IMS demonstrated its capabilities by providing important timely data to the Treaty's State Signatories on the 2006 and 2009 announced nuclear tests conducted by North Korea.

While the CTBT's verification system was designed to detect nuclear explosions, data from the IMS is valuable for other purposes. In fact, the CTBT State Signatories agreed to allow the limited use of IMS data for disaster mitigation purposes. This proved particularly valuable recently when data from IMS seismic and hydroacoustic stations were available to tsunami warning centers that provided warnings of the tsunami generated by the recent massive earthquake in Japan.

In addition, following the Fukushima nuclear reactor release, radioactive particulates and gases were detected at every operational radionuclide monitoring station in the Northern Hemisphere within ten days, demonstrating the effectiveness and sensitivity of this part of the IMS.

At entry into force of the Treaty, the full body of technical data gathered via the IMS will be available to all States Parties. This will enable us to fulfill our shared obligation to enforce the global ban on nuclear explosive testing, a nonproliferation goal we all seek.

The United States has increased its participation in all of the Preparatory Commission's activities in preparation for the entry into force of the CTBT, especially with respect to the effective implementation of the Treaty's verification regime. U.S. technical experts are working closely with their counterparts in

collaborative efforts to improve the capabilities of the global International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre.

After an eight-year absence, U.S. experts since 2009 have been fully engaged in further developing the On-Site Inspection element of the verification regime, both from policy and technical perspectives. The United States has also continued to bear the full costs of operating, maintaining, and sustaining the 34 certified stations of the 37 stations of the International Monitoring System assigned by the Treaty to the United States. These actions tangibly demonstrate the commitment of the United States to prepare for the entry into force of this Treaty.

I would like to take this opportunity to note that EU member states are also contributing significantly in this regard with 41 certified stations of the 45 stations that they host. The continued operations and maintenance of the IMS serves as a confidence building measure in the capabilities of the verification system and the ability of the CTBTO to operate and maintain a global monitoring network.

With regard to our nuclear deterrent, in 1999, there were legitimate questions regarding our ability to maintain in the absence of explosive testing the long term reliability of our nuclear weapons as they age.

Today, through the extensive surveillance methods and computational modeling developed under the Stockpile Stewardship Program over the past 15 years, our nuclear experts understand how these weapons work and the effects of aging better than when explosive nuclear testing was conducted.

Last November, the President made an extraordinary commitment to ensure the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure. The investment of more than \$85 billion over the next decade in science and technology and stockpile reliability demonstrates our commitment to modernize the U.S nuclear weapons complex that supports our deterrent so that it continues to be safe, secure and effective.

While working toward the entry into force of the CTBT, the United States will continue its nearly two-decade long moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We call on all other governments to declare or reaffirm their intention not to test.

In anticipation of the ratification effort, the Administration commissioned a number of reports, including an updated National Intelligence Estimate and a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report to assess the ability of the United States to monitor compliance with the Treaty and the ability of the United States to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal in the absence of explosive nuclear testing. A public version of the NAS report is expected to be released soon. These authoritative reports, together with others, will help to inform the Senate's assessment of the CTBT.

Our recent experience working with the U.S. Senate to gain their advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation has prepared us for the debate over the CTBT. We do not expect it will be easy or happen quickly, but we will work hard to make it happen.

Ratification of the CTBT by the United States will encourage other states to sign and ratify the Treaty, including those remaining States whose ratifications are necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. An in force CTBT will deter states from testing nuclear weapons and raise the costs for any state that might choose to pursue a testing program.

It is important to note that all members of the EU have ratified the CTBT. And today, EU members are actively encouraging other states to ratify the Treaty; thereby advancing its universality and getting us closer to the goal of entry into force.

If nuclear testing is prohibited, other countries will be constrained in their ability to develop new, advanced nuclear weapons and modernize their existing arsenals. A legally binding ban on nuclear testing is an essential step on the path toward a world without nuclear weapons. The national security of the United States, and all states, will be enhanced when CTBT enters into force.

Thank you for inviting me to join you today.